Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev in signing ceremony ending dispute over the use of the name Macedonia, June 17, 2018. Dimitris Tosidis\/Press Association. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n
The accord crafted between Greece and the Former Yugoslav
\nRepublic of Macedonia (FYROM) resolving the name dispute has an energising
\nsocial potential. It potentially undermines nationalisms in the Southern
\nBalkans, while at the same time fighting neo-liberal economics imposed on the
\nBalkans from outside, which is a form of imperialism. This, nevertheless, is a
\nforbiddingly uphill task given the lack of radical\/progressive political
\nsubjects to carry out such a demanding process in both Greece and FYROM. In
\nthis regard, the accord brings about more NATO and Germany in the region, not
\ngood news. Lastly, I should point out that the agreement is profoundly
\nanti-Russian.<\/p>\n
A number of conjunctural events and agential strategies, both
\ndomestic and external, have conspired to produce the agreement between Greece
\nand FYROM, whereby the latter agreed to be
\nre-named North(ern) Macedonia (as long as both parliaments and, in the case of
\nFYROM, a referendum, approve the agreement). What are these events? The most
\nimportant include: <\/p>\n
a)\u00a0 The
\nstrategy of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under the leadership of
\nNick Kotzias to create fractures within the right-wing opposition party of New
\nDemocracy (ND), which is split between old-fashioned nationalists and liberals
\nat a time when the country is undergoing a period of extraordinary austerity,
\ncoupled with economic contraction. It seems to me that the MFA\u2019s strategy has
\npaid off, judging by the defensive and utterly dispirited attitude of New Democracy
\nduring the debate in the Greek parliament.<\/p>\n
b)\u00a0
\nThe
\ncrisis of the political system in FYROM in which the former nationalist PM,
\nNikola Gruevski, as well as many others, are in danger of imprisonment, whereas
\nthe current incumbent, the \u2018socialist\u2019 Zoran Zaev, is attempting to drive a
\nwedge between his nationalist President and the Albanian parties, and all this in a country equally entrapped in a serious
\nsocial, ethnic and economic crisis.<\/p>\n
c)\u00a0 Massive The so-called \u2018modernisation\u2019 of the western Balkans In this respect, a critique of the agreement can only fully I will lay to one side issues concerning the recognition of a In any event, I should not fail to note that all three Balkan The name of \u201cNorth(ern) Macedonia\u201d has no Slavic element in The opposite is also true. No-one can prevent North(ern) My criticism of the agreement, therefore, concerns the fact Given the dependence of Greece on the regime of bailout From a Greek point of view, the more generic framework of the This is not a bad time for Greece, given the grievances NATO The more Turkey gets embroiled in the quagmire of the Middle Is it, then, correct to argue that everything is wrong with No. Macedonian society is deeply divided on the issue and western-sponsored In the medium to long run, the agreement could emancipate Southern In Greece, Syriza, precisely because it is locked into the But, then, who can address the social issue across the southern [1] [2] Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev in signing ceremony ending dispute over the use of the name Macedonia, June 17, 2018. Dimitris Tosidis\/Press Association. All rights reserved. The accord crafted between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) resolving the name dispute has an energising social potential. It potentially undermines nationalisms in the Southern…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-926","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/926","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=926"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/926\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=926"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=926"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=926"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\npressure on both countries on the part of the USA and Germany that want to see
\nFYROM as a member of NATO and the EU. This is part and parcel of Germany\u2019s and
\nNATO\u2019s policy of Drang nach Osten<\/em>, namely
\ntheir drive to exclude Russia from the Balkans and push themselves deeper into
\nthe Eastern frontier, as they want to displace Russia
\nfrom the Ukraine. This is directly connected with Germany\u2019s interest in
\ncontrolling the Axios-Danube water river passages alongside the geostrategic axis
\nSalonica-Belgrade (Salonica\u2019s port and the Macedonian interior are major
\nstrategic hubs providing supplies and logistical support for the west in case
\nof war with Russia).\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\n(investments for the creation of infrastructure, modern railways, control of
\noil and gas pipelines in order to secure the flow of hydrocarbons to western
\nmarkets, spread of financial and banking institutions etc.) seems to have been
\ntaken over completely by German and Austrian interests, whereas NATO is taking
\ncare of the security aspect (a \u2018division of labour\u2019 that dates back, I would
\nsay, to the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc). In this
\nequation, Greece has since the late 1980s been slated for a certain role in the
\nBalkans and FYROM, a kind of \u201cAfghanistan of the Balkans\u201d[1]:
\nit cannot be floating East and West; nor can it be left out of the western fold,
\nas the west advances eastwards. <\/p>\nSlavic elements<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nmake sense from a left-democratic and radical perspective. The Greek ruling
\nparty, Syriza, fully inserted in the pro-NATO camp obeying the German monetary
\ndiscipline of the bailout agreements, has effectively carried out a state policy
\non the name. As Kotzias explained in his speech in the Greek parliament, the
\nname \u201cNorth(ern) Macedonia\u201d, among others, was discussed by all previous Greek
\ncabinets, especially those of the right New Democracy party, now the main
\nopposition party. The same, obviously, applies to Zaev\u2019s \u2018socialists\u2019: they
\nsimply carried out state policy at what seemed a favourable domestic political conjuncture:
\nat a moment when the USA is on a mission to create dependent geopolitical
\ntrampolines aimed at sapping Russia\u2019s posture in the Ukraine and the Black Sea.\n<\/p>\n
\n\u201cMacedonian language\u201d and \u201cidentity\u201d, both of which, as with every nation on
\nearth, are constructed by state elites and their ethnic intellectuals. I would
\nonly like to add that the more this construction is delayed historically the
\nless credible it becomes and, in this respect, Bulgaria\u2019s claims are more
\ncredible. It would hardly take a good linguist and historian any effort at all
\nto convince an educated audience that the modern Macedonian language that is
\nspoken in FYROM is nothing but <\/em>a
\nBulgarian dialect. In fact, had Bulgaria not sided with Germany in two world
\nconflicts, the lands under the sovereignty of the (FY) Republic of Macedonia today
\nmight very well have been under Bulgaria\u2019s sovereignty (see also the names of
\nthis \u2018nation\u2019: Zaev, Gligorov, Ivanov, all rather Bulgarian names, which may
\nwell have been changed by dominant state Bulgarian or Serbian policies in the
\npast \u2013 precisely because of a lack of a comprehensive Macedonian ethnic
\nontology at a time when other such ontologies dominated Balkan politics). <\/p>\n
\nstate nationalisms \u2013 Greek, Bulgarian, Serb \u2013 are partly responsible for the
\ncreation of this late modern Macedonian ethnic ontology. It takes many hundreds
\nof years for a language to develop naturally. How far has the language of FYROM
\n(Albanian apart) developed since 1944, when a British Special Operations
\nExecutive Officer wrote that the language was \u201ccorrupt and debased, without a
\nliterature or a fixed grammar\u201d.[2]
\nI will resist further temptation to talk about \u2018language\u2019 and \u2018identity\u2019, as it
\nrequires a historically informed perspective and this is not the right place
\nfor that. But I am extremely interested in what I call the \u2018political depth\u2019 of
\nthe name that Greece and the (FY) Republic of Macedonia have agreed erga omnes<\/em>, that is, for all kind of
\nuses. <\/p>\n
\nit and this is historically inaccurate: as if Yugoslavia never existed, or as
\nif modern Bulgaria never had a claim, and rightly so, on this geographical area.
\nThis is not a simple matter. \u201cNorth(ern) Macedonia\u201d sounds like an entity that
\nseceded not from Yugoslavia but from Greece. Greece has three administrative
\ncounties called \u201cMacedonia and Thrace\u201d, \u201cCentral Macedonia\u201d and \u201cEastern
\nMacedonia\u201d. What is missing is \u201cNorth(ern) Macedonia\u201d. This, apart from being a
\nlegal oddity, can very well give the pretext for any Greek or Bulgarian government
\nin the future, assisted by the west, especially in times of crisis and conflict
\nbetween NATO and Russia, to lay irredentist claims on North(ern) Macedonia,
\nabrogating the agreement. <\/p>\n
\nMacedonia, especially if pushed by its NATO allies, from abrogating the
\nagreement and calling herself what it wants to be called, namely Republic of
\nMacedonia. Greece cannot stop this, as there is no relevant clause in the
\nagreement stipulating that once North(ern) Macedonia becomes a member of NATO
\nand the EU, it cannot disrespect it. In this context, it becomes clear who the
\nreal arbiters of the agreement are \u2013 none other than the USA and Germany, that
\nis, their problematic and conflictual alliance in the Western Eurasian theatre,
\nas they both expand \u2013 the former in the field of security, the latter in
\nbusiness \u2013 eastwards, undermining Russian
\ninterests and influence in the Balkans.\u00a0 <\/p>\nThe further
\nmilitarisation of the Balkans<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nthat it upsets the balance of power in the Balkans by way of unilaterally
\nundermining Russia\u2019s interests in the region, while relinquishing South Slav political<\/em> identity. Greece is getting
\nembedded more and more in the west\u2019s system of power. In other words, and
\nespecially after the collapse of the Greek-Russian understanding with the shelving
\nof the Bourgas-Alexandoupolis pipeline project in 2015, Russia loses several
\nstakes in the Balkans which constitute an important geopolitical trampoline in defence
\nof the Crimea and Ukraine. <\/p>\n
\nagreements, the accord signed in Prespa Lakes becomes an important stepping-stone
\nfor the further militarisation of the Balkans and the dominance of German
\nfinancial interests. Herein lies the urgency with which Kotzias rushed to visit
\nMoscow straight after the agreement was signed. I doubt, however, if he was in
\na position to convince the Russian Minister, Sergey Lavrov, that the accord is
\nnot meant to damage Russian interests. <\/p>\n
\nagreement is located in the new foreign policy of the Hellenic MFA to reverse
\nGreece\u2019s traditional pro-Arab policy and, in its stead, embrace Israel, forging a solid Greece-Cyprus-Israel understanding
\nin the Eastern Mediterranean. <\/p>\n
\nand Germany have towards the neo-Ottomanist regime of Tayyip Erdogan and the
\nissue of refugees. Erdogan, who won the election of 24 June 2018, has no
\nintention of changing the foreign policy of his country in the foreseeable
\nfuture. From this perspective, too, the compartmentalisation and NATO-isation
\nof the Balkans becomes more and more entrenched, whereas the deepening of
\nGreece\u2019s dependency upon the USA, Germany and Israel deprive the country of any
\nmeaningful bargaining chips in times of war and peace. <\/p>\n
\nEast, the more NATO, Germany and Israel, via Cyprus and Greece, want to embed themselves
\nin the Balkans and ignore Turkey. FYROM, in this respect, becomes a key. At the
\nsame time, Turkey can at any time shift its terrain of confrontation in the
\nAegean Sea, engaging Greece. From this perspective, the real threat to Greece
\ncomes from within NATO: from a reckless and nervous Turkey unable to administer
\nthe crisis of its borders in the interior. <\/p>\n
\nthe agreement, and that it should be scrapped? <\/p>\nThe social<\/em> issue<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nmedia label all those who disagree with the agreement as \u201cnationalists\u201d, which
\nis wholly wrong. But in the event that the agreement is approved by both sides,
\novercoming the \u2018hurdle\u2019 of the referendum in FYROM \u2013 then it has the potential
\nto release a new social dynamic in which the primary political element would
\nnot be competing Balkan nationalisms but the social<\/em> issue. <\/p>\n
\nBalkan societies from morbid nationalisms and make them concentrate on their
\nreal problems, which are none other than unemployment, austerity, lack of
\nsustainable economic development, collapse of social services and unbelievably
\nlow salaries and wages. From Sofia to Tirana and from Athens to Belgrade, Banja
\nLuka and Podgorica, the real issue of concern is the class<\/em> issue, and not whether or not Macedonian is a Bulgarian dialect.\n<\/p>\n
\npower-system of the bailout agreements, cannot raise this issue with any
\nconceivable chance of success. Doing so would mean undermining its own position
\nin government. Zaev\u2019s \u2018socialism\u2019 in the (FY) Republic of Macedonia, on the
\nother hand, sells the agreement domestically as the achievement of two progressive
\nBalkan governments opening the way to peace, development and reconciliation. No
\ndoubt, he receives an enormous boost from various agencies and pro-western
\n\u2018NGOs\u2019. But he, too, has no means of addressing the social issue, as he is
\nwholly dependent on EU and other funding, whereas the policies he pursues are
\nthose of austerity and cuts. <\/p>\n
\nBalkans and beyond? Well, the \u2018other Left\u2019 can, but we are all in search of it.
\nHaving said this, then, it seems to me that the Macedonian Question will be
\nthere for many years to come, easily manipulated by both imperialisms and
\nnationalisms of all kinds.<\/p>\n
\n
\nThere is no intention to offend. I use an orientalist description here because
\nthis is how, pretty much, western policy-makers think of landlocked statelets
\nwith \u2018under-developed\u2019 economic and political institutions. Just have a look at
\nZbigniew Bzrezinski\u2019s The Grand
\nChessboard<\/em> and you will see what I mean. <\/p>\n
\n(Secret) Report<\/em> on the \u201cFree
\nMacedonia Movement\u201d, BNA-FO 371\/43649, file R232039\/1009\/67, quoted in
\nMallinson, William and Zoran Ristic, The
\nThreat of Geopolitics to International Relations: Obsession with the Heartland<\/em>,
\nCambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2017, p.31.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"