Unidos Podemos: Errejon, Bustinduy, Iglesias, Montero, Garzon, Mayoral, Bescansa after the results of Spain's national elections in June, 2016.Jimenez Rodrigo/Press Association. All rights reserved.Following decades of
social mobilization throughout the 1990s and 2000s premised on the idea of “changing
the world without taking power”, through building progressive alliances in
autonomous spaces, at a distance from the state, the emergence of 15-M in spring
of 2011 placed the unique character of the post-Franco ‘78 regime firmly on the
table.
This movement brought
to a popular and global consciousness not only the deep and damaging social
effects of the economic crisis in Spain, but a considerable political and
regime crisis. Both mainstream political parties (PP and PSOE) and the entire
political class were duly charged with a complete inability to represent the
people so mobilised (No nos representan).
In this way 15-M had the dramatic effect of reconnecting the question of
institutional change with social transformation. It aroused the desire to make
institutions work in the interest of a social majority.
The emergence of
Podemos in January 2014, and its surprising success in the 25 May European elections,
were seen as the long-awaited arrival of a project committed to channelling the
transformative spirit of 15-M into the institutional arena. Podemos’ European
elections program combined anti-austerity proposals with a critique of “bipartisanship”
to produce one of the most ambitious political programs it had formulated. The
unexpected electoral success and freshness of the message generated a wave of
optimism that culminated that summer with the creation of nearly 1,000 local
and sectorial assemblies (circulos)
across Spain. This early phase was characterized by a lack of formal
representation, a horizontality and decentralization, which saw the assemblies
(some naturally developed out of the neighborhood assemblies that came out of 15-M)
functioning completely autonomously.
This movement phase of the party came to an abrupt
end at the first state-wide assembly in Vistalegre (I) in October 2014, where
the formalization of the party’s structure became imperative and a choice
between models necessary. The model of the party-movement,
supported by Pablo Echenique and the anticapitalitas,
proposing a more horizontal formation, was defeated in the face of a united effort
from the main leading figures around an alternative. A more centralized and
hierarchical proposal, supported by both Iglesias and Errejón, built on the latter’s hypothesis of the electoral war machine, which placed the question of structure and
efficiency before that of internal democracy. This won out with an overwhelming
majority (80.7%). Faced with a rapid sequence of local, autonomic and general
elections, this majoritarian current justified a more centralized structure as
better suited to maintaining consistency, and able to respond more rapidly to
the complex game of electoral competition.
With their eyes
firmly set on winning the general elections, this short-term, blitzkrieg
strategy of electoral assault determined a series of key decisions: embracing
transversality over a more left-identifiable program of social demands; reduction
of politics to the electoral contest; a head-on confrontation with the Popular
Party and adoption of the rhetoric of war; a self-imposed insulation from social movements and the
attempt to bypass social conflict in proposals and programs. In short, organisational
and communicative verticality.
The effect of these decisions
was the subordination of the local assemblies and other structures to the centre
and increasingly vocal discontent among the broader social movements in favour
of a more bottom-up strategy and a broader understanding of politics and social
transformation. This exclusion of plurality made unfeasible the development of
effective counter-powers capable of
counteracting the pernicious influence of oligarchic tendencies within the party’s
organisation (illustrating the “iron law of oligarchy”).
In our previous
oD series on Podemos we looked,
among other things, at the resistance to this process of centralisation and
loss of internal democracy from both the rank and file and social movements. The
sense then was that the undemocratic “deal” of Vistalegre I was only ever
accepted on the premise of a contract: handing over to the centre the strategic
and communication initiative in exchange for a win. But the electoral success
never arrived, in 20 December 2015 or 26 June 2016. That devolution of power
has yet to take place.
Vistalegre
II
So we arrive at the second state-wide assembly of
Podemos, taking place next weekend, 11 and 12 February, in Vistalegre (II). The question that this assembly puts
on the table is that of the continuing suitability of a structure created to
fight in electoral wars for the new
political cycle of both institutional, parliamentary opposition, and necessary
re-vitalisation and engagement with the party’s base. It is also a chance for a
collective reflection on the previous model’s success (given its costs). There’s
a declarative consensus, from all sides of the debate, that a new model for the new cycle is needed,
and that a level of internal democracy and decentralization needs to be
restored. But it is hard to imagine in practice what this entails from the debates
so far. The interventions collected here illustrate the positions of three of
the main currents in Podemos today: the sector around Iglesias, the group
around Errejón and the anticapitalistas. We have also invited contributions from the wider
social movements, such as the municipalist
movement, as their plans and their impact are often deeply felt within the
party.
Schism
The main difference between the assembly two years ago and today is that Iglesias and Errejón are leading two different sets of documents and candidates’ lists: Podemos for All, supported by the former, and Recovering Illusion, promoted by the second.
This schism between
the two most visible figures has recently taken on intense manifestations in
the media and social networks in Spain, with both declaring the vote decisive for
who will end up leading and continuing to shape the direction of the party. This
may create the suspicion that Podemos’ leading project has always had at least
two visions which coexisted only through a considerable effort on both sides, united
by the imperative of “winning” alone. A recent vote on the procedures for next
weekend gave Iglesias’ proposal a very narrow victory, indicating a split vote
and the open-ended nature of next weekend’s proceedings.
A third important
proposal (with less support) is that of the anticapitalistas
(Podemos
in Movement), whose support appears to be decisive for the success of either of the
other two, (although they seem much closer to Iglesias’ group, if their recent
alliance for winning over the leadership of Podemos Madrid is anything to go
by.)
Four days of debate
Our contributions to
openDemocracy over the following four days offer a glimpse into this key debate
and show what is at stake in Vistalegre II: the collective capacity to build
unity from within a plurality of visions; or the distinct possibility of
further division, disenfranchisement and even fragmentation. The main question
is: will Podemos find the right model to continue to be a determining political
force for change in Spain, able to mobilise the social majority? Or will it
turn into an ABC that is beginning to miss some of its key letters? The membership
will decide this week.
Tuesday’s trio of
viewpoints asks on what basis should Podemos approach the new post-electoral, political
cycle? Podemos’ relation to the post-Franco ’78 regime. This discussion raises fundamental
questions about the terrain of the political battle, the nature of the
forces opposed and the forms of organisation needed. The debate is structured
by a series of key contrasts between the three most visible sectors (around Errejón, around Iglesias and anticapitalistas). The key terms are: middle class vs. working class; consensus
vs. conflict; relying on a plural language vs. using more left-identitarian
markers; simple “opposition to the PP” vs. “opposition to the ‘78 regime”;
institutional work vs. social mobilisation and “recovering the streets”. The
first group embraces the first series of terms, while the latter two espouse the
second series of terms, but differ on the specific weight and articulation of
those elements considered necessary for a successful social transformation.
Wednesday, we ask: Can the party be
democratized at the upcoming party congress (Vistalegre II)? If so, how? The week’s decisions have huge implications for
the way the party will be organised for years to come. Here the key debate is
between the Errejón sector’s thesis of “winning normality” and the movementist idea of opposing the
exceeding focus on governance and institutional management with an agenda for
creating a counter-power and deepening democracy at the local level. Given the
difficulty in reversing Vistalegre I, some contributions question any
possibility of democratizing Podemos in this week’s process.
Thursday tackles: How to expand
Podemos’ social base? The very fact that
this question is being asked accepts not only how detrimental the electoral war machine was to Podemos’ internal
democracy, but how isolated both leadership and the party itself became, once separated from its wider social base. All contributions
seem to agree that an expansion of the social base is necessary while they
diverge over their understanding of where
this expansion should be and what are the necessary means of reaching “those who are still
missing” without losing “the ones that are already there”.
Are those likely to be attracted to the political centre,
or those on the progressive left, the ones to be pursued? Should the mothers
and the elderly, the people in the rural areas with their specific realities,
or those who “were once there” but were driven away by a strategy of
centralisation and moderation come first? Will they be won by a discourse of
moderation, or by stressing the social demands that must produce antagonism and
even fear across the body politic? Can this social base be reached
single-handed, or only by building alliances with other transformative forces?
The final selection
this coming Friday looks at: What communication strategies are needed
for this new, post-electoral cycle? Podemos has always been leading,
and praised for, their innovative communications developed on the basis of
different interpretations of populism. Contributors on Friday look at the options:
appropriating the “winning signifiers” by expressing a proposal for an open
identity; reforming the media system to promote independence, pluralism,
transparency, professional empowerment, community media and cooperatives; or taking
into account the current limitations for the successful implementation of a
communication strategy based on an integrative diagnosis and narrative. Is any of this now even possible ?
Joan
Pedro-Carañana and Simona Rentea (editors) would like to thank Livia Gasparini, Katherine García, Lucas Asnis,
Lucía Sendargorta, Sofía Blanco, Elan Pinedo, Pato McKelligang and Pedro
Candela for their help and support with putting together this selection.