Hussein Malla/AP/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.Jabhat
al-Nusra’s split from al-Qaeda offers the west a unique and crucial opportunity
to create a fully inclusive and strengthened transition in Syria while dividing
al-Nusra’s supporters.
Jabhat
al-Nusra and the Islamic State are the only opposition groups banned from the
Syrian peace talks and excluded from the government/rebel cessation of
hostilities, while organizations like Ahrar al-Sham, ideological
and military allies of Jabhat al-Nusra, are allowed to take part.
This has enabled
the Syrian government to continue bombing and attacking rebel-held areas, such
as Aleppo, under
the pretense of attacking Jabhat al-Nusra. The justification for including Jabhat
al-Nusra on the list of terrorist groups and excluding them from the talks stems
from their origins within al-Qaeda, and the fear that their resources and
experience will be utilized to stage attacks against the west. These attacks,
however, have never materialized.
To
be clear, Jabhat al-Nusra in its present form cannot exist in a post-war Syria.
There will be no Islamic State or authoritarian Islamic regime replacing Assad
and there will be no safe-haven for terrorist attacks to be planned against
anyone. There are, without a doubt, violent and anti-democratic segments of Jabhat
al-Nusra, but there is also a fluidity to the organization’s general ideology.
This
is no more evident than when examining the leadership conflicts that plagued
Jabhat al-Nusra in the fall of 2014, when in the wake of major territorial
losses to ISIS, the
largely pragmatic deputy leader Abu Mariya al-Qahtani was replaced by the more
radical and al Qaeda aligned Jordanian cleric Dr Sami al-Oraydi.
Furthermore,
while in some areas Jabhat al-Nusra enforces strict Sharia law and carried out
executions, there are many regions where, according
to Charles Lister, the local populace has largely embraced the Salafi group. This
may be in part because many ideologies now fight under al-Nusra's flag.
Some moderate
rebels have joined the group, as its strength gives them the best chances
of survival and launching successful attacks against Assad. Additionally, some
foreign fighters have found that, despite holding different ideologies from those of Jabhat al-Nusra, it was the easiest opposition group for them to join.
Charles
Lister argues that "the
international community must…more forcefully push for a diplomatic settlement
[in Syria] so as to prevent the establishment of a longstanding jihadi safe
haven.”
By inviting Jabhat al-Nusra to the negotiating table, the
organization is forced to debate the future of their movement. How much of a
localized Syrian group are they, how much control do foreign fighters and
clerics hold over the organization, and how many of its members truly desire an
Islamic State at the expense of a peaceful Syria with full political
representation?
If
Syria is to become a democratic country, Islamists must be allowed to
participate. Allowing even conservative Islamists, like the Salafists who
support Jabhat al-Nusra, to run in local and national elections gives the
Syrian people full agency in choosing their own government.
It is entirely
possible that the Tunisian example will occur: the Islamist party wins the
national elections, fails to follow through on its promises, and is promptly
voted out of office. But the exclusion of one ideology from the infant Syrian
electoral process will only entrench and radicalize the Salafists in Syria,
just as it has done to the Salafists in Jordan and Egypt, and the Sunnis in
Iraq.
Inviting
Jabhat al-Nusra to the negotiating table does not mean acquiescing to their
every demand. Instead, it allows an alternative to violence for those members
who no longer wish to fight or who do not share the leadership’s strict
interpretation of Islam. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are many
disillusioned
fighters
among the Syrian Salafist opposition.
By providing a non-violent path for Jabhat
al-Nusra fighters, the west can separate the members who only want to overthrow
Assad from those who would use violence to implement their vision of Islamic
governance.
The
Syrian members of Jabhat al-Nusra may feel that diplomacy is the best route,
while the more hardcore foreign fighters will likely choose to continue with
violence. By offering the choice of non-violence, the west can hope to split al-Nusra,
allow a peaceful way out for those who wish it, isolate the violent jihadi
elements of Jabhat al-Nusra, ensure the wholeness of the Syrian political
transition, and force the Syrian government to focus its fight on IS.
In this
way, the Syrian political transition is strengthened while Jabhat al-Nusra and
the Islamic State are simultaneously weakened. Yet this will only work if real,
tangible progress is made in the negotiations and a peaceful transition appears
feasible. Otherwise, Syrian opposition fighters will see no choice other than
to continue fighting.