President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the 28th Arab League Summit at the Dead Sea, south of the capital Amman, Jordan, March 2017. Xinhua/SIPA USA/PA Images. All rights reserved.In the first meeting between President
Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Netanyahu articulated
a shifting dynamic in the region, that of Sunni Arab regimes viewing Iran
rather than Israel as the main threat to their national security.
This was followed by reports
that President Trump is supporting the formation of a NATO-like Arab alliance,
which would include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Israel, not
formally part of this alliance, would coordinate closely with it.
This idea of an Arab military alliance is
not new, it was suggested
by President Sisi in February 2015 and set
in motion by the Arab League during the Sharm El Sheikh summit in March
2015.
Even though President Sisi publicly
endorsed the call for an Arab military alliance, Egypt’s regional role has been
eroding over the past few years due to its adoption of a conservative foreign
policy, which has been causing tensions with regional
allies, most notably Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, Egypt has only played a symbolic
role in the war in Yemen. It has also played no effective role in the war in
Syria or Libya. On the contrary, Sisi has publicly opposed intervention in both
Libya and Syria, following
the line of supporting “national” armies; in the case of Syria, offering moral
support to the Iranian backed Assad regime.
This should raise concerns regarding Egypt’s
willingness to play an effective role in any proposed conservative
Sunni Arab alliance aimed at containing Iran.
Egypt, as the most populous Arab Sunni
state with the largest army, is expected to play an integral role in any
proposed alliance. One only needs to remember the second Gulf War when the
Egyptian military played
an operative role in the containing Saddam Hussein in the lead up to Desert
Storm, in addition to playing an integral part in ground operations.
Thus, Egypt’s leadership is in a rather
difficult position between appeasing allies, most notably the United States and
Saudi Arabia, and being confronted by a domestic crisis, which restricts its
ability to act as a regional power.
These pressures result in contradictory
positions. Calling for an Arab alliance, while opposing intervention in
regional conflicts, and attempting to appease allies, while maintaining
domestic stability. In essence, attempting to straddle the fence in a feeble
attempt to solicit international support, while avoiding making any tangible
commitments.
The domestic pressures on the regime can
be attributed to two main factors, Egypt’s economic woes as well as the
fragility of its domestic front.
Egypt’s
crumbling economy & expanding military empire
In terms of the economy, the regime has
followed a dual policy of large prestigious infrastructure projects as well as
increased austerity and neo-liberal reforms, which have led to rapid inflation,
increased pressure on the lower and middle classes, and the expansion of the military’s
economic empire at the expense of the private sector.
The Egyptian regime invested 8 billion USD in the expansion
of the Suez Canal, a project that has resulted in little tangible returns to the
Egyptian economy. This project was primarily undertaken by the military,
helping to finance the growth of its economic empire.
Another example, is the new
administrative capital. Another mega infrastructure project, primarily being
executed by the military; acting, once again, as a catalyst for the expansion
of the military’s economic empire.
These mega projects are accompanied by unpopular austerity measures, imposing regressive
VAT taxation as well as a free-floating currency due to a 12 billion USD IMF
loan agreement, which has led to a significant increase in inflation, reaching 32.5% – the highest
since the 1980s.
These policies have not only increased
discontent among the lower and middle classes, increasing pressure on the
regime, they have also pushed the regime to rely on debt and aid to counter the
growing fiscal crisis.
In spite of receiving billions in aid
from Gulf states, the levels of external debt have now reached a whopping 60.1
billion USD , the highest in Egyptian history.
Even though the Egyptian regime controls
the largest Arab army, its economic base cannot sustain prolonged military
operations in Yemen or Syria. It is simply too fragile and debt ridden to do
so.
Funds have been squandered on
infrastructure projects that have failed to generate revenue or stimulate wider
economic growth, thus negatively affecting the economic base of the
regime.
Wealth is being concentrated in the hands
of the military elites and this is eroding the regime’s ability to project
power beyond its borders.
The
fragility of Egypt’s domestic front
The fragility of Egypt’s domestic front figures
more prominently in the ability of the regime to engage in long-term military
operations abroad.
The most notable symptom of which is the
increased level of terror attacks across Egypt since the military coup of July
2013.
The total number of terror
attacks has increased from 376 in 2013 to 812 in 2016, constituting an 115%
increase, with 2015 being the bloodiest year with attacks reaching 1097 across
the country.
There are also worrying trends of an
increasingly active branch of IS operating in the mainland, which is
organizationally distinct from Wilayat Sinai, the IS branch operating in Sinai.
This mainland branch of IS has claimed responsibility for a number of Church
bombings: one in December 2016, which claimed the lives
of 25 worshipers; and the twin bombings on Palm Sunday in April 2017, which
claimed the lives of 44
people.
The latest series of bombings have
prompted the regime to declare a state of emergency across the country, which
will only heighten and legalize already existing repression; widening the
regime’s brutal crackdown on its critics and the media.
In addition to the wave of terror
attacks, Egypt has been experiencing a wave of social protests and labor
strikes, in-spite of mass repression, arrest and media censorship.
As of the end of 2015, the Egyptian
regime faced on average
five times more protests than the Mubarak regime did in the years from
2008-2010, which resulted in the mass eruption at the beginning of 2011.
Based on a report issued by the Egyptian
Center for Economic and Social Rights, in 2016 there were 1736 protests and 726 strikes.
The most notable examples of which were
those by workers of state-owned companies, such as those of the petroleum
sector. The strikes revolve around work conditions and economic grievances.
Additionally, 2016 witnessed the first mass
protest against the regime in opposition to the transfer of two islands
in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia. A move that has not only sparked anger, but
also led to a prolonged legal battle.
Thus, the regime is not only having
economic difficulties, it is also facing strong domestic discontent regarding
its economic and social policies. As such, any foreign involvement can lead to
intensified opposition, especially if it could potentially result in high levels
of causalities.
The regime has limited room for maneuver
and can offer little in terms of material support to allies. Based on this, one
can argue that the value of Egypt as a pivotal state in the region and member
of a potential alliance to counter Iranian influence is rather limited.
This raises questions regarding the value
of American aid to Egypt, since it only helps to perpetuate the grip of a
de-stabilizing regime, which is primarily concerned with the short term goals
of elite enrichment and regime security, and is in essence, weakening the
ability of Egypt to act as a balancer and guarantor of regional and Gulf
security.
Considering external and internal
pressure on the regime, it has little choice but to attempt to straddle the
fence in an attempt to appease all parties. However, as time passes, pressure
on the regime will mount and a choice will have to be made between a domestic
crisis, loss of valuable allies and international support.