Grand national assembly of Turkey main chamber. Wikicommons/VOA. some rights reserved.In politics, a Hot Potato is a topic so contentious
that it causes damage to a candidate whether he shows himself to be for it or
not. For a campaign to be successful, so argue strategists, such issues are
best to be avoided altogether, or, better yet deflected onto the opposing candidate.
The term evolved
from a nineteenth century game, in which participants would sit in a circle and
pass a lighted match, piece of paper, or candle around until the flame burnt
someone’s fingers. The group would then choose an embarrassing or painful
challenge for the loser to perform. In later times the flame was substituted
with a hot potato, but the lesson remained the same. Try not to burn your
fingers. Perhaps the most poetic part was the accompanying rhyme: “Jack’s alive
and likely to live. If he dies in your hand you’ve a forfeit to give”.
As Parliament
convened on June 23, the only forfeit to give was power. And while the
elections have been correctly identified as a victory for identity politics,
the ensuing political instability is likely to continue, as any coalition
government will have to assume the costs of the AKP’s looming financial debt
crisis.
The crossroads at
which Turkey now stands has given rise to the paradoxical situation in which
everyone wants to rule, yet no party wants to assume the potentially devastating
cost of taking responsibility for the fallout from AKP policies. Even the
appointment of a commonly agreed parliamentary speaker is fraught with risk.
Either the parties find common ground quickly, or let the clock run out and
allow the AKP to keep the prestigious seat.
As the parties
pass around the Hot Potato of forming a coalition, the parliamentary system
risks becoming the scapegoat for a lack of political momentum. Already rumors
and conspiracy theories abound, with some speculating that the AKP deputies
will vote to keep the HDP speaker candidate in the race, so as to fragment the
opposition and present itself as a center alternative. A risky strategy no
doubt, and if nothing else, one that serves as a clear indicator of the
unpredictability of current events.
In the hours
following the election results, AKP Deputy Burhan Kuzu, head of the
parliamentary constitution committee, described the outcome as an indicator of
‘the weakness of the parliamentary system’. Although better known for his
colorful outbursts, which include claims that Angela Merkel’s skiing injury was
retribution for the Gezi protests, his argument that parliament is weak
contains a hidden truth.
Despite rumours about infighting within the
AKP political elite, a divided parliament may be Erdoğan’s best bet at returning to his
former prominence. Paralysis in parliament will inevitably make the Presidency
appear stronger, and may well shift the public’s sympathies back towards the
AKP. Add to this the memory of the chaotic 70s, during which Turkey saw more
than ten different coalitions try their hand at ruling the country, and it
becomes clear that the process of coalition forming will undoubtedly be imbued
with negative connotations.
The formation of
a coalition Government will be made harder as the adrenaline of a shock
election subsides. That the public has rejected the idea of an expanded
presidency, does not automatically entail an endorsement of the parliamentary
system, especially in a country that has become accustomed to strongman tactics
and lightning fast policy changes. With the gradual stagnation of Turkey’s
economy, the loss of investor trust following the graft scandal, and the social
costs of increasing unemployment and rising inflation, the challenge for any
coalition will be to provide fast results, and to pin the crises on the AKP,
rather than being crushed under the weight of the aforementioned issues.
Add to that the
uncertainties of foreign policy, the security challenges in the Middle East,
and the already vastly increased Presidential influence in international
politics, and it becomes clear that the formation of a coalition Government is
to no party’s immediate benefit. That does not take away that the moment is
ripe for political and economic reform, and that the window of opportunity for
meaningful change has not closed. Certainly, the AKP has suffered a significant
setback, but it means that the coalition building process must be faced with
caution if the opposition wishes to maximize the electoral advantage that it currently
enjoys.
The dilemma is as follows. On the one hand,
the elections have re-energized the parliamentary system, saving it from a
stifling decade-spanning majority rule. For the first time since the inception
of the AKP, the party finds itself forced to consider forming a coalition in
order to govern. On the other hand, the political maneuvering required to
achieve a coalition agreement will no doubt paralyze the country’s obligations
to engage with pressing economic and foreign policy issues, and may yet quell
Turkey’s newfound enthusiasm for parliamentary politics.
Some have put
their hopes on a new coalition without the AKP. Yet this poses the problem that
a new Government will inherit the woes of the current administration, and would
likely shoot Erdoğan straight back into power during the next election cycle.
To enter into a non-AKP coalition would hence seem political suicide. And yet
any party that joins an AKP coalition will find it difficult to live up to the
promise of change.
The HDP knows it
cannot risk to dampen the momentum of the current wave of enthusiasm,
especially considering that its real success was in capturing a large part of
the Kurdish vote from the AKP, and not in the heralded consolidation of the
supposed post-Gezi liberal vote. Here too, a paralyzed parliament will not be
able to bring about any change in the Kurdish issue, and will make it difficult
for the HDP to retain its strategic advantage in the long term.
On the other hand,
if the AKP chooses to strengthen its conservative base by forming a coalition
with the nationalist MHP, it risks losing the Kurdish vote for good. In sum, as
the parties pass the Hot Potato to avoid looking weak in the coalition
negotiations, they risk losing the momentum required to bring about lasting
change.
If the opposition
parties want to retain the momentum that translated into electoral gains, they
need to have the courage to accept these challenges, and to prove that they can
provide an alternative to the strongman tactics that have come to define the
AKP political style. To transform the current optimism into a working
government will require caution, strategy, and most of all the ability to
formulate a new vision for Turkey that both recognizes the breadth of the
challenges at hand, without succumbing to the politics of polarization.
This then, is
both the pitfall as well as the potential of parliamentary politics; that the
parties have a chance to embrace cooperation, reject polarization, and prove
that the prospect of forming new coalitions is no Hot Potato, but rather an
opportunity to steer Turkey back towards social cohesion and economic progress.