Protesters to the opposition are covered with shields in front of the attacks of tear gas bombs that the Venezuelan National Guard fired to disperse the march destined the Ministry of Interior and Justice in the center of Caracas.May 18, 2017 – Caracas, Venezuela. Adrian Manzol/Zuma Press/PA Images. All rights reserved.
Amid the tumult on the
streets of Venezuela, which has cost dozens of lives in the past six weeks, two
crucially important, and related, events threaten to spur even greater violence
and eclipse all possibility of international engagement aimed at redressing the
country’s plight.
One was the announcement on
23 April by Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez that the country would withdraw
from the Organization of American States (OAS) in response to what the
government of Nicolás Maduro sees as “interference” in Venezuela’s internal
affairs. The other move, which immediately incensed protesters and brought
widespread foreign repudiation, was a presidential decree of 1 May convening an
assembly to rewrite the country’s constitution.
These two decisions mark the crossing of a threshold in Venezuela, and the formal abandonment by the “revolutionary” regime in Caracas of representative democracy.
According to Maduro’s
blueprint, half of the assembly’s members are to be elected by organisations,
such as trade unions and peasant groups, which in all likelihood will be
satellites of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The other
half would be elected at the municipal level, under a system (yet to be fully
explained, and perhaps even decided) that seems designed to over-represent
pro-government forces. Political parties will be excluded, although the precise
design of the election system for the assembly is in the hands of the
government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE). It is worth noting that
the combination between sector-based and municipal representatives is identical
to that in the National Assembly of Cuba.
Taken together, these two
decisions mark the crossing of a threshold in Venezuela, and the formal
abandonment by the “revolutionary” regime in Caracas of representative
democracy. They came in response to pressure, both external and domestic, on
the Maduro government to hold elections, restore the separation of powers, free
political prisoners, and open a “humanitarian channel” to ease the country’s
critical shortages of food, medicines and other basic goods. Rather than accede
to demands for genuine negotiations with the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD)
alliance – which controls a legislature shorn of power by the Supreme Court
(TSJ) – the government has made good on its threat to “deepen the revolution”
by creating a so-called “communal state”. What is proposed is similar to the
constitutional reform Maduro’s predecessor and mentor Hugo Chávez put to a
referendum in 2007, which was rejected by the electorate – Chávez’s sole
national electoral defeat in his 14 years in power.
Shotguns firing plastic pellets are also often used
at almost point-blank range, and demonstrators caught alone can expect to be
severely beaten.
Meanwhile, in response to
almost daily demonstrations by the MUD, security forces have clearly been given
orders to intensify the repression. By 10 May, six weeks of violence had killed
39 people, according to the PROVEA human rights organisation. At least two
demonstrators have been killed and many more injured by riot squads repeatedly
firing tear-gas grenades directly into crowds. Police use them to disperse
static crowds, often firing in front of and behind protesters, trapping them.
Retreating protesters are pursued with volleys of tear gas, which is now
frequently being fired into residential or commercial premises, and has even
affected schoolchildren and hospital patients. Shotguns firing plastic pellets
are also often used at almost point-blank range, and demonstrators caught alone
can expect to be severely beaten. Over seven hundred injuries are reported,
along with 2,000 arrests, according to legal aid group Foro Penal. Once again,
civilian parapolice gangs, armed with pistols, have been deployed to intimidate
protesters, some of whom have died of gunshot wounds, often to the head.
In several parts of the
country, including the capital, nightfall has brought episodes of looting,
which in one particularly violent night in Caracas led to the deaths of at
least a dozen people. In Venezuela’s third city, Valencia, looting also took
place in broad daylight, with around 100 warehouses, shops and supermarkets
systematically ransacked as police and national guard troops looked on.
If greater violence is to be
averted, the government will need to abandon its self-serving plan to rewrite
the constitution and its use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators.
In turn, opposition forces, together with Venezuela’s regional neighbours,
should devise a plan to encourage more pragmatic elements of the regime to
negotiate a return to democracy, while offering a potential exit strategy for
those in power who can have no future political role and fear imprisonment – or
worse – if they are ousted.
A new “communal”
constitution
The central demand of the
opposition is that a free election be held to allow Venezuelans to determine
the way out of the conflict. But the government, whose support in the polls
hovers around 20-25 per cent, fears that submitting to a vote would be
political suicide. The proposed constituent assembly is a way of evading
democratic accountability. It would have supra-constitutional powers that would
allow it to dissolve parliament, restructure the state and even govern the
country indefinitely, if it so chose, without any need to hold fresh elections.
OAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro called the move “a fresh coup d’état” aimed
at “consolidating this authoritarian regime”.
A number of Latin American
countries have rewritten their constitutions in recent years, with varying
results. Colombia’s 1991 constitution, which sprang from a citizens’ movement
seeking greater participation, is often cited as a success. More recently, in
Bolivia and Ecuador, the process began in the wake of electoral victories for
major new political forces – most significantly, an indigenous peoples’
movement led by Evo Morales – but was extremely contentious, with opposition
forces steamrollered or excluded at crucial points. In both countries, a
majority of voters approved the new constitutions at the polls.
Venezuela’s 1999 constituent
assembly was 95 per cent composed of supporters of President Chávez, despite
their having won only a little over half the vote. But after Chávez’s failed
attempt to reform it in 2007, and the government’s increasing violation of its
key provisions, the 1999 constitution came to be seen as a potentially unifying
element between the opposition and moderate chavistas. Most constitutional
scholars argue that only at times of broad national consensus can a successful
constitution be drafted; the alternative is a document that enshrines the
victory of one side over another. The present constitution furnishes a “road
map” with broad support that would be perilous to abandon at this point of
extreme polarisation.
“But preservation of the 1999 constitution could well become a rallying cry for hitherto loyal government supporters who revere Chávez but repudiate his successor.”
Maduro is gambling that a
new, “communal” constitution will consolidate the revolution. But preservation
of the 1999 constitution could well become a rallying cry for hitherto loyal
government supporters who revere Chávez but repudiate his successor. Already the
Attorney General (fiscal general) Luisa Ortega Díaz, who recently distanced
herself from the regime by saying the “constitutional thread” had been broken
following a Supreme Court ruling to strip parliament of its powers, has weighed
in. In a 3 May interview with The Wall Street Journal, Ortega said the
1999 constitution could not be improved. Her words were echoed by a
pro-government legislator. But aside from these and other cases, so far there
is no firm indication of mass defection from the regime, nor has this dissent
gone unpunished. Now that the public prosecution service (ministerio público),
which Ortega heads, is no longer regarded by the regime as trustworthy,
arrested demonstrators are increasingly being arraigned before military
tribunals. Dozens have been indicted, and sent to a jail far from their place
of residence.
Maduro is gambling that a new, “communal” constitution will consolidate the revolution.
Marching
out of the OAS
Maduro’s explicit abandonment
of democratic rule has, however, clarified matters abroad. It is increasingly
difficult even for the country’s allies in the region – all of which, except
Cuba, adhere to democratic norms – to defend its posture, and the group of nations
pushing for a restoration of democracy seems bound to grow. At the same time,
the Venezuelan government seems prepared to become ever more isolated in the
region.
The decision by the OAS
Permanent Council on 23 April to convene a consultative meeting of the region’s
foreign ministers to discuss the Venezuelan conflict prompted the Maduro
government to storm out of the organisation – although the process of
disengagement, under OAS rules, takes two years. In a clear sign of the
regime’s increasing estrangement, its bid to have the issue debated instead by
foreign ministers of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC – a body that includes Venezuela’s ally Cuba but excludes the United
States and Canada) fell flat. Only four of 33 CELAC foreign ministers showed up
to the meeting on 2 May and it concluded with no resolution. Seven countries
boycotted the meeting, and on 4 May Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay issued a sternly-worded statement to
“condemn the excessive use of force on the part of the Venezuelan authorities”
against protesters in the streets.
The date and venue for the
OAS foreign ministers’ meeting, agreed by the OAS Permanent Council on 26
April, is to be held on May 31st, and Venezuela has announced it will boycott
it. The imminence of the organisation’s regular, scheduled General Assembly –
in Mexico in late June – means the Venezuelan issue will almost certainly have
to be dealt with there, although the gravity of the crisis merits greater
urgency.
A way
forward
Maduro’s decision to close
off the limited democratic space that still exists – on the streets and,
potentially, at the ballot box – guarantees that there will be more violent
unrest. The opposition is convinced that to abandon street protests at this
point would be to permit the consolidation of a dictatorship; it senses that it
has nothing left to lose. It will not desist from its mobilisation until, at
the very least, there is a binding commitment from the government to hold free
and fair elections.
The opposition is convinced that to abandon street protests at this point would be to permit the consolidation of a dictatorship.
Perhaps the greatest
potential danger is posed by a chaotic fragmentation of the regime. In the
event that the armed forces were to split into roughly equal parts, Venezuela
could face civil war. At the very least, there could be a period of violent
anarchy on the streets, with armed, pro-government groups and criminal gangs
spreading mayhem. The civilian population, already facing hunger and a
breakdown of the country’s basic infrastructure, would suffer even greater
hardship, and the task of reconstructing Venezuela would become far more
taxing. In contrast, a decision by the bulk of the armed forces not to obey
government orders to use violence against demonstrators – and to take action
against armed civilians acting as parapolice groups – could galvanise both sides
into seeking a peaceful and negotiated solution. Already there have been signs
of internal dissent, with dozens of officers, including two generals,
reportedly under investigation by military intelligence (DGCIM).
International pressure is
vital, but needs to be carefully calibrated, with carrots as well as sticks, so
as to offer a way out to those members of the regime who may be inclined to
negotiate a return to democracy. In this spirit, the National Assembly should
consider legislation offering partial, conditional, amnesty to both military
and civilian regime members, thereby signalling their intent to seek
reconciliation and to avoid witch-hunts in the event of a transition. While the
Supreme Court almost certainly would veto this, the bill would send a message that
could isolate those, relatively few, who are unlikely to benefit from amnesty
due to their involvement in activities such as drug-trafficking or grave human
rights abuses. Individual sanctions, already imposed by the United States
against certain regime leaders, could be widened to target figures associated
with egregious human rights violations, as a bipartisan proposal tabled in the
U.S. Senate last week seeks to do.
Genuine negotiations – as
opposed to the interminable “dialogues” the government prefers – are essential,
and should ideally lead to elections and to an interim government of national
unity in which some current officials (perhaps including Attorney General
Ortega) could play a part. Any such outcome should include in the short term
recognition of the current National Assembly, and respect for its powers. There
is no longer any future for the mediation effort led by former Spanish Premier
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, although some of its elements might be
incorporated into a stricter and more effective negotiating structure. This
ought to be a primary focus of the OAS initiative, which will require setting
up a “group of friends”, including at least one country sympathetic to the
Maduro government.
The government itself
recently invited the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, St Vincent and
Uruguay to “accompany” its proposed dialogue. The role of the group of friends
– which might usefully be expanded under the aegis of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations – could include devising a viable asylum plan for those
high-ranking regime members who have reason to fear future prosecution, and
convincing them to accept it. Another priority for the group would be to adopt
immediate measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis.
A decision by the bulk of the armed forces not to obey government orders to use violence against demonstrators […] could galvanise both sides into seeking a peaceful and negotiated solution."
If not limited to the OAS,
the initiative might eventually benefit from the assistance – formal or
otherwise – of other governments that have influence with Caracas. This is
particularly the case for Cuba, which is not a full OAS member and has a conflict-prone relationship
with the organisation, and China. Both these countries would want to see their
interests safeguarded in the event of a change of government.
Ultimately, of course, Venezuelans will decide how
their country should be run. But with a president who seems determined to deny
them the right to do so, they need outside help to produce a negotiated
solution and avert a catastrophe.
Previously
published by International Crisis Group.
__________
Post-script (26 May, 2017)
After
two months of street protests the death toll stands at 58, with thousands more
injured. According to the legal aid group Foro Penal, there had been over 2,800
arrests by late May; almost 1,200 people remained in detention, of whom 338
faced trial by military tribunal. In the state of Barinas, where the late Hugo
Chavez grew up, the murder of a young demonstrator set off several days of
rioting which brought half a dozen more deaths, a wave of looting and the
torching of several government buildings.
Attorney-general
(fiscal general) Luisa Ortega
confirmed the responsibility of the security forces in much of the violence at
a press conference she gave on 24 May. Most strikingly, Ortega refuted the
government version of the 26 April death of Juan Pernalete, saying he had died
after being struck in the chest by a teargas canister, fired at close range by
the National Guard (GNB). Government ministers had claimed he had been shot by
another demonstrator, using a captive-bolt pistol.
Ortega’s
new-found determination to apply the law is a major problem for the government
since her office has a monopoly on criminal prosecutions. The transfer of many
cases to the military justice system (in contravention of the Venezuelan
constitution and international treaties) is a response. President Maduro has
also moved to transfer cases of political violence to a government-created
‘Truth Commission’ and prosecutors in various parts of the country have
reported that they are being coerced, or bribed, to speak out against Ortega.
On
23 May President Maduro presented the electoral authority (CNE) with the
government-designed voting system for the election of his proposed constituent
assembly. Of the 545 members, 364 will be elected ‘territorially’ (one per
municipality, two for each state capital and seven for Caracas), vastly
over-representing lightly populated rural areas where the ruling party is
strongest. For example, the Andean state of Merida (pop: 730,000) will have 24
representatives, while Miranda (pop: 2.3m) will have 22. The remaining members
will be elected ‘sectorally’, with the ‘sectors’ (workers, fishermen, indigenous
people, women etc.) chosen by the government. The election is to be held in
July, with elections for
state governor (due under the constitution in December last year) set for
December 2017.
The constituent assembly will, however, have the power to suspend the latter,
or even abolish state governors, should it choose to do so.
On
the international front the UN Security Council, at the request of the United
States, held a closed-door session on 17 May to discuss Venezuela. After the
session the chair of the UNSC (currently held by Uruguay) said there was no
need for further action. At the regional level, however, OAS foreign ministers
are to meet on 31 May to discuss the crisis.