At the June
Summit, which will take place after the UK Referendum, the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica
Mogherini, will present the results of her global review of external strategy.
As part of the review process, the Human Security Study Group, at the LSE,
which is convened by Mary Kaldor and Javier Solana, has presented a report
entitled From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking the EU Strategy
Towards Conflict together with twelve
background research papers .
Conflicts are at the
sharp end of contemporary crises. Refugees, extremist ideologies, criminality
and predation are all produced in conflict. Contemporary conflicts are
sometimes known as ‘hybrid wars’ or ‘new wars’ in which classic distinctions
between public and private, government/regular and rebel/irregular, and internal
and external break down. They are best understood not as legitimate contests of
wills (the twentieth century idea of war) but as a degenerate
social condition in which armed groups mobilise sectarian and
fundamentalist sentiments and construct a predatory economy through which they
enrich. Identifying ways to address violent conflict could open
up strategies for dealing with broader issues.
In this special
openDemocracy series, the Human Security Study Group outlines the main
conclusions of our report in our introductory
essay together with six essays based on some of the background papers.
These essays include: an analysis of the conceptual premises of the Global
Review (Sabine
Selchow); three essays on specific conflict zones – Syria (Rim Turkmani),
Ukraine (Tymofiy
Mylovanov), the Horn of Africa (Alex
de Waal); the importance of the EU’s justice instrument (Iavor
Rangelov); and how EU cyber security policy is human rights focused rather
than state focused (Genevieve
Schmeder and Emmanuel Darmois).
Germany Syria talks. Joint stroll prior to meeting of Foreign Ministers of Germany and France with UN special envoy for Syria and Head of the Higher Negotiations Cttee. May, 2016. Ferdinand Ostrop / Press Association. All rights reserved.
The EU rightly identified in its 2007
Syria strategy paper that “Syria
is a key factor in regional stability and plays a pivotal role as a transit
country between the EU and the Middle East”. Yet, this
did not stop the EU from rushing into unwarranted political and economic
measures in the early months of the Syrian conflict that hindered its ability
to influence the process. Consequently, as the Syrian crisis escalated to severely affecting
Europe, the EU found itself in a position unable to play a significant role in
resolving the conflict.
Although the Syrian conflict developed into a very complex
combination of revolution, Syrian armed conflict, proxy war and terrorism, the
roots of this conflict remain the long-standing political oppression and
injustice which initiated the public resentment. Most of the actions taken by
external powers did not help in easing this political oppression. But
remarkably, the Cessation of Hostilities agreement which was agreed by Russia
and the US in February 2016 without any Syrians present in the meeting managed
to bring relative calm to the country for more than two months and saved
thousands of lives.
This is enough of an indicator that the US vs. Russia level
of this conflict is very significant. Yet it is neither Russia nor the US that
suffered the most from the consequences of the war in Syria. It is the EU that suffered from the increased
security threat, terrorism and the refugee crises, and it is taking a lead in
supporting and funding the humanitarian programmes responding to the “world's
largest humanitarian crisis since World War II”. The EU, as Commission and
Member States, covered over €5 billion of the humanitarian bill. In addition,
over €3 billion were pledged at the London donor conference in February 2016.
“The world is not only
Europe”
Prior to the conflict the
EU had rather extensive relations with Syria, and through the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy was
applying a range of instruments, with some limited effect, aimed at bringing
about political and economic reform. These efforts were abandoned shortly after
the conflict began, and instead the EU focused on the application of sanctions,
scaling down its mission in Damascus, and taking extreme political measures
that led to the loss of political leverage.
The Syrian foreign minister responded in
June 2011 by announcing in a statement to the media, “We will forget that there is Europe on the map,” and promised to
look “eastward and southward and in every
direction that extends its hands to Syria. The world is not only Europe.”
Indeed, shortly afterwards, Syria did suspend its membership in the Union for
the Mediterranean, and it did look in other directions for support, mainly from
Iran, Russia and China. This served only to increase the leverage of these
countries over the Syrian government and increase polarisation at all levels. The theory of change that
assumes that the regime is going to change its behaviour should such measures
be imposed has not only proved to be wrong, but to the contrary, these measures
produced the opposite outcome.
August 18, 2011 saw a
turning point in EU policy towards Syria. Following “large-scale use of
military force in the cities of Hama, Deir al-Zour and Lattakia,” the EU
announced, “The President's promises of reform have lost all credibility as
reforms cannot succeed under permanent repression. The EU notes the complete
loss of Bashar al-Assad's legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and the
necessity for him to step aside.” This announcement seems to have been
orchestrated, as the US President Obama, the British Prime Minister David
Cameron, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, all demanded that Assad immediately resign on the same day. The logic
behind the move was that if other leaders followed this move then it would
force President Assad to resign. Hilary Clinton commented on this move saying, “If Turkey says it, if King Abdullah says it, if other
people say it, there is no way the Assad regime can ignore it.”
All these political and economic measures
were taken before any specific strategy towards Syria was outlined. A new
strategy for Syria was only outlined two years later in June 2013.
Justice and
stability
What has been much needed for Syria throughout are policies
aimed at improving the situation of ordinary people, providing them with much
needed protection and countering the structural dynamics of the conflict. Some
of the EU policies, however, did just the opposite. The sanctions that targeted
the general economy worsened the conditions of ordinary affected people, and
accelerated the development of the predatory war economy instead of pressuring
the Syrian regime, which found alternative ways to overcome the impacts of
sanctions.
One of the areas that Europe can play a key role in bringing
stability in Syria is justice. For sustainable peace and stability in Syria and
for the underlying political and social structures that gave rise to the
conflict to be addressed, justice is an absolute key necessity, for the
conflict is deeply rooted in many layers and forms of injustice, grievance and
inequality.
The EU announced commitment to justice and accountability in
Syria, and supported several transitional justice programmes run by civil society.
However, its role has faced a ‘dilemma’, torn between seeking accountability
and ending the conflict. This became apparent in the last six months after the beginning of the Vienna peace
process for Syria. The EU became a member of what is known as the International
Syria Support Group (ISSG), which is the catalyst of the process. The ISSG
issued two statements in Vienna at the end of 2015. Neither statement includes
any reference to the need for commitment to accountability, justice, and
transitional justice mechanisms. These statements later became the backbone of UNSC
resolution 2254 issued on 19 December 2015, which also excluded any mention of
justice and accountability.
The EU has regularly called for the respect of International
Humanitarian Law in Syria, and the protection of civilians, and condemned all
indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Similarly, it called for allowing
unrestricted and constant humanitarian access to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid and medical care to all
people in need. However, like most international actors the EU did not take
enough concrete steps to guarantee the implementation of these calls.
Civil society in Syria
The rise of civil society in Syria is
one of the most positive things that has happened in Syria during the last five
years. Together with Local Administrative Councils (LACs) it was able to fill
the gap of the total or semi collapse of the state in different parts of Syria.
The EU helped fund these civic actors in opposition-controlled areas and supported programmes that promoted
good governance in Local Administrative Councils, this having helped to enable
the right actors and promote a positive trend that empowers civic actors over
armed entities.
In areas with mixed security control,
the EU had less influence. The end of 2013 and beginning of 2014 witnessed many
local ceasefires in Syria in areas of mixed security control, typically
opposition-controlled areas surrounded by a government-controlled one. Although
these local agreements arose amid very bad conditions including sieges, many led
to an improvement in the humanitarian situation. The EU played no direct role
in the ceasefires. In April 2014 it issued a statement criticizing these
ceasefires: “The EU is concerned with cases of forced surrender, labelled as
local ceasefires, imposed by the regime through starvation sieges. The EU calls
on the regime to allow effective third-party monitoring of ceasefires to
sustain them, to allow safe and unhindered evacuations of civilians on a voluntary
basis and the passage of humanitarian convoys and personnel.”
In fact, the Syrian Government used the
tactics of sieges against civilians in many areas to force their submission to
its conditions. In some cases, as in Mouadamiya, however, not all the ceasefires
were cases of surrender: but even where they did mean surrender, they provided
an opportunity to help civilians when nothing else worked. The EU rightly
identified third party monitoring as a key factor in sustaining these ceasefires,
yet it is not known that it did anything to provide this monitoring. For
example, it did not push for a mandate from the UNSC for a new UN monitoring
mission after the last one was pulled out in 2013, neither did they send a
monitoring mission from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
A
new round of Geneva talks
As a new
round of Geneva talks are under way, the EU should ensure that the outcome is
not merely the result of US and Russian talks, which could well translate into
creating further future conflicts that could affect Europe. The talks would not
have ended up in Geneva had the process been “Syrian led” as the UNSC 2254
claims it should be. Yet the EU could do much to ensure a more Syria-led
process, because only such a process will set Syria on the path to peace and
democracy.
The EU
could play a role in ensuring that the transition in Syria heads towards
democracy. Among the many concrete measures the EU could bring to this table is
to equip the
negotiations with economic tools. All the EU instruments such as the
Association agreement, economic relations, the bilateral cooperation programmes
under European Neighbourhood Policy, and partnership in the EU's regional
programs together with the loan operations and technical assistance by the
European Investment Bank and the lifting of economic sanctions: all of these mechanisms
can be introduced as gradual incentives in Geneva with the aim of encouraging
compliance. This could have the triple benefits of: i)
legalising the formal economy, which is a crucial step to combatting the war
economy, ii) enhancing the humanitarian and economic situation of the Syrian
people who are hit hardest by these measures, and iii) lifting these measures
as an incentive to the Syrian government to comply with specific human rights
measures, such as ending the shelling of civilian areas and releasing
detainees. The EU could
also play a role in ensuring that accountability is central to any transition
plan for Syria.
In the meantime, the EU should continue the valuable work it did
in supporting local processes and newly-emerging legitimate local agencies,
particularly the LACs, and by placing a strong emphasis on supporting
good governance. The EU should play a pivotal role not only on supporting civil
society and the local civic authorities in Syria, but also should put its
weight behind making them an essential part of the solution, and ensuring their
presence at Syrian-related decision-making tables. Only their presence would
truly ensure a “Syrian led process” and a new democratic neighbour for Europe.