IS fighters in Raqqa with captured weapons, Jan 2014. AP Photo/Militant Website. All rights reserved.
The
anti-ISIS coalition is preparing a major ground offensive against ISIS to
recapture Mosul and, eventually, ISIS-declared capital Raqqa. However, any
armed victories will come with enormous costs for the locals and are unlikely
to bring mid- or long-term stability to the region.
What
will be won through arms is likely to be kept by further violence afterwards.
But what other long-term strategies could be considered? What lessons do other
historical struggles against totalitarians offer for fights with more
contemporary violent radicals? Do past struggles provide insights into
strategies other than military response? If so, what is the likelihood for
their application on the ground today and how?
Historical examples of
nonviolent strategies against totalitarians
In
the Second World War, the 75% of Jews in France, 90% of Jews in Mussolini
Italy, all of the Jews in Belgium, almost all of the Danish and Bulgarian Jews, and the few Jews in Poland that escaped the Holocaust
were rescued because
local populations refused to obey totalitarian henchmen. Most of these Jews
survived not because they fought with arms or were defended by arms, but
because ordinary people engaged in individual and collective, sustained and
organized, nonviolent noncooperation with Nazi extermination orders.
The East German state eventually collapsed because the very force that the Berlin Wall was built to counter—the exodus of people—was let loose
At
the same time that Jews were being slaughtered by the Nazis but also saved
through nonviolent means, Norwegian teachers and other workers refused to join
state-sanctioned trade unions, and carried out noncooperation and deliberate
inefficiencies in their daily work as a form of resistance against their own
fascist political leadership—headed by the Nazi collaborator Vidkun Quisling.
Nonviolent resisters were arrested and fired from their jobs, and some were
sent to the concentration camps in the Artic. They persevered; helped by the
underground solidarity networks. Eventually, faced with this sustained refusal
to obey, the Quisling regime had no choice but to give up on the realization of
a corporative state in Norway.
Almost
five decades later, in 1989, one of the most destructive and repressive
totalitarian systems that ever existed, the Soviet Union, imploded largely
peacefully from inside. Its relatively quiet demise was brought about not
through greater violent power, but as a result of domestic grassroots
nonviolent mobilization and the resistance of ordinary people. This nonviolent
mobilization and resistance was compounded by the transnational assistance to
nonviolent actors, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, and international
containment of the totalitarian Soviet threat within its borders. The
containment strategy, articulated in 1946 by George Kennan,
the minister-counselor at the US embassy in the Soviet Union, aimed to contain
the Soviet Union’s expansionist ideology and hold back spread of its influence
through defensive alliances as well as nonmilitary “long-range policies,”
including political, economic, and cultural “counter-force.”
One
of the linchpin statelets for the Soviet Union’s Iron Curtain, East Germany—propped
up by its feared and brutal secret police Stasi, was almost brought to its
knees by the beginning of the 1960s. This happened not because of the
advancement of NATO armies or the weakening of the Soviet power, but because
more than 3 million Germans left its territory before the Berlin Wall was
erected in 1961. The East German state eventually collapsed because the very
force that the Berlin Wall was built to counter—the exodus of people—was let
loose when Hungary opened its borders with Austria in May 1989 and thousands of
East Germans poured through Hungarian and Austrian territories, into the West
German lands. That exodus was the beginning of the end of the walled territory
behind the Iron Curtain.
Nonviolent strategies
against extremely brutal foes such as ISIS
No
single action by itself can dislodge totalitarians and pave the way for more
stable societies, but collective actions, like the multipronged, civilian-based,
and nonviolent strategies offered in the cited cases, can prove successful
against extremely violent groups, including non-state brutal actors such as
ISIS.
These
strategies consist of:
–
Containment that lets the henchmen rule and erode their own legitimacy in the
eyes of locals;
–
Grassroots noncooperation against totalitarians, including acts of subtle and
overt disobedience, deliberate inefficiencies, and underground solidarity
networks;
–
Protest migration by local people who neither want to join a violent group nor
an armed opposition, nor want to remain in place and accept their own
exploitation;
–
Setting up temporary relocation zones for those who decide to join protest
migration;
–
Transnational assistance to nonviolent activists and their civil resistance
actions in a violence-torn environment.
Any
of these strategies might be criticized as unrealistic or ineffective, but their
alternative—an armed campaign—has historically fared many times worse
than its nonviolent counterpart in dislodging brutal regimes, in reducing costs
on populations, or building stable political and socio-economic environments
after conflict has ended.
In
fact, military might has been successful against only 7% of
violent terror organizations. If nonviolent strategies seem impractical, it is even
greater naiveté to think armed solutions can be the answer.
Containment as a more
effective strategy than a ground assault
Traditionally,
containment is about the establishment of effective checks on the opponent's
ability for further political and military expansion and its financial and
ideological strangulation—short of all-out invasion of the territory the
opponent holds. However, more importantly, containment is about a preservation
of a civic space within the contained area, and denying an extremely violent
group the opportunity to carry out their atrocities in the midst of violent
conflict.
It
was on the eve of the Final Solution in March 1942 that Joseph Goebbels wrote: “Fortunately, a whole
series of possibilities presents itself for us in wartime that would be denied
us in peacetime.” In so many words, the Nazi propagandist was acknowledging the
fortuity of open violent warfare for Nazi plans of annihilating an ethnic and
religious group.
The
containment strategy aims to decrease the chances for such an open violent
conflict that advantages an opponent with genocidal and totalitarian instincts,
in favor of a stable though possibly repressive peace in the cordoned area. As
artificial and tyrannical as this stability is, in the long-term it privileges
the local population and creates a legitimacy crisis for its repressive rulers.
Even
though containment seemingly lets the oppressor rule without physical
intervention from outside, its main impact, although intangible at first, is to
create a fertile ground for the emergence of a genuinely grassroots
counterforce to the oppressor that, for its own long-term survival, must strive
to maintain its local legitimacy.
Why use weapons that ISIS knows so well? German Nazis were, like ISIS, experts in violence.
The
time and space that is given the oppressor, through containment, to govern and
abuse help reveal in the eyes of the local population inherent contradictions
in the ruler’s promises and actions. The violent rule is natively contradictory
when it claims that violence and repression are used for good; war for peace; prosecution
and death to protect life; abuses for security; bending law for rule of law.
These
hypocrisies are the source of inherent vulnerabilities in violent totalitarian
systems and groups, and undergird future legitimacy crisis.
According
to
Vaclav Havel, the Czech anti-communist dissident, the abusive ruler must stay
captive to his own lies in order to maintain his grip on power. The violent
regime “pretends not to possess an omnipotent and unprincipled police
apparatus. It pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to persecute no
one. It pretends to fear nothing. It pretends to pretend nothing.”
As
a consequence, the perceptions of local populations about such rule changes
with time as the contradictions and hypocrisies become increasingly obvious. In
those circumstances, the best weapon against violent regimes is to let them
rule as they inevitably mess things up for themselves. More often than not,
attacking a violent regime from the outside only gives it an alibi for its own
violence, and ineptitude.
A
similar legitimacy crisis reportedly
fuels resentment in Deir ez-Zor and other ISIS-controlled towns and cities, as
people begin to see ISIS corruption, incompetence, and repressive methods
directed not only against ‘non-believers’ but also against Sunni Muslims. This
behavior contradicts ISIS’ own promises and propaganda. The realization of
ISIS’ hypocrisies is in fact the main driver behind defections from ISIS. Many
who joined ISIS drawn by the promise of adventure, solidarity in arms, and
glory, defected because they felt
that they were used as cannon fodder, while no promised luxury goods (cars or
houses) ever materialized. Instead, these defectors came to see ISIS’
indiscriminate violence, and the pervasive corruption within the ISIS ranks
that privileges foreigners over Middle-Eastern fighters.
When
containment is rejected in favor of direct military intervention, the costs,
even of a successful violent campaign, reach prohibitive levels. The retaking of
Ramadi in Iraq from ISIS in December 2015 shows the perils of the armed
re-conquest of territory. The human toll, including mass displacements and infrastructure
damage, was so great that there is little
chance that the Iraqi government, strapped for cash,
will be able to rebuild, deliver services, or provide effective governance to
the city for months if not years to come. This destruction is a breeding ground
for a continued instability—where the governance vacuum is likely to be filled
in by violent (even if pro-government) groups of different stripes, jockeying
for power in the area.
Dependency and noncooperation
Michele Amoruso/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images. All rights reserved.
The
legitimacy crisis comes once reality falsifies violent groups’ promises for a
relatively better status quo than the one inherited from its predecessors. Once
this legitimacy crisis widens, the probability will increase for the local
population to engage in small and subtle acts of defiance and later, in more
mass-based, organized acts of nonviolent resistance.
It also demanded from civilians to sign over car titles and family houses as a security deposit before allowing locals to leave the territory, even for a brief two-week period.
Violent
groups such as ISIS clearly recognize the dangers that a legitimacy crisis
might bring. To reduce the chances of a crisis materializing, ISIS has established
a service-based governance on the conquered territories, serving more than five
million people. It has opened welfare institutions, and it runs schools,
orphanages, and bakeries. It has restored and provides some electricity, health
services, and sanitation. Its Islamic courts resolve disputes between citizens.
To avoid being undermined by accusation of hypocrisies, ISIS has demonstrated
that their members must practice what ISIS preaches. If found guilty of
robbery, adultery, homosexuality or smoking ISIS does not hesitate to punish its
own—even in public. Though this might sound surprising given the media
reports about ISIS atrocities, the violent group also provides a degree of
protection for the locals, both of their property and life.
This
type of work at the basis of society allows ISIS to maintain a relative
legitimacy, at least in the eyes of some local people, as the alternatives to
ISIS looks even less appealing or competent in ensuring security.
In
exchange for these services ISIS demands from the people under its rule three
things: absolute obedience to its authority, administrative and military
services if needed, and most importantly, taxes. In fact, ISIS introduced a sophisticated taxation system
that is estimated to bring almost the same if not greater
amount of revenue to the terror group than it receives from oil sales. It taxes
between 10% and 50% of income and business activity. 2,5% of tax is levied on
capital assets, 5% fee on bank cash withdrawals, and 20% of tax on spoils of
war, in addition to taxes on land or retail spaces. Residents of the
ISIS-controlled territory also pay their rulers for electricity,
cleaning and water. Even if bombings are able to dislodge ISIS oil production
and smuggling routes, this is unlikely to
put much of a dent in ISIS coffers as it can continue relying on the local
revenue that it receives from its people.
At
the same time, the payment of taxes and the estimated 30,000 local administrators
that make ISIS bureaucracy work, create strong dependency relations with the
local communities that the violent group must rely on to function. If the
population changed its patterns of obedience and engaged collectively in acts
of noncooperation this would constitute a major threat for ISIS and its
long-term survival on the territory.
As
a violent organization ISIS knows only too well how to deal with armed challenges
that it successfully and harshly suppressed in
the past. Why use weapons that ISIS knows so well? Consider German Nazis who,
like ISIS, were experts in violence. When imprisoned German officers were
interviewed, they noted that it was a relief to
them when the local resistance turned violent, as it allowed German troops to
deploy most drastic and indiscriminate measures to suppress the violent adversary.
What confused the Germans most was when populations used subtle and concealed
forms of nonviolent resistance. Nazis had little, if any, training and
experience in dealing with such elusive defiance.
Similarly,
resistance against ISIS could begin with subtle acts of disobedience (like refusal to send
children to ISIS controlled schools) and deliberate inefficiencies (potentially done by workers
that ISIS seeks to employ), as well as through building solidarity networks to
turn defiance into more open acts of noncooperation (like the business community in the Syrian city
of Minbij that went on strike in 2014 and closed down all
commercial activities in protest against ISIS), joined and coordinated by a greater
number of people. For such resistance to take place, civilians must have enough
open space to operate and organize which can only emerge if containment, rather
than territorial assault, is the prevalent strategy. As the recent outbursts of
civilian-led nonviolent protests in
the rebel-held areas in Syria suggest, even a fragile ceasefire can open the
door for civilians to organize and act.
Protest migration
The
North Korean regime is neither afraid of international sanctions, western
militaries, nor even pressure from its closest ally China. What the regime is
most afraid of is North Korean citizens and their actions. If China and South
Korea decided to make their respective borders wide open in order to give the
opportunity for millions of North Koreans to escape—no doubt the North Korean
soldiers would likely shoot at civilians though many might have joined the
exodus—the regime would not survive; leading to its collapse in the same way
and at the same speed as what happened to East Germany. North Korea has mined
and militarized its borders, not only to keep enemies out, but, more
importantly, to keep its people in.
People
leave conflict zones and escape territory under totalitarian rule. They do this
for personal reasons; to flee persecution and survive. They are victims that
seek rescue outside. However, an organized, mass-based migration from territory
under the yoke of violence can too be a bold political move of empowered people
making a conscientious decision to no longer be passive, and to no longer
accept violence or participation in violence against violence—nor do they want
to die. These people make a choice for a nonviolent action: migration in
protest against the violence that surrounds them. If done collectively, in an
organized manner and en masse this can be a powerful political statement
and a major disruption for the totalitarians.
In fact, there is a long tradition of protest migration in the Arab world going back to the time of the prophet Mohammed.
There
are historical examples of protest migration and collective purposeful
disappearance, where communities decided to move, and by doing so, stood up to
oppression and aggression as their actions increased costs for and placed a
significant burden on their opponents.
In
the first half of the nineteenth century, Algerians under the French colonial
yoke left the country in
thousands in protest against the rule of non-Muslims, land confiscation, and
military conscriptions. The scale of the exodus and its consequences for the
security of the region were so great that the French had to take measures to
reduce and stop the flow.
During
the Japanese occupation of China, whole villages would just disappear before
Japanese troops arrived. A contemporary to the Japanese invasion scholar of the
Chinese history, George Taylor, observed
“[s]o well organized are the villages now that when the Japanese approach, the
people evacuate the village completely, bury their food, remove all animals and
utensils, and retire into the hills. The Japanese must, therefore, bring with
them everything they need.”
In
fact, there is a long tradition of protest migration in the Arab world going
back to the time of the prophet Mohammed. The popular term – hijrat (or hegira
or hizrat) – deliberate migration – refers to the flight of the prophet
Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to escape persecution at the hands of
tyrannical tribes. Hardly powerless, the escapees then as they do today, can
constitute a major challenge for the violent groups.
And
this is exactly what ISIS is concerned with.
In
the fall of 2015, when protest migrations from ISIS controlled territory took
on a massive proportion, when thousands were leaving the area, ISIS went to great
lengths to stem the flow. They released a number of videos and
documents in which ISIS both appealed to and threatened those who
were thinking about leaving “Darul-Islam [land of Islam]” voluntarily. Such an act was called “a dangerous major sin
[kaba’ir].” To further discourage migration from its territory ISIS
additionally imposed exorbitant “departure taxes” on
the locals. It also demanded that civilians sign over car titles and family
houses as security deposits before allowing locals to leave the territory, even
for a brief two-week period.
Temporary relocation zones
While
ISIS makes extraordinary efforts to stop
the outflow of people from its territory it is determined to get all major
powers involved in open violent warfare against its Islamic fighters. There are
no pleas from ISIS to stop the bombing as there are for locals to stop leaving
ISIS territory. Western strategies of armed intervention are precisely what
ISIS wants, while no attention is being paid to what ISIS is truly worried
about.
By
the end of January 2016, the United States had spent more than $6 billion or
$11 million per day on
its bombing campaign against ISIS. The Pentagon also requested an additional $7.5
billion for the operations against ISIS in 201— twice as much as
the sum spent in 2016; a clear indication of the expanding military engagement
in preparation for retaking ISIS strongholds. Two US partners alone, Canada
and Britain, have each spent approximately $300 million
so far on their participation in the bombing raids against ISIS.
The
containment strategy would be much less expensive, freeing a considerable
amount—counted in billions of dollars—on
a strategy that ISIS is genuinely afraid of: setting up major relocation zones
designated specifically for civilians from the ISIS controlled territories. Such
zones, built by thousands of engineers and run by local civil servants would be
weapons-free areas (equivalent of peace zones or peace communities in Colombia, the Philippines or
Afghanistan) though protected by coalition troops and local forces.
Engineers could reinforce the zones by erecting humanitarian walls
around them as a nonviolent strategy to prevent infiltration by gunmen.
These
temporary relocation zones need not necessarily be large, if planned well –
less than 400 square miles (the area of the size of New York City that houses
almost 8 million people). The zones could be situated in relative proximity to
ISIS-controlled territory for easy access by civilians; close to the Turkish
border on the Syrian and Iraqi sides, which is under the control of the Kurdish
forces. Alternative areas for location of such zones could be sparsely
populated desert regions of southern Syria close to the Jordanian-Iraqi border,
far from violent groups and armed conflict but with access to the transportation
routes.
These
temporary relocation zones could become places for democratic self-governance,
honing leadership and self-organization skills by empowered civic actors and
for grassroots engagement free of violence.
In
contrast to safe havens, the zones should also be seen as a weapon against the
brutal enemy and not merely a protection against it. Emptying ISIS territory of
civilians – even if temporarily – will hollow out ISIS coffers, and ISIS ideological
and political control, allowing for a quicker defeat of ISIS with the lowest possible
loss of human life, limited destruction to infrastructure, and greater chances
for quicker rebuilding and a more stable environment afterwards.
Transnational assistance
While
states can take on the major burden of executing containment strategies as well
as setting up relocation zones, civil society organizations and the
international community, including the UN, could plan for delivering major
transnational assistance. Such assistance would aim to support the civilian
efforts on the ground to engage in nonviolent noncooperation to violent actors,
as well as helping those who would choose a protest migration to leave ISIS
territory.
In
each case, transnational assistance could be a combination of development and
humanitarian aid and know-how: including skills and strategies for organizing,
mobilizing and engaging in lower risk, often subtle and innovative, methods of
noncooperation and nonviolent defiance. This could build off of some of the
existing examples of noncooperation
and acts of disobedience in ISIS-controlled cities
before the conditions are ripe for more overt, mass-based civil resistance
actions such as open boycotts, demonstrations or general strikes.
In
addition, transnational assistance could aid constructive types of defiance,
including support for building schools and developing appropriate curricular
for children to counter radical Islamic teachings in the conflict zones, or
supporting defected lawyers and judges with developing a network of civic
courts – even if underground, where people could resolve their disputes and get
the recourse they seek while they boycott Islamic courts.
ISIS power and
vulnerabilities come from the local population
ISIS
recognizes the power of civilians under its control more so than the states
bent on fighting ISIS.
This
civilian power is untapped and disregarded, as people are seen only as victims or
the potential collateral damage of a ground armed invasion. In reality, the
civilian population, and more importantly its behavior patterns, can be the
keys to dislodging ISIS— while, at the same time, minimizing costs and loss of
human life, and creating post-conflict environments that are more conducive to
a more peaceful transition than any that armed strategies are likely to
deliver.