Picture from “The Banners of Occupied Kfar Nabel” page on Facebook. Amnesty
International’s
report
on mass hangings is a harrowing reminder of Assad’s tyranny.
Torture, sexual
violence, attacks on medical
facilities, and murder and atrocities
are all components of a calculated
brutality that has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions,
and caused untold misery.
The
decade leading up to the outbreak of war in Syria saw progress in
market liberalisation and growth. Though lagging behind most other
Arab nations, economic
freedom
and human
development
improved and per capita income grew by 15%, with income levels higher
than many neighbouring states (New
Maddison Project Database).
Per capita wealth doubled from $1,601 USD in 2000 to $3,283 USD in
2010 (Credit
Suisse, 2016).
Overall income inequality and the income share of the top 10% fell
(UNU-WIDER).
None of this delivered welfare and political liberalization. Millions
lived in poverty.
As
argued by Ronald Wintrobe in Rational
Extremism,
dictators hold power by a combination of loyalty to the regime and
repression. Rising incomes and crony capitalism helped Assad to
purchase the loyalty of some, whilst repressing the many. Civil
liberties
and political rights flatlined. CIRI
human rights data
show increased torture, extrajudicial killings, political
imprisonment, and disappearances in the years building up to 2011.
This deterioration arose from a sequence of conscious decisions
instigated by the Syrian state. For example, the Damascus
Declaration, a united platform of various opposition groups demanding
peaceful democratic reform, sent alarm bells ringing. A call for
democracy posed a major threat to Syria’s ruling elites. Assad
responded with repression. The brutality accelerated exponentially
with the Arab spring. In Wintrobe’s terminology, Assad’s goals
are indivisible: all or nothing, “Assad or we burn the country”.
As discussed by Robin Yassin-Kassab and Leila Al-Shami (e.g. in
Burning
Country),
brutality was employed to provoke a response; a political settlement
would work against the regime, so Assad opted for military
confrontation and civil war.
As
a rational extremist, Assad chose methods that would achieve his
goals. Rather than accommodating demands for political participation
and allowing civil society to flourish, Assad responded with
brutality and terror. With the aim to divide and rule, Assad
exploited ethnic and tribal rivalries and generated fear. Propaganda
portrayed all the opposition as terrorists. When the military tide
turned against the regime, Assad brought foreign nations to invade;
tyrants
bring the invaders.
Syrian and Russian military effort was primarily directed not at ISIS
but at weakening the moderate opposition and shifting the balance in
favour
of jihadists; the fruits of this have now
been realised.
While these were highly risky strategies, the pay-offs to Assad’s
survival have been enormous.
Options
for peace
In
an ideal world, Assad would pay for his crimes. However, his foreign
backers will prevent this. Exile to Russia or Iran is improbable. A
moderate rebel victory is now unlikely. Russia’s intervention
ensured that there is no regime change; without it Assad would today
be ousted. It is also unlikely that Syria could return to the
pre-2011 status quo. Unfortunately, a permanent occupation, with
Syria as an Iranian proxy facing an on-going Sunni funded jihadist
rural insurgency is not out of the question.
The
key elements for a lasting peace are obvious: protecting civilians,
supporting non-Baathists and non-jihadists, and fostering a
multi-ethnic pluralistic society. To be successful, the peace process
needs to appeal to the interests of several competing groups.
The
most pressing issue is the protection of civilians. This requires UN
and Russian backed safe zones, strict enforcement of ceasefire, and
an end to sieges and the forced removal of civilians.
In
all likelihood, Assad will need to stay in power for a fixed period,
e.g. via a constitution imposed presidential term-limit. In the
meantime, federalism offers a viable mechanism for peaceful
transition, with decentralized autonomy given to three or four
regions. This would buy political and economic space for various
competing groups. Western and Arab donors should provide monitored
aid to these regions in exchange for cessation of conflict and
improved governance and human rights. Autonomous regions could build
upon the civil society and grass roots developments (e.g. Local
Coordinating Committees) that emerged in the course of the rebellion
(see Burning
Country),
potentially serving as a model for the rest of Syria. Finally, there
will need to be continued struggle against radical jihadists and
ISIS.
Assad
cannot rule by repression alone. He relies on support from within
Syria as well as from Russia and Iran. Syria’s tribes
(e.g.
al-Zoubi, al-Masalmeh,
and Bani
Khalid) and
various ethnic communities (e.g. Alawites, Kurds, and Druze) have
played an important role for both the regime and the opposition and
need to be brought into the peace process. The Kremlin must urgently
use its political capital to convince Assad and Iran to implement
political reforms. Sanctions on Russia can be lifted in exchange,
with Ukraine supported through aid and subsidies; a democratic and
corruption free Ukraine is a better response to Russian aggression
than trade reducing sanctions.
Syrians
crave what all people want: to live in peace and dignity. The world
has a duty to protect all civilians and this is ultimately in our own
self-interest. An injury to one is an injury to all.