Tunisian police investigate Bardo museum attack. Demoted\/Chedly ben Ibrahim. All rights reserved.The jihadi attack at the museum of Bardo on March 18 marks a new stage
\nin the developing turmoil in the MENA region. In particular, concerns have been
\nexpressed on the evolving impact of Islamic State through the region up to the
\nsouthern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. The situation is far from clear, the
\nimpression being that the local political deadlock which is evident in Libya,
\nEgypt, Syria and Tunisia may be a propitious context for the further penetration
\nof extremist jihadi cells espousing the caliphate of al-Baghdadi.<\/i><\/p>\n
As for the situation in Tunisia, several violent events marked the post-revolutionary
\nperiod, notably the political assassination of the two leftist leaders, Mohamed
\nBrahami and Choukri Bel Aid. The ideological polarization of the political
\nscene made these events appear more like a polemical intervention than a
\ncomprehensive frame for real threats but this made the dynamic even more
\nconfusing. Some new elements, however, have emerged in these recent days that help
\nto clarify some of the mysteries of the Tunisian transition, with special
\nregard to the emergence of a jihadi threat. I will try to make sense of the
\ngeneral situation arising from the latest jihadi statements. <\/p>\n
The first source is from the Ifriqiyya<\/em> website, considered close It is fairly clear that Okba Ibn The second document that seems interesting is the interview that appeared I repeat we can\u2019t be sure this is the truth, but at least this narrative The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia at the beginning of 2011 was the Thanks to such factors, the public were radicalized and for some this More radical jihadi elements were also lingering behind the scenes. As was Of the two trends of the jihadi movement, we may say that Ansar While it is not completely correct to say that the IS group is totally \u2018apocalyptic\u2019 Understanding the differences within the international jihadi movement gives In conclusion, the Islamic State project is finding some consensus in Tunisian police investigate Bardo museum attack. Demoted\/Chedly ben Ibrahim. All rights reserved.The jihadi attack at the museum of Bardo on March 18 marks a new stage in the developing turmoil in the MENA region. In particular, concerns have been expressed on the evolving impact of Islamic State through the region up to the southern shore…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1351","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1351","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1351"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1351\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1351"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1351"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1351"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nto the AQMI-linked Okba Ibn nefaa<\/em>, responsible
\nfor attacks against the Tunisian army over the last two years. In a long
\ndocument of twenty pages released on March 29, they seem to challenge the
\ndeclaration by the Tunisian security services that they had eliminated the
\nleadership of the group in a recent operation in Sidi Aicha (Gafsa) during
\nwhich 9 armed jihadi were said to have been killed. What is most important in this
\ndocument is that they claim to be part of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and
\nat one and the same time to be supporting the cause of the caliphate and
\nstressing the will to create a new wilaya (region) of the caliphate in Tunisia.\n<\/p>\n
\nNefaa<\/em> (like AQMI in general) is part of the Islamic State nexus, if not
\nformally with a clear pledge of loyalty, certainly in the type of operation, the
\nchoice of objective (targeting the Tunisian state) and in its general political
\naim, the implementation of a caliphate. This gives credence to the thesis that
\nAQMI is merging into the general IS trend, probably through its experience of Jihad
\nin Tunisia.\u00a0 On the other hand, the evidence
\nthat Okba Ibn Nafaa<\/em> is developing
\ninto a local Tunisian operator is very clear from the general tone of the
\nstatement. We get the distinct impression of Tunisians talking to Tunisians
\nabout Tunisia. After evaluating the number of people at the demonstration
\nagainst terrorism, counting about 20,000 people and reacting with some
\nprecision to each public declaration concerning the Bardo attack, they conclude
\nthat Tunisians are however waiting for the coming of the Islamic State because
\nthey hate politicians, the corruption and social injustice of the state. This
\nlast statement has become a common argument in many working class areas of
\nTunisia, with people speculating that Islamic State might install a more basic
\ntax system and a much freer social system.<\/p>\n
\nin the IS review, Dabiq <\/em>(n.8) with Abu Muqatil al-Tunisi, alleged killer
\nof Mohamed Brahami, one of two political leaders assassinated in July 2013. It
\nis not sure whether he is really telling the truth. But if we presume that this
\nis so, we get some interesting clarifications of past events.<\/p>\n\n
\nsaying that the assassinations aimed at creating chaos, according to the famous
\njihadi thesis, translated into English as \u201cthe management of savagery\u201d. This
\nbook theorizes that in such situations, similar to the ones produced in many
\ncountries during the Arab Spring, a political assassination can precipitate political
\ncontradictions into a situation of all against all, in which an Islamic vanguard
\ncan push forward to an Islamic state seen as a solution and accepted by the
\npopulation. <\/li>\n
\nstrategy failed because the other Islamist groups would not buy into it.<\/li>\n
\nthat executed both the operations seem to be extremist jihadi elements,
\nradicalised by their past experiences in prison and without any clear link to
\nany organization.<\/li>\n
\nprovided a training camp and easy supply of arms to accomplish such operations.\n<\/li>\n
\nrespect to the Bardo operations, he praises those executing them and hoped that
\nthere would be further instances of people emulating them, but did not make any
\nreference to a group that organized it.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
\nhas the advantage of linking several points of analysis. Joined in this fashion
\nthey help us grasp the logic behind past, present and future developments on
\nthe ground.<\/p>\n
\nculmination of the challenge to several regimes, in particular the Tunisian,
\nLibyan and (in part of the territory) the Syrian. Setting aside the very
\nspecific case of Syria, for Libya and Tunisia further consequences were the
\nweakening of state institutions and an increase in outlaw activities, together
\nwith a period of intense contention and an ideological vacuum, typical of any situation
\nof transition. <\/p>\n
\ntook the shape of a radical Islamization. In fact, the public space had been
\nopened up to several political and non-political agencies, but first and
\nforemost, to the Islamists. Alongside an older generation of Islamists (from the
\nMuslim Brotherhood ideological family), who wanted to govern and were
\ninterested in advancing a position of moderation, radical Islamic actors became
\nSalafists, representing a new generation that was more radical and less disposed
\nto compromise. Most of this conflict seemed to get absorbed into a process of
\ncontention, radical but mostly not violent, that was \u00a0keen to form alliances with social actors on
\nthe ground. In Tunisia, as in Libya, the new Salafist brand, Ansar al-sharia, was
\npositioned somewhere between the Muslim Brotherhood and more takfirist
\n(radical) elements. <\/p>\n
\nthe situation in Tunisia, described by abu Muqatil in this interview, we get
\nthe sense that takfirist elements acted covertly, without really trying to
\nmerge in the process of public contention taking place, but only planning obsessively
\ntheir apocalyptic plans for the realization of an Islamic state. <\/p>\n
\nal-sharia and Jebahat al-Nusra make politics, having a realistic vision of their
\npolitical goal, while the others are purely \u2018revolutionary\u2019 and seem obsessed
\nby a literal application of what they see as the Quranic precepts. These
\nelements are a part of the Salafi-jihadi movement, and are easily distinguished
\nin the same environment from the other types and factions. They have a more urgent
\napocalyptic vision of the world: which is why I distinguish them by calling the
\nformer, radical Islamists (or Salafists) and the latter \u00a0\u2018apocalyptic jihadis\u2019. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\n(they are in an advanced stage of state-building), we can say that they are a
\nnew generation of jihadi, completely obsessed by the jihad per se. The
\nreferences to the Quranic verses of Jihad are a constant stream, while the
\nother groups advocate a changing evaluation of the situation in the field. They
\nmagnify martyrdom and encourage it, while the others avoid suicide operations,
\nfor example. Ansar al-Sharia and Jabahat al-Nusra have joined the Islamic
\nfronts in a national fight while the others fight for their own goals without
\nany political calculation, seeing world conquest as the final stage.<\/p>\n
\nus a key to elaborate a counter-strategy. Any response to the international
\nexpansion of IS requires a good policy that proceeds according to certain guidelines.
\nFirst, avoid as best one may the exposure of the western countries to any military
\naction (this is exactly what an apocalyptic vision requires – the battle
\nbetween good and evil). Second, keep a low profile, avoiding big rhetorical
\ndeclarations; focus instead on an intelligent counter-terrorism action that
\nlimits the interventions to specific targets in the apocalyptic camp. Third,
\nleave local actors to deal with these tensions; then it is their own
\ncontradictions that they have to deal with. Fourth, push for a political
\nsolution to each aspect of the crisis which gives the IS strategy its support.
\nFive, deal justly in those international issues (like Palestine\/Israel) that
\nmake Arab countries frustrated vis \u00e0 vis<\/em> western policy.<\/p>\n
\ncountries where political deadlock reduces our social lives to a primordial
\nlevel. Social and economic frustration stays at an all-time high level, even in
\na country like Tunisia, where the political evolution of the Arab Spring did
\nnot bring that change expected in our material lives. Political tension, due
\nmainly to ideological polarization within society has given way to the logic of
\nconfrontation. The radical Islamic solution of the Islamic State has some
\nattractions under these conditions. However the apocalyptic vision of the world
\nand the brutal means of action designed to achieve it are despised by most
\npeople. Besides that, those groups fail in any politically realistic evaluation.
\nThey are doomed to fail. It is just a matter of time. What is important though
\nis to make their failure the consequence of the struggle of their own people,
\ninstead of that \u2018evil\u2019 Western imperial intervention. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"