Kurds demonstrate in Strasbourg calling for Ocalan's release, February 2015. Demotix\/ Jonathan Rae. All rights reserved.Turkey and the Kurds share the aim of
\nending their long-standing conflict. So what of the so-called peace process
\nbetween the Turkish state and the PKK, especially their imprisoned leader
\nAbdullah Ocalan? And what is the potential role of Kurdish diaspora groups in
\n\u2018peace-making\u2019, \u2018peacebuilding\u2019 and \u2018reconciliation\u2019 processes with Turkey? <\/i><\/p>\n
I have been exploring the experiences
\nof Kurdish individuals and families in the diaspora, specifically looking at
\ninvolvement in homeland politics, conflict and peace between April 2014 and May
\n2015 for my research, facilitating five focus groups and securing interviews with
\nthose from different parts of Kurdistan now living in the UK and Germany. In
\ntotal, my research involved 60 Kurdish adults, of whom 29 were women, and 31
\nwere men, building on work on the Kurdish diaspora in the UK and Germany since
\n2008.<\/p>\n
I want to start by
\narguing that there is not actually any real peace process in Turkey. The
\noutcome of this research shows that the aim of negotiations \u2013 for both AKP and
\nthe Kurdish parties, especially the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) \u2013 is actually to monopolise power and violence. <\/p>\n
This \u2018game\u2019 is likely
\nto further deepen divisions between Turks and Kurds, and may even open the door
\nfor further escalation of violent conflict. Something like this was seen on 6-7
\nOctober 2014 in almost all the Kurdish-populated cities in Turkey when around
\n50 people lost their lives.<\/p>\n
Especially for the AKP
\ngovernment, these so-called negotiations are not about risk-taking to make
\npeace \u2013 but about risk-avoidance to maintain the status quo, and so to maintain
\nthe current actors\u2019 grasp on power. But without taking substantial risks,
\nincluding the risk of losing power, it is almost impossible to broker peace.<\/p>\n
Before analysing the
\ncurrent conditions in the Middle East and Turkey, and the role of diaspora
\ncommunities in more depth, I would like to underline the fact that
\npeace negotiations are never easy. Getting started is often \u2013 usually \u2013 the
\nmost difficult thing to do. Conflict will either continue, or only be temporarily
\nand conditionally stopped. Any peace process is like a game, a theatre. There
\nare many players, actors \u2013 from different sides \u2013 who do not trust each other.
\nDifferent sides have different agendas. Some protagonists may benefit directly
\nfrom the war, and can easily choose to destroy any possible peace process. For
\nexample, the 50,000 men currently employed by the Turkish state as village
\nguards have no incentive to support peace, since peace will probably mean that
\nthey will lose their family\u2019s livelihood. <\/p>\n
Moreover, with Kurdish populations
\nliving in Syria, Iraq and Iran, as well as in the diaspora and Turkey, one
\ncannot separate the Kurdish and Turkish \u2018peace process\u2019 from ongoing conflicts
\nand wars in the neighbouring countries. Many of the Kurds I have interviewed
\nbelieve that for any successful and permanent peace, Kurds living in all of
\nthese places, including the diaspora, must be involved in any peace process. <\/p>\n
In the Middle East and Turkey,
\nespecially in the last 35 years, there has never been a day without war and
\nviolence. The most recent conflict \u2013 which started in March 2011 in Syria, and
\nhas included Iraq from 2014 \u2013 has cost around 500 thousand lives and created
\nmillions of homeless people and refugees. It is not surprising that all of
\nthese wars have disproportionately affected the Kurds. <\/p>\n
In Syria and Iraq now, there is no rule
\nof law, no consistent authority and, effectively, no state. The Iranian and
\nTurkish states both have their own agendas. They are both aiming for \u2018big
\nbrother\u2019 style leadership of the Middle East using, respectively Shia \/ Sunni
\nproxies. Neither wants to see Kurds united: both have been accustomed to using
\nwarring Kurdish factions as buffer armies since the 16th century. When Kurds try to distance themselves from
\nthis situation, and connect with the international community, then Iran and
\nTurkey try new ways to weaken and keep Kurds divided. <\/p>\n
Most recently, at the same time as
\nTurkey was supporting ISIS against Kurds, Iran was directly helping and
\nsupporting Shia militias fighting in Iraq against both Kurds and ISIS. Both
\ncountries are happy to see Kurds given a bloody nose and divided. There is a
\nfamous phrase that \u201cif you find two brothers fighting, do not try to separate
\nthem, otherwise they will both turn on you.\u201d In the Kurdish case, other
\ncountries do not just leave Kurdish factions to fight with each other, they
\nalso pour petrol on the fighting to make sure that fighting continues.<\/p>\n
So, it is difficult to talk about any
\nreal peace process between Turks and Kurds. There do seem to have been some
\ntalks about possible peace-talks. These limited talks have only been between
\ntwo political parties or groups (AKP and PKK), rather than involving all the
\ndifferent internal and international power-holders. However, these talks about
\ntalks are not new. Around two decades ago, in 1993, President Ozal tried to
\nnegotiate with Ocalan through various mediators. The failure of this initiative
\nopened the door for the very brutal conflicts of the 1990s. Then in 1997, Prime
\nMinister Erbakan made another unsuccessful attempt \u2013 one of the results of
\nwhich was a military coup. In 2009, the \u2018Oslo process\u2019 involved Turkish state
\nrepresentatives, especially the Turkish National Intelligence Service and the
\nPKK negotiating secretly with the help of diaspora representatives. <\/p>\n
However this 2009 attempt by the AKP
\ngovernment for peace with Kurds did not continue. Both sides, the government
\nand the PKK, blamed each other for the collapse of the talks in 2011, when the
\nprocess was made public. The broken promises and loss of hope after Oslo
\nresulted again in some of the bloodiest conflicts between Turkish state forces
\nand the PKK since before the 1999 Abdullah Ocalan arrest. The Uludere massacre
\ntook place in December 2011, when 34 Kurdish civilians were killed by the
\nTurkish military. Following this, Ocalan\u2019s meetings with his lawyers and
\nvisitors were cancelled and PKK prisoners in Turkey took part in lengthy hunger
\nstrikes at the end of 2012. <\/p>\n
During this crisis I carried out
\nfieldwork research in Germany and met and talked with Sakine Cansiz about the
\nconflict and the poor prospects for peace just a few weeks before she and other
\ntwo female Kurdish political activists were assassinated in Paris (9 January
\n2013). The murderer\u2019s links with the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) have
\nbeen established. Despite a bloody war, 67 days of hunger strike and the Paris
\nassassinations; Newroz 2013 was seen as another step towards peace between
\nKurds and Turkey when Ocalan\u2019s ceasefire message was read during the Newroz
\n(New Year) celebrations in Diyarbakir. The PKK and Ocalan openly declared that
\n\u2018Peace Process\u2019 negotiations were going on. However, the AKP government claimed
\nfor a long time that it was not the government but the state that was in
\ncontact with Ocalan and other Kurdish political representatives \u2013 thereby
\ntrying to protect the AKP from any damage from this process. They were
\navoiding, rather than taking, any risks.<\/p>\n
Six years after the
\n2009 Oslo talks there has not been much in the way of substantive developments;
\nexcept for several talks between Ocalan and some key players, including some
\nKurdish MPs, the Turkish Intelligence Service and some AKP members. Erdogan has
\navoided, at least openly, either being part of the process or working to move
\nthe process on. \u00a0<\/p>\n
For any successful
\npeace negotiations, the different parties must work together and be prepared to
\ntake risks to solve the dispute. In contrast, in the Turkish and Kurdish
\nso-called peace process many political and societal power holders have not been
\ninvolved. Key actors within different civil societies and the various relevant
\npolitical parties do not know the details of the negotiations between the
\nimprisoned Kurdish leader and the AKP or state representatives. There is no
\nclarity about the peace talks themselves, the possible reconciliation process,
\nand possible new institutions in the formation of a potentially decentralised
\nTurkish state. <\/p>\n
Past experience suggests
\nthat this may open the door for brutal conflict. Even if a peace process was
\nsuccessfully developing between the PKK and AKP, the exclusion of the other
\nfactions is likely to increase the possibilities of conflict. For
\nexample, Kurdish Hezbollah could turn their guns onto the Turkish state, saying
\nthat they do not recognise any peace process, and that they want to fight for
\nan independent Kurdish or Islamic state, as pursued by Hamas. Already, Turkish
\nnationalists and former members of the Turkish military do not recognise the
\ncurrent process and may support a bloody war. Since bad and good can easily,
\nand very quickly, swap sides in Middle East politics, it is important that any
\npeace process should include all main actors, and factions.<\/p>\n
The underlying concern is how to work
\ntowards successful negotiations for peace, including stability post-conflict,
\nwith the help of diasporas. One can easily observe deep differences between and
\nwithin diasporic communities. There is a strong emotional connection between
\nKurdish diaspora communities and society in Kurdish regional homelands. Just
\nlike Kurdish homeland society, diasporas are not a unitary or homogenous
\nentity. <\/p>\n
War and conflict over the past thirty
\nyears have forced hundreds of thousands of stateless Kurds to flee their
\nhomelands in Turkey and other countries in the Middle East in an attempt to
\nsecure safety outside of the region. <\/p>\n
It can be argued that statelessness,
\ndiaspora and nationalism are strongly connected in so far as statelessness and
\ndiaspora can be seen to feed nationalism. Since Kurds have no \u2018unitary\u2019
\nreligious or linguistic identity, many Kurds have claimed that the only way
\nforward is to become much more nationalistic. From this perspective, unity
\nthrough nationalism is the only way to end Kurdish statelessness and to make a
\nstable peace. <\/p>\n
Many Kurds believe that Kurdish people,
\nboth as individuals and as a community, have not been \u2018strong enough\u2019
\nnationalists, since they have not been successful at establishing their own
\nstate. The weak nationalism of stateless people, including Kurds, has been part
\nof academic debate in recent years. For example, Ismail Besikci, a well-known
\nTurkish academic who has researched Kurdish issues for decades, has asserted
\nthat:<\/p>\n
Kurds are not good enough nationalists. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the However, some other Kurds argue against Because of long years under the Members of the Kurdish diaspora have Under the KNC banner, Kurdish People from the diaspora who cannot go Kurds are no longer As we have seen, diaspora communities If there is going to be any peace with Millions of people have suffered and Of course we [diaspora Kurds] want The imprisoned Kurdish leader, Ocalan, At the 13th General Meeting of the KNC, held in Brussels on Democratisation of [the] Middle East As we see from this explanation, there More tactically, and perhaps more Many of my interviewees believe that The Turkish President Recep Tayyip To conclude: the existing peace As discussed above, Kurds demonstrate in Strasbourg calling for Ocalan's release, February 2015. Demotix\/ Jonathan Rae. All rights reserved.Turkey and the Kurds share the aim of ending their long-standing conflict. So what of the so-called peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK, especially their imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan? And what is the potential role of Kurdish…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1392","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1392","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1392"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1392\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1392"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1392"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1392"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nThey should not be as democratic as they are today. It\u2019s too much. It is not
\nKurds\u2019 business to make Turkey a more democratic country. <\/em><\/p>\n
\nKurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK), who has been imprisoned by Turkey since 1999,
\nhas also called on all Kurdish people around the world to unite, and to show
\nresistance against their enemies. Kurds who have left the various imagined
\nhomelands of Kurdistan to live in diasporas, often take such calls for national
\nsolidarity especially seriously. The ISIS attack on Kobane, which has cost
\nthousands of lives and caused suffering to hundreds of thousands of people, is
\nthe first time in history that Kurds from different parts of the world have
\njoined together to fight for the same cause. These efforts demonstrate a
\nsignificant shift in Kurdish nationalism: from localized and weak nationalism
\ntowards a collective, stronger form of nationalism with the help of diaspora
\nmobilization. <\/p>\n
\nstronger nationalism, and instead believe that Kurds need to be more democratic
\nthan they are currently. When Abbas Vali, another well-known Kurdish academic,
\ncommented on my recent presentation of Besikci\u2019s statement, he said that, \u201cI
\nhave to fundamentally disagree with Besikci. Kurds are not democratic enough.\u201d
\nKurds who want to promote a more advanced form of democracy are especially
\nconcerned about the rights of women and other powerless groups. They even want
\nto champion the right to be heard for those people who hold political views in
\ndirect opposition to their own. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nassimilationist policies of the Turkish state, then until recently many Kurds
\nhave felt ashamed of their cultural identity. Many Kurds hid their Kurdishness
\nand Kurdish roots. However, with the recent conflict in the Middle East and,
\nespecially, the victorious fighting in Kobane, many Kurds are now becoming
\nincreasingly proud of their Kurdishness. Linked to this, there is increasing
\nKurdish nationalism. As Kurds are still an underdog minority, this nationalism
\nis developing into an \u2018aggressive\u2019 form which has even been described by
\nBozarlan as \u2018narcissistic nationalism\u2019. <\/p>\nKurdish diaspora
\nmobilization for the homeland<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nfor many years tried to remove the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) from the
\nEuropean Union\u2019s list of designated terrorist groups. Freedom for Ocalan is
\nanother key aim for the Kurdish national diaspora movement. All of these movements
\nare organised under the banner of the Kurdish National Congress (KNC). This was
\nestablished on 24 May 1999, just a few months after Ocalan was arrested.
\nUnderlining the importance of the diaspora communities the KNC is based in
\nBrussels. This is a temporary arrangement which will last until Kurds have full
\nindependence, or at least, substantive autonomy. <\/p>\n
\ntransnational political and protest movements in Europe have made the world
\naware of the effects of ISIS attacks against Kurds in Shengal in Iraq, as well
\nas in Kobane, Syria. As part of my ethnographic research, I was told that
\nseveral hundred young Kurdish men and women have travelled from London and
\nBerlin to fight, and help the Kurds in Turkey and Syria. Some of these people
\nare well-educated or work in well-paid professions. <\/p>\n
\nto fight themselves, instead organize fundraising events and take part in
\nlobbying activities and demonstrations with the aim of persuading British and
\nEuropean politicians to help the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and
\nIran. In September and October 2014, some London-based Kurds even went on
\nhunger strike for the Kurdish cause. Benedict Anderson may be wrong when he
\nclaims that members of diaspora communities try to influence what is going on
\nin their homeland without being physically involved in destructive conflicts. <\/p>\n
\njust a local tribal group, operating through kinship networks. The Kurdish
\nlobby in the diaspora may not be as strong as that for Armenians and Jews, but
\nthey are moving in that direction. Millions of Kurds and their supporters can,
\nand do, take to the streets of Istanbul, Berlin, London, Paris, New York and
\nBrussels, whenever there is an issue of concern. They also have increasingly
\nstrong and close relationships with the governments of their new host
\ncountries. For example, Kurds regularly use facilities within the UK parliament
\nfor meetings and political discussions, and several MPs and Lords usually input
\nfavourably. These increasing links should not be underestimated.<\/p>\n
\ncan easily become a driving engine for homeland politics, nationalist
\nmovements, and even armed conflict in the original homeland. They can also
\nbecome an agent of change towards peace. As discussed above, this was the case
\nfor the peace process between the PKK and Turkish state representatives,
\nespecially the Turkish National Intelligence Service. In 2009, initial
\nnegotiations were brokered with the help of diaspora representatives, in the
\nso-called \u2018Oslo Process.\u2019 This example demonstrates that the Kurdish stateless
\ndiaspora has already been an active, influential actor in policies affecting
\nits homeland. As one of my interviewees said:<\/p>\n
\nTurkey, it will be down to the diaspora. And that\u2019s true for conflict too. We
\nare becoming as strong as the Armenian and Jewish diaspora. Assimilated Kurds
\nin Turkey cannot make peace \u2013 or war \u2013 without us. We [diaspora Kurds] have
\nsuffered. And we [diaspora] will be a part of the decision-making process, if
\nthere are going to be any decisions. <\/em><\/p>\n
\nmoved to different diasporas because of the conflict. Many of them have very
\nlittle trust in the on-going so-called \u2018peace process\u2019. All of this makes any
\ntalks and the peace process itself very fragile. Many of my interviewees do not
\ntrust the Turkish state, especially the current Erdogan-led government, to make
\npeace. Another of my interviewees explained: <\/p>\n
\npeace. Who would not want peace? I have lived in three different diasporas in
\nthe last 30 years:in Germany, in France and now in the UK. I haven\u2019t seen my
\nhometown or my relatives in Turkey since the 1980s. My land was occupied by the
\nvillage guards. Peace may help people like me to end this misery and to have
\ntheir land and their home back. But Turkey is not serious about making peace.
\nErdogan is just playing with us. He needs Kurdish votes and he has used us to
\nstay in power since 2002. He has not made any legal changes in favour of Kurds
\nin his last 13 years in power. He is not a friend of Kurds. We [Kurds] have to
\nthink beyond any national borders to help each other. We cannot trust others to
\nhelp us to make peace; we should create our own state and pull down all the
\nborders that divide us.<\/em><\/p>\n
\nunderstands what a potentially important role diaspora communities have. He has
\nrepeatedly asked the diaspora to contribute to the development of the peace
\nprocess both by organising discussions and other events, and also to involve
\nEuropean institutions and governments in these events. With this in mind,
\nseveral conferences (May and December 2013, December 2014) were organised in
\nBrussels by the Kurdish National Congress in the Diaspora (KNC). These meetings
\nhave shown how Kurds feel they cannot trust the Turkish state to engage in any
\nreal peace process, and that they realise they must become just as good at
\nplaying political games as that state. <\/p>\n
\n25-26 May 2013, it was stated that Kurds have the right to live and create
\ntheir own destiny in their own land as a Kurdish nation, and: <\/p>\n
\ncan be achieved through the recognition of Kurdish identity and Kurdistan as a
\nnation\u2026 On these grounds Kirkuk and other parts of [the] Kurdish region[s] that
\nwere taken [by Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran] have to be included again in the
\nmap of Kurdistan, and these countries have to show their respect for the map of
\nKurdistan and its territory. <\/em><\/p>\n
\nare no signs that Kurds, as represented by the PKK and KNC, have dropped their
\nclaim of creating a unitary Kurdish state. <\/p>\nAre
\nKurds learning to play the system?<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nrealistically, many Kurdish nationalists have temporarily postponed their aim
\nto create a Kurdish state in Turkey, as they focus on state-making in Syria and
\nIraq. As long as the fight continues in Iraq and Syria, the most radical Kurds
\ncan consolidate their increasingly radical members around that struggle. As Jok
\nsays for the South Sudanese case: \u201cnations don\u2019t just happen \u2013 they have to be
\nplanned, forged and crafted.\u201d Many Kurds in diaspora and also in Turkey are
\naware that the processes and techniques for state making are not easy and may
\ntake a long time. For example, the Mayor of Kobane acknowledged that \u201cwe
\n[Kurds] are not professional [yet] when it comes to independence.\u201d Cemil Bay\u0131k,
\none of the founders and leaders of the outlawed PKK, has said that although
\ncurrently there is no situation that requires an armed struggle against Turkey,
\n"this does not mean we will lay down our weapons. When the chaos that is
\nengulfing the Middle East is taken into consideration, disarming is not
\npossible.\u201d <\/p>\n
\nthe sort of democratic autonomous system that Ocalan and many Kurdish
\nnationalists currently support for Turkey would not only give them time but
\nalso allow some of the necessary preparations for a future unitary Kurdish
\nstate. Kurds already practice their own legal system for business, family and
\neven criminal cases as a de facto<\/em>, as part of their practical resistance
\nagainst the Turkish state and institutions of the state and also part of
\nKurdish state building project in Turkey unofficially. This practice has been
\nre-developed and introduced by the PKK for Kurdish people. <\/p>\n
\nErdogan has also pointed out in many speeches how different Kurdish
\npower-holders, and especially diasporas, play a crucial role in the ongoing
\nconflict and its resolution. The Kurdish diaspora is therefore recognized as an
\nimportant influencing factor by both sides of the conflict. <\/p>\n
\nnegotiations between Turkey and Kurds are not balanced. Messages from Ocalan
\nabout the negotiations are carried by a few selected Kurdish political party
\nmembers. I understand that any peace process should be limited to start with,
\nwith only a few actual actors, but there seems to have been no substantive
\nprocess over the last six years. <\/p>\n
\nKurdish diasporas have followed a \u2018strong\u2019 and even \u2018aggressive\u2019 nationalism in
\nrecent years. They have actively contributed both to the ongoing conflict and
\nto peace. This dual role may be an important barrier for Kurdish leaders to
\novercome if they are going to make any peace.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"