Amr Nabil/AP/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.In many parts
of the Arab world, especially amongst the urban middle class, moderate Islamists
have fallen out of favor.
The Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt witnessed a spectacular fall from grace; moving from the presidency
to prison cells. In Tunisia, El-Nahda was able to avoid a similar fate,
prompted by events in Egypt and an increased polarization of the political
system, by wisely choosing to give up power, losing the pre-eminent positon it had gained through fair and free elections.
This was
followed by an attack on Islamism as an ideological construct by secular Arab
middle classes equating Islamism with backwardness and in some cases equating
moderate Islamists with radical groups in order to justify their repression. This was stark in the case of Egypt. The Muslim
Brotherhood were declared a terrorist organization and blamed for all acts of
violence perpetuated against the state after the coup of 2013.
Some might
argue, correctly, that moderate Islamist groups failed in their brief tenure of
power due to short-sightedness, a desire to be in a position of power and their
collusion with elements of the deep state.
All of this is
true, however, it ignores a deeper structural issue with Islamist ideology,
which was decisive in its collapse; namely, its intellectual poverty and focus
on the preservation of the status quo.
Islamism,
in spite of decades of political engagement, has shown a remarkable weakness in
its ideological development. It has failed to provide an ideological vision
that critically differs from that of its secular rivals. On the contrary,
modern Islamism has shown a strong neo-liberal leaning not very different from that
of Arab ruling elites.
This manifested
itself in their message for the focus on the individual, under the notion that
reforming the morals of citizens will reform society without the need to
perform any substantial changes in social relations. Their idea is rather
simple; problems in the Arab World stem from individuals deviating from ‘the true path of Islam’. As such, when the morals of
the individual are reformed a ‘proper’ family will emerge, which will then
multiply and lead to the birth of a reformed society.
This shifted
the focus away from overarching societal problems to individual moral problems.
Issues like sex segregation, sexual morality, and women’s dress codes became of
paramount importance. This was compounded with an increased Salafi influence, which
places a high premium on issues of personal morality and piety.
Thus, when
moderate Islamists were in power they showed no desire or vision to offer
alternatives to their followers. On the contrary, they carried on with the
policies of the autocrats they replaced. During Morsi’s brief tenure in power, for
example, a loan with the IMF was negotiated which would mean a continuation of
the Mubarak era policies of austerity and neo-liberalism.
This focus on
the individual serves to act as a status quo ideology, as it moves the burden
of responsibility from the ruling class to the governed. Simply put, issues such
as rural poverty, urban decay, working class exploitations and the collapse of
the social safety net become of secondary importance. Poverty becomes
depoliticized and is no longer seen as a social problem that arises from a
certain configuration of power relations. It is seen as a problem that can be
resolved through the implementation of Sharia, namely zakat, the
compulsory alms the rich give the poor.
Based on this,
if ‘proper Islam’ is implemented the problem would disappear. However, the
nature of the exploitive relationship between rich and poor rarely makes an
appearance in Islamist discourse. This ideological orientation explains the weak
intellectual development of the movement, failing to produce a cohesive
ideological vision that promises radical social change. Even though there are
intellectuals associated with Islamism, like Tarek El
Bishri and Selim El Awa, they
have yet to produce a strong transformative vision of society.
This
ideological outlook takes a very elitist approach towards society. It assumes that
the people are morally corrupt. A perspective that is shared by the secular
elites, who also view the masses as backward and in need of civilizing. Thus,
the malaise of the secular forces is shared by their Islamist foes.
The simple solution
is good governance and fighting corruption, however, it is assumed to stem from
the abandonment of Islam. This, however, does not mean that Islamism is the
ideology of the elite. On the contrary, Islamists have a broad base of support,
especially among the poor in urban and rural areas where Salafism made
significant inroads and contributed to the “Salafisation” of this Islamist
base.
The resonance
of the Islamist message is based on two pillars: their deep reach into civil
society, and the organic connection of Islamist language to the culture of the
masses.
For example, as
the state retreated from its traditional role as the provider of social
services in post-Nasserist Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood started to fill the
void by providing services, such as health care, education and charity drives.
The provided services were packaged in the moral language of the group, delivering
their message of the need for personal reform. Health care services were
segregated by sex, thus enforcing Islamist sexual morals among the masses, which
in the end had the effect of entrenching itself in the psyche of those
receiving this service.
The second
pillar is the notion that, unlike other secular ideologies, Islamism has a
deeper cultural connection with the masses, offering a mystical view of the
past as it promises to recreate it out of the ashes of a world devastated by
colonial encounters. This makes it easier for Islamists to communicate their
moral message, which is devoid of social content, and gain support amongst the
masses by simply appealing to their sense of religious duty and obligation. In
a way, they become the symbol of the divine and a way to salvation from a
troubled world, as they promise not only salvation in the after life, but also
in this world if only ‘proper Islam’ were implemented.
This does not
mean that Islamism cannot act as a vehicle for social change. One only needs to
reflect on the Iranian Revolution and the explosive impact Islamism, mixed with
secular ideologies, had. As Ervand Abrahamian eloquently argues, Khomeinism is not a radical
Islamist ideology as many would like to believe, it is heavily influenced by
secular Third World ideologies, making it part of the Third World intellectual
tradition of resistance that includes thinkers like Franz Fanon.
He points out
that the intellectual base of Khomeinism comes from the work of Ali Shariati,
a French educated intellectual, who was influenced by Fanon and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq
who took part in armed action against the Shah. This intellectual tradition
mixed elements of Marxism and Shia Islamism, producing a potent, radical,
indigenous ideology of social action and change.
Khomeini divided society into two main
classes: the exploiters “Mustkabreen” and the exploited “El-Mustafeen”, urging
action against the exploiters using Islamist and traditional rhetoric. This
allowed him to make a strong connection to the urban poor in south Tehran,
which enabled him not only to defeat the Shah, but also to survive a brutal war
and bloody power struggle with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.
Thus, Islamism can deliver social change,
but only if mixed with a focus on social issues and exploitive social
relations. Modern day Islamism represents the interests of a specific social
class, unlike in Iran, the worldview of a non-revolutionary class, namely, the
petty bourgeoisie and some elements of the bourgeoisie that have no qualms with
current social and economic structures. Their main aim is to increase their
share of state power, not to alter social relations or enact revolutionary
change. They simply want a greater piece of the political pie, making modern Islamism
very docile, and placing them in the same position as the despots.