Photo courtesy of Nueva Sociedad. This article is being
published as part of the partnership between Nueva Sociedad and
democraciaAbierta. You can read the original article here.
The regional elections of October 15 were a true catastrophe for the opposition
in Venezuela. Few times in history has an electoral event had such overwhelming
consequences: practically, the destruction of the loser – nothing less. The
Democratic Unity Table (MUD), the alliance of parties that, with some success,
had been confronting Nicolás Maduro, has dissolved and the parties that made it
up, each with its own interpretation of what happened, have now regrouped into
three large blocks which are more or less opposed to each other. The candidates
who, until the day before the elections, had been well placed in the polls, are
now blurred to the point that nobody seriously considers them as potential
candidates for the forthcoming elections in 2018. And the opposition voters, who
are still in a majority, have sunk into hopelessness and do not know if to give
up and accommodate as best they can with the situation, or to find a way to
move abroad.
How was this hecatomb possible? How is it that, after four months of
protests that practically paralyzed the country, with a government disapproval rate of about 80%, international condemnation
and sanctions, the worst economic crisis in the history of the country and the
possibility of a default in the very short term, Maduro can claim victory and
such a huge one at that?
The answer to these questions is key to understanding the changing
Venezuelan situation and to extracting some useful lessons for political
analysis. The way in which each side played their cards, with one side being able
to gather its forces while the other dispersed theirs, the importance of the narratives
and of the leaders who give meaning to events that move the population, and the
role of appearances for conquering power or maintaining it, are all factors that
have been at play in the chain of events and decisions that led to the results
of the October 15 elections.
How is it that, after four months of protests that practically paralyzed the country (…) Maduro can claim victory and such a huge one at that?
Let us start with the appearances. The sheer size of the protests and their
continuity in time led many to think that the regime’s fall was near. But the
truth is that, except from the dissidence of Attorney General Luisa Ortega
Díaz, the government block did not break, at least not in any apparent way, or
enough so as to be forced to accept the opposition’s demands: an electoral
timetable, the freeing of political prisoners, the opening of a humanitarian
channel. On the contrary, while the police, the National Guard and the
so-called "collectives" managed to control – although barely – a
society which felt tired after more than three months of protests and more than
one hundred dead, Maduro took the lead by calling a National Constituent
Assembly (NCA).
From that moment on, the opposition struggled to avoid its establishment
and it won some great victories, such as the symbolic referendum on July 16 and
the condemnation of Maduro’s initiative by many foreign countries. But the move
allowed the government to lead the debate. And here is where the narrative links
with the appearances: Maduro had no reason to roll back on his decision, but he
made a couple of feints, such as his proposal to postpone the NCA if the opposition
was willing to accept it. The
indications are that the opposition leadership was so
sure that they would manage to stop the initiative that, apparently, they did
not prepare for the possibility that the NCA would finally be established. On
the other hand, considering that opposition to the NCA was very strong among their
followers, it was almost impossible for them to accept participating in it without
offending them. The long list of unfulfilled promises which were made during
the dialogues between the opposition and the government before the crisis also went
against their heeding Maduro’s offer.
The
game of appearances and the narratives that give
them meaning had another side to them: probably in order to consolidate the
mobilization against the NCA, it was stated that, if the Assembly were finally
established, that would give absolute power to the government. But this meant
that it was recognized, in advance, that absolute power would be bestowed on
the government if this actually happened and that therefore, if it did happen,
everything would be lost.
The opposition’s narrative turned out to be a rope tied around its neck
And, well, this is indeed what happened. And the opposition’s narrative turned
out to be a rope tied around its neck. On July 30, when the National Electoral
Council declared that eight million Venezuelans had voted for the Constituent
Assembly (an estimated seven million participated in the referendum on July
16), the opposition leadership did not hit back with anything forceful. At the
most, they said that these figures were the result of a huge fraud. A few days
later, Smartmatic, the firm in charge of the vote counting, said that the
results had been manipulated, thus endorsing this thesis. But elections of governors
had already been called by then, and this meant that the opposition had to face
the dilemma of either participating in these elections, despite all the serious
doubts about their fairness, or refusing to do so and thus risk losing power spaces
and leave all the governorates in the hands of Maduro’s government.
It was decided – on the basis of sound reasons – to go for the first
option, but it is obvious that many voters saw in this an incongruity: how can you
ask voters to participate in elections which are organized by those whom you
yourself have accused of being dishonest? Although there were leaders who did
call for the voters’ abstention, it did not take too much effort to sow doubt,
especially because instead of explaining the risks and the reasons why it had
decided to participate, the opposition chose to jump on an over-confident narrative
which said that it would surely win, if not all, almost all the country’s governorates.
And this is where Maduro confirmed that he was a better player. While in
the opposition-dominated constituencies people decided not to vote – maybe the loss
of middle-class voters who have emigrated began to be felt too -, the
government ran an efficient voter co-optation machine through its aid –
especially food – distribution channels and its well-disciplined militancy. Some
observers say that this is very similar to what the Mexican Institutional
Revolutionary Party does: electoral authoritarianism – that is, a system in
which there is no need for massive fraud, you have only to add up many
different forms of shifting the advantage to the government’s side so as to win
always, with or without a majority. The forms in which the government can do,
and does it range from last-minute transfer of middle-class opposition voters
to polling stations further away from their homes, or to polling stations
located in places they would consider dangerous, to using food distribution
councils to mobilize voters.
The
result was the knockout of October 15: nineteen governorates for the government
and five for the opposition.
Again, there was some talk of fraud, but low voter turnout was quickly
blamed for the results, which suggests that the government's victory was
perfectly clean – or that the defeat was recognized by the opposition. The
icing on the cake was that four of the five elected opposition governors were
sworn in before the National Constituent Assembly which had been declared
illegitimate by the opposition.
Maybe the experience has taught some lessons to the opposition players
Following this, the differences that everyone knew were brewing inside the
MUD surfaced and ended up splitting the alliance into three bloks: the Social
Democratic parties Democratic Action and A New Time, which have taken the
option of operating within the limits set up by the regime (although some say
it is simply connivance with the established power); at the other end, the Liberal
party Come Venezuela and the Social Democratic Brave People Alliance led by María
Corina Machado and Antonio Ledezma, which, united under the I Am Venezuela
alliance, are committed to uncompromising resistance; and, finally, Justice
First (center), Popular Will (Social Democratic) and Radical Cause (Socialist),
which present themselves as the true heirs of the MUD under a new alliance,
Venezuela Comes First.
Notwithstanding the fact that the rejection by a majority of the
population, the disastrous economic situation which is bound to get even worse,
and the international sanctions, do not make things easy for Maduro, the opposition
tragedy has meant that political discussion now focuses on the possibility of Maduro
running for re-election next year, or on whether the United Socialist Party of
Venezuela will opt for a leadership renewal and present as a candidate young
Héctor Rodríguez, a promising figure of Chavismo who has just won the very
strategic Mirando State – which covers, basically, the hinterland of Caracas –
and who, so it seems, is currently rising in the polls. It is being ruled out
that any other figure stands any real chance.
The disaster experienced by the Venezuelan opposition
will probably be a study case. For it shows that, in politics, things are not
what they seem and that the narratives which are built on them can carry
fundamental weight. The game continues and there are still cards up the sleeve.
Maybe the experience has taught some lessons to the opposition players.