Refugees in a camp in Colombia, Source: Wikimedia Commons
In April 2017
the Venezuelan opposition began a major campaign of street protests against the
government of President Nicolás Maduro. For four months, riot police and the
National Guard clashed almost every day with thousands of protesters on the
streets of Caracas and other Venezuelan cities.
Armed pro-government civilians,
loosely referred to as “collectives”, also played a role. The death toll was roughly
one a day, with many of the victims young demonstrators caught up in what human
rights organizations called “excessive use of force” by the security forces.
According to the
government’s account of events, by August, “peace” had returned to the streets.
The opposition campaign, under the leadership of the Democratic Unity (MUD)
coalition, had failed.
Among other things, it had sought to force the
government to re-establish the powers of the National Assembly (AN, the single-chamber
parliament that has been in opposition hands since January 2016), and hold fair
and transparent presidential elections.
Today, the images of Venezuelans that appear in the international press are not of masked protesters throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. They are of refugees crossing borders with the few possessions they are able to carry.
Instead, Maduro summoned a Constituent
Assembly, boycotted by the MUD , which has functioned ever since its creation as
the supreme legislative body in the government’s eyes. The National Assembly was
rendered impotent.
Today, the
images of Venezuelans that appear in the international press are not of masked
protesters throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. They are of refugees crossing
borders with the few possessions they are able to carry, often with children in
their arms. They sleep in the streets of Colombian and Brazilian cities and
search for health care in the overcrowded hospitals of neighbouring countries.
On 30 July, the 545-member,
all-chavista Constituent Assembly was elected in a process that violated the principle of
“one person = one vote”. The National Electoral Council, which is controlled by
the government, was accused of doctoring turnout figures. Two days later, so
many Venezuelan refugees were arriving at the Colombian border that the queue to
cross was seven hours long.
Around 600,000
people crossed the border in 2017, of whom, according to Save the Children, 48%
were minors. For many of those fleeing, all hope of resolving the country’s
predicament in the short term had vanished. At the same time, the crisis itself
had evolved from being a largely internal matter to a concern for the entire region.
A presidential
election will be held on 20 May, but it is unlikely to break the deadlock. The
date was decided unilaterally by the government, wrecking negotiations under
way at the time in the Dominican Republic between government and opposition over
election conditions.
Half the countries in the region, including the US and
Canada, as well as the EU, have already declared that they will not recognise
the result of this “illegitimate” poll . Only a small faction of the
opposition, headed by the former governor of Lara state, Henri Falcón, has
agreed to take part.
The opposition
is split into three main blocks. Aside from Falcón and his supporters, those
who refuse to participate in the elections include a number (mainly associated
with the parties that dominate the National Assembly) who still insist on
negotiating a solution, while another faction
has formed the Soy Venezuela movement, which is demanding the immediate
resignation of Maduro and calling for a “humanitarian intervention”.
This term
is an evident smokescreen for military intervention, the consequences of which could
include even greater suffering for the civilian population. But it is also true
that, thus far, negotiations with the government have only managed to prove its
bad faith.
In our most
recent report, International Crisis Group analyses the impact of Venezuela’s
implosion on the rest of the region. It is not only a migratory crisis: the
country that used to export almost nothing but oil now exports disease,
organised crime, political instability and economic contraction.
For now, the
outside world can only deal with the symptoms: putting an end to the crisis and
finding a lasting solution depends on substantive negotiations, which will not
be possible without the assistance of foreign governments and multilateral
organisations. The economy is also in need of external assistance, as much
bilateral as multilateral, as well as private investment.
It will not be
easy to achieve. Venezuela’s government leaders fear, with good reason, that
they could lose everything if they leave power. Until now, the main effect of
external pressure in the form of individual sanctions imposed by the US and the
EU, as well as more general financial sanctions imposed solely by Washington,
has been to further entrench them.
And internal pressure has been extinguished almost
completely following the splintering of the opposition, reducing the cost to
the government of maintaining itself in power.
Typically, governments facing such dire economic turmoil do not survive, but there is no alternative currently in sight.
The absolute
priority now is to deal with the humanitarian crisis, not only by assisting
refugees and the countries which take them in, but also by finding innovative
ways of alleviating the extreme hardship inside Venezuela which is driving the exodus.
But neither government nor opposition should use humanitarian intervention as a
political weapon.
Second, governments
of the region must find a way to apply sanctions, even when their own legislation
does not permit them simply to copy those implemented by the US, Canada, the EU
and other countries. It is vital that Latin America and the Caribbean take on
the responsibility of helping restore democracy in Venezuela.
Sanctions should
continue to be primarily individual, and their lifting must be conditioned on a
return to the negotiating table and concrete steps towards a democratic
restoration.
Sanctions alone
will not produce change. A coordinated political campaign that is both
persistent and creative is necessary. For example, it is worth exploring the
possibility of convincing the Chinese government to persuade its ally Maduro to
engage in serious negotiations. Beijing has refused to lend Venezuela more
money for some time, but if it wishes to protect its investments there, it
should consider adopting a more proactive approach.
The country has already entered a hyperinflationary
cycle. Annual inflation could easily reach 300,000% by the end of 2018 if there
is no change of policy after the elections. The government is merely paying a
portion of its external debt: it has already
defaulted to the tune of more than $3 billion.
Typically, governments facing
such dire economic turmoil do not survive, but there is no alternative
currently in sight. Chavismo has turned the rationing of subsidised foods into
a mechanism for social and political control, even though these state provisions
are insufficient to assuage people’s hunger.
It is essential to prevent a
further deterioration of the situation, while avoiding what may seem like easy
solutions in the shape of an oil embargo, or worse, a military intervention.
Inaction however, is not an option.