Left-wing ex-president of Uruguay, Pepe Mujica. Wikimedia Commons. All Rights Reserved. <\/i><\/p>\n
This article is part of the series "Persistent inequality: disputing the legacy of the pink tide in Latin America" produced in alliance with the Institute of Latin American Studies and at the Instituite of Sociology of the Freie Universit\u00e4t Berlin.<\/p>\n
There are three sources of disempowerment encroaching
\nupon Uruguay\u2019s regional relevance and singularity which result in a decrease in
\nnational self-esteem and an exhaustion of its utopian energies.<\/p>\n
Number 1 is as follows: Upon accessing power, the
\nleft, far from implementing a jubilant, triumph-driven radical discourse,
\nceased to promise radicalism or to consolidate change. <\/p>\n
Instead, they talked
\nabout "people-like capitalism", and "capitalism in
\nearnest", as its most charismatic and popular leader, the legendary Pepe
\nMujica, put it during his second term as President at the head of a Broad Front
\n(FA) government.<\/p>\n
Two is as such: The country\u2019s proud sense of
\nself-esteem as an original singularity, originating from as far back as its
\npolitical-administrative status under the colonial government, has been
\nweakened by the powerful invasion of great narratives of modernity, which have challenged
\nthe idea that Uruguay is somehow unique. <\/p>\n
The country, which proudly considered
\nitself to be the 'Switzerland of America', and the 'Athens of the Rio de la
\nPlata', which used to think that 'there\u2019s nothing like Uruguay', the small
\nmodel-country which thought it could carry out social experiments akin to the Welfare
\nState without being dragged down by the weight of old historical conflicts like
\nin Europe. <\/p>\n
Ideological globalization reached Uruguay through Communism,
\nSocialism and Anarchism at the beginning of the 20th century; through Third
\nWorldism, Christian Democracy and a first version of developmental
\nneoliberalism in the late 1950s; through Maoism, Trostkyism, Dependentism and
\nFoquismo (Cuban revolutionary ideology) in the 1960s. Thus, the pride in the
\nodd singularity became diluted.<\/p>\n
Three is the following: The exercise of the duty
\nof government impedes any expansion of utopias and radical ideologies. The
\npolitical routine entails concessions, ideological de-radicalization,
\nleadership dominance, distancing from the bases and party bureaucratization.\n<\/p>\n
This is exacerbated by the granting of a ministry to each fraction with a
\nsubstantive constituency within an increasingly multi-faceted coalition.
\nShort-term tactical manipulation of strategic teleology takes place, and the
\ngentrification of the party correlates with entropy and exhaustion.<\/p>\n
Continuity
\nin power is not relinquished to manipulate pragmatic euchronias at elections
\nand in appointments of personal allies to key positions.<\/p>\n
Professional surveys conducted immediately after the end of the dictatorship showed the military at the bottom of the ranking; but just a few years later, if a plebiscite were held on the formation of National Guards and their involvement in internal security matters, the majority of the population would probably be in favour.<\/p>\n
Four can be summarised as: This entropic
\nexhaustion coexists with a weakening of the ideal of democracy, which Uruguay
\nembodies as a precocious regional model, and a world leader. <\/p>\n
Professional surveys Uruguay lacks, in relative terms, a sense of civil Despite the fact that Uruguay is a highly Plans and programs play a rhetorical role in exhibiting The emergence of national and regional public Television time is replacing radio and the Following the trend The political parties, which were born from a The discovery of attractive leaders allowed the left In these times of 'sophisticated' plot This has been, and still is, undoubtedly a But in urban concentrated Uruguay in which a unitary system with few Its main legislative problems have been internal, Second, when the objectives of the classical propositional left, Young This exchange of favours produced fragile and laboriously-reached When it resorted to If in other countries, the governments could not One of the most striking recent problems In Uruguay, this has not been the case: many of the One. As a candidate, Tabar\u00e9 V\u00e1zquez asked several The vote for the FA did not always imply ideological affinity, it was often only a punishment vote against the traditional parties due to the string of crises endured, and also a vague hope expressed in the popular dictum: "a new broom always sweeps well".<\/p>\n Although he secretly hoped to The vote for the FA did not always imply ideological affinity, it was Added to this was the fact that the Two. There are more powerful and comprehensive A) We know that there is no coherence between the The conservative distance between B) At least two other reasons explain that B.1) Changing political-electoral interest. In The beneficiaries of redistribution who left They will not vote for those who threaten to They are no longer B.2) Social psychologists and sociologists discovered So a caste-based society That would not happen in societies with no mobility and no So, redistribution may not build its All this is not surprising; on the contrary, In Uruguay, you could draw up an extensive list It should suffice to compare the Gini indexes of current and trend In the case of Uruguay, and in relation to change, the governments of the left have not gone as far as expected nor as they could have considering the relative advantages they enjoyed.<\/p>\n However, huge doubts remain about the achievements One: In the case of Uruguay, and in relation to change, a) A boom in commodity prices which made possible This model became less viable when the boom b) A favourable psycho-social context for c) The exit from a deep crisis from 2003 onwards, Two. The country showed clear evidence that a a) In addition to many improvements in The b) Regarding the evolution of the relative c) In a country where 50% of the lower-income Since 1993 GDP per capita has increased 40%, Finally and briefly: it is unlikely that continuity The international In Uruguay, The Left Left-wing ex-president of Uruguay, Pepe Mujica. Wikimedia Commons. All Rights Reserved. This article is part of the series "Persistent inequality: disputing the legacy of the pink tide in Latin America" produced in alliance with the Institute of Latin American Studies and at the Instituite of Sociology of the Freie Universit\u00e4t Berlin. There are three sources…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-934","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/934","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=934"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/934\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=934"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=934"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=934"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nconducted immediately after the end of the dictatorship showed the military at
\nthe bottom of the ranking; but just a few years later, if a plebiscite were held on the formation of National Guards and
\ntheir involvement in internal security matters, the majority of the population
\nwould probably be in favour. Popular memory is worryingly short.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\nThe decline
\nof debate in the public sphere <\/strong><\/h3>\n
\nsociety. It is a State-centred nation, created by a leviathan and demiurge
\nState, and managed within a binary system by two catch-all parties (White and
\nRed), the hegemony of which has been at play for more than 150 years, right
\nuntil the arrival of the Broad Front as a plausible contender in 1999, and then
\nas a winner in 2004.<\/p>\n
\nurbanized and demographically concentrated country, the public sphere is not
\ncharacterized by an ascending and proactive relationship but by a top-down
\napplication of decisions, and an inclination towards complaining and
\nthreatening electoral punishment than to the kind of criticism that defines a
\nmature democracy. <\/p>\n
\ngovernment capacity, but their content is unknown to nearly everybody; their
\nother function is to measure the relative force of different fractions of the
\ncoalition on different topics. <\/p>\n
\nopinion polls produces figures and spreads issues which grant popularity and
\nlegitimacy without debate. The media have less and less time for debates, and
\ncarry increasingly brief and explosive, less analytical content. <\/p>\n
\nwritten press in building a political spectacle, and social media (Uruguay is
\nthe country with the highest internet and social media use in the region)
\nexacerbates the increasing lack of debate and proposals. <\/p>\n
\nset by advertising and commercial marketing, politics is rapidly replacing
\nattempts to convince through rhetorical cognitive persuasion, efforts of
\nemotional, poetic seduction. <\/p>\n
\nstruggle between 'caudillos' and 'doctors' and then became parliamentary
\nforces, have been \u2018re-caudillizing\u2019<\/em>
\nin the last 20 years. <\/p>\n
\nto abandon its unpopular conceptual elitism in the region. Max Weber\u2019s
\nprophetic fear, in 1917, that democracies could become charismatic populisms,
\nis shining today in all its splendour. <\/p>\n
\ndevelopments on Twitter – in 'philosopher king' Trump style -, it is much
\neasier to satisfy than to convince public opinion, and to 'sell' a charismatic
\ncandidate rather than a thoughtful ideologue.\u00a0<\/p>\nA volatile
\nparliamentary base<\/strong><\/h3>\n
\ngovernance problem in most countries of the region, especially in those that
\nhave a high number of political parties and a federal political and administrative
\nstructure.<\/p>\n
\nrelevant parties reins, the Broad Front has always enjoyed the backing of a
\nparliamentary majority, not very large but nevertheless sufficient, except for
\npassing the few laws that do require special majorities.<\/p>\n
\nendogenous ones: first, when it had to obtain an ad hoc majority because of a
\ndissident in its ranks or someone in Congress seeking to 'sell' his or her
\nagreement. <\/p>\n
\npost-fiscally redistributive, clashed with those pursued by younger
\nparliamentarians, a 'young liberal left', which successfully promoted issues
\nsuch as State regulation of the marijuana cycle, an approach to abortion from
\nthe perspective of a reproductive health law, and same-sex marriage. <\/p>\n
\npeople got away with it but had to support their elders even on issues such as
\npublic safety in which the laws passed were shamefully conservative and
\npunitive, especially with regards to minors. The elders also had to vote for
\n'liberal' rights-based guarantees in exchange, with which they did not agree
\neither. <\/p>\n
\nmajorities, but the government never had to resort, as in other countries, to
\nideologically suicidal alliances (such as in Brazil). <\/p>\n
\ncalling for a wide agreement on State policies, as in security matters, this
\nwas done to disguise its lack of decision to apply really leftist measures: the
\ncall to others was not intended to reach any agreement, but to put the blame on
\nothers for the lack of inter-party consensus \u2013 hypocritical faint-heartedness
\nwhen you enjoy the support of a majority which does not require you to seek an
\ninter-partisan consensus.<\/p>\n
\ncarry out what they wished for due to a lack of a sufficient majority, in
\nUruguay, on the contrary, the FA destroyed its own majority by calling on
\ndissidents to reach an agreement without any real need, then it ran into
\ndifficulties with its own majority for endogenous reasons.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\nThe
\ndifficult voter loyalty of the middle classes<\/strong><\/h3>\n
\nexperienced by the left in government (especially in Brazil) has been the
\ninsufficient political-electoral loyalty of many beneficiaries of its
\nredistributive policies. <\/p>\n
\n'loaned' votes in 2004 were not lost in 2009 and 2014. There are two main reasons for this:<\/p>\n
\ntimes for 'borrowed' votes from citizens whom he supposed were probably
\nsupporters of the historical majority parties.<\/p>\n
\nconquer and retain them – which is in part what happened – it would not have
\ncome as a surprise if some of these votes had eventually gone back to their
\norigin. <\/p>\n
\noften only a punishment vote against the traditional parties due to the string
\nof crises endured, and also a vague hope expressed in the popular dictum:
\n"a new broom always sweeps well". <\/p>\n
\nblockade of Cuba, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and a certain familiar air of
\nthe leftist candidates had de-stigmatized the Left.<\/p>\n
\nreasons to understand the regrettable lack of voter loyalty on the part of the
\nbeneficiaries of government policy-generated redistribution.<\/p>\n
\nstructural position of class in stratification and the 'situation' of classes
\nin the process of taking concrete decisions. <\/p>\n
\nboth dimensions has been qualified as 'alienated class consciousness', a
\nconcept which is perhaps applicable in the case of those who benefited from the
\ngovernment policies of a given party and who now change their vote as
\npost-beneficiaries.<\/p>\n
\n'alienated' and 'treacherous' infidelity.<\/p>\n
\npart, people are utilitarian: they pursue their interests without caring much
\nabout political allegiances. <\/p>\n
\npoverty behind and entered the middle classes, statistically and psychosocially
\nwill now vote for whoever assures them they will keep improving their lot. <\/p>\n
\nredistribute wealth from them to those who now have less than them, even though
\nthey benefited precisely from that when they were worse off. <\/p>\n
\nin the position of needing redistribution, they can now lose in relative terms
\nfrom the redistributive impulse. So, they will no longer vote for the
\nredistributor who benefited them in the past because he will no longer favour
\nthem and could even perhaps harm them.<\/p>\n
\nin the 1940s that in contexts in which mobility already exists, mobility is
\nmore demanded than in contexts without mobility. <\/p>\n
\ndemands less mobility than a meritocratic one because the perception of some
\nascending motivations generates dissatisfaction among those who are not as
\nmobile. <\/p>\n
\nmobility-related expectations, with models which are difficult to emulate, and
\nin which there is no relative dissatisfaction or fear of immobility – or
\nrelatively less fear – before the mobility of others.<\/p>\n
\nbeneficiaries' loyalty as expected, partly because it is no longer in their
\nbest interest, and partly because they think that their previous voter allegiance
\nwill no longer satisfy their expectations of mobility – which were previously
\ndormant, and have now been awoken.<\/p>\n
\nwhat is surprising is that some are surprised at all. There exists a
\nlyrical-romantic imaginary about real people which is tragically wrong, a
\nradical product of the idea of popular sovereignty projected on a Rousseauian
\nbackdrop.<\/p>\nThe elites
\nsave their profits<\/h3>\n
\nof the successes of the left in government, in fact, it has already been done.
\nIt is actually quite clear, as in the case of the other countries governed by
\nthe left, that the overall results have been better than if the right had been
\nin power. <\/p>\n
\ninequality between countries governed by the left and the right.<\/p>\n
\nof the governments of the left if we compare them with the expected results of
\nleftist management.<\/p>\n
\nthe governments of the left have not gone as far as expected nor as they could
\nhave considering the relative advantages they enjoyed, especially right after
\ntheir election victory and accessing power. They had, in fact, a number of very
\nsignificant advantages:<\/p>\n
\na redistribution model that reduced formal thresholds of poverty without
\ntouching the most exclusive elite. <\/p>\n
\ncame to an end, which, in addition, delayed the possibility of overcoming of
\nthe agro-export and under-industrialization model affecting the countries in
\nthe region in general;<\/p>\n
\nelectoral change through punishment voting, with voters lending votes or
\nexchanging them in hope of a 'new broom' to sweep things clean;<\/p>\n
\nthe result of which magically benefited those in government – the FA, since
\nMarch 2005 -, even though it could not be ascertained whether the merits of
\nthat success could in fact be attributed to the government.<\/p>\n
\nre-primarized export and financial capitalist model had been maintained and
\nnourished – a model that the Left in government ought not to have allowed to
\nreproduce itself extensively:<\/p>\n
\nunionization and some minor though real redistributions in Uruguay, the
\nownership of land and production was further concentrated and foreignized. <\/p>\n
\nlandowners' profits from the price of properties of more than 200 hectares
\namounted to 30 billion dollars in 20 years, with a tax burden on agriculture of
\nonly 1.2% (taxation was also very low on equity, real estate, income, profits):
\nin addition, the price of the hectare quadrupled, its yield doubled and the
\nprice of agricultural products increased;<\/p>\n
\nparticipation of capital and labour, the value of land increased six-fold while
\nreal wages barely doubled;<\/p>\n
\npopulation accounts for only 23% of GDP while 20% of the higher-income
\npopulation gets 45%, GDP since 1968 has slightly more than doubled, while real
\nwages have grown only by 70%. <\/p>\n
\nwhile real wages remains the same. Can a government of the left be satisfied
\nwith these macroeconomic results in a context where it has enjoyed the relative
\nadvantages we have described?<\/p>\n
\nof the left in government can strengthen change in Uruguay. <\/p>\n
\neconomic situation is less favourable, the ideological similarity with regional
\ngovernments is lower, and the friendly neighbors are worse; and the Left has
\nforgotten the Gramscian dictum that economic and political domination must be
\nstrengthened by changes in the political culture of civil society. <\/p>\n
\nmanagement evaluation is liberal, and the culture is consumerist,
\nindividualistic, hedonistic, and mimics glamorous jet-set patterns. <\/p>\n
\nwill not make any proposal outside that imaginary, because it would put at risk
\nvoter allegiance, which is considered today the supreme value by its
\nalternative, previously utopian leadership.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"