{"id":1290,"date":"2019-03-27T04:06:16","date_gmt":"2019-03-27T04:06:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sportsnewsforyou.com\/?p=1290"},"modified":"2024-12-05T10:59:20","modified_gmt":"2024-12-05T10:59:20","slug":"refugees-and-realistic-european-options","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/?p=1290","title":{"rendered":"Refugees and realistic European options"},"content":{"rendered":"

Click:tin box manufacturer<\/a><\/p>\n

Protest poster at PEGIA demonstration( Patriotic Euopeans againt Islamisization of the West). Jens Meyer \/Press Association. All rights reserved.Like the Eurozone crisis before
\nit, Europe\u2019s refugee crisis has forced the EU into a state of permanent
\nemergency. Refugee flows into Europe continue to dominate the headlines, punctuated
\nby regular emergency summits and hastily scrambled together dossiers. As with
\nthe Euro, the crisis is proving fiendishly difficult to resolve \u2013 every policy
\noption has the potential to lead to political ruin. Last week the European
\nCommission took another stab at resolving one aspect of the problem: the EU\u2019s
\nso-called \u2018Dublin\u2019 asylum system.<\/i><\/p>\n

The Dublin system for managing
\nasylum was originally introduced in the 1990s to ensure clarity over which
\nmember state was responsible for each asylum seeker that entered the EU. The
\nneed for clear rules became apparent with the introduction of the Schengen
\nagreement that brought down border controls between most Western European countries.
\nOne core aspect of Dublin is that in general, other than in particular cases
\nsuch as when an asylum seeker has a close family member in a member state, the
\nfirst member state that an asylum seeker enters is responsible for their asylum
\napplication.<\/p>\n

Over the years Dublin has worked
\nrelatively well for top destination countries of asylum seekers in northern
\nEurope, which have had recourse to return some of their asylum seekers to the
\nfirst EU member state they passed through. But \u2013 particularly in recent years
\nas the refugee crisis has grown \u2013 countries on the southern periphery of the EU
\nhave borne the brunt of asylum applications. This is far removed from the
\nprofessed principles of transnational solidarity and cooperation at the foundation
\nof the EU project. <\/p>\n

Moreover, the rules have now
\nbecome dysfunctional. Many returns do not take place: in 2014 the UK only
\ncarried out 252 transfers through Dublin, despite making 1831 requests. The
\nEuropean Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have ruled
\nthat asylum seekers cannot be returned to Greece through the Dublin rules due
\nto its poor conditions and deficiencies in its asylum procedures. And last year,
\nfaced with vast numbers of asylum seekers making their way through Europe,
\nGermany took the decision to temporarily stop returning Syrian asylum seekers
\nto the first EU member state they entered.<\/p>\n

Two options<\/strong><\/h2>\n

So what are the alternatives to the
\ncurrent system? Last week the European
\nCommission set out two immediate options for reform.
\nOn the one hand, the paper offers a more radical, centralising system for
\nmanaging asylum applications. Under this plan, Dublin would be replaced
\nentirely by a system that continuously relocates asylum seekers across the EU
\naccording to a \u2018distribution key\u2019. <\/p>\n

This distribution key would
\ndistribute asylum seekers based on factors such as population size, wealth, and
\nthe member state\u2019s capacity to absorb refugees. The relevant member state would
\nthen assess the asylum seeker\u2019s application. (In the long-term, the paper also
\nhints at the possibility of a centralised asylum system, with EU bodies
\nappointed for assessing asylum applications and appeals and directing asylum
\nseekers to a designated member state, but recognises this is not feasible in
\nthe short to medium term.)<\/p>\n

But the politics suggest that a
\nradical overhaul of the Dublin system is simply far-fetched. With populist
\nparties riding high and public opinion sceptical in a number of member states \u2013
\nnot least in all-important Germany \u2013 and with an in-out EU referendum in the UK
\nlooming, there is little will or desire to let the EU take further control over
\neach EU member state\u2019s asylum process or to make any dramatic changes to the
\ncurrent system.<\/p>\n

The second option put forward by
\nthe Commission (known as \u2018Dublin Plus\u2019) is to leave the basic Dublin rules
\nintact and to instead put in place provisions for extreme scenarios like the
\none the EU currently faces. This reform would supplement the Dublin rules with
\nan additional emergency \u2018fairness mechanism\u2019 that reallocates asylum applications
\nfairly according to a distribution key when asylum flows are very high. <\/p>\n

This reform too faces
\ndifficulties. The EU is currently operating a similar emergency relocation
\nscheme for Syrian refugees from Greece and Italy as a consequence of the
\ncurrent crisis. But it isn\u2019t working \u2013 in March, only 937 of 160,000 promised relocations were carried
\nout. A new report out this month from the Commission again found progress
\nwas unsatisfactory. Despite the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council agreeing to
\nthe relocation plans (albeit amid opposition from some central and eastern
\nEuropean countries), many member states now seem to be dragging their heels. Some
\ncritics argue that, if EU countries can\u2019t make relocation work now on a
\ntemporary basis, it seems pointless to embed the idea as a permanent feature of
\nEU policy.<\/p>\n

Secondary flows<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Moreover, others have argued
\nthat the relocation scheme suffers from a fundamental flaw \u2013 it is incompatible
\nwith the Schengen agreement, which allows asylum seekers and refugees to travel
\nacross many EU member states. So even if the relocations can be carried out,
\nindividuals can move again in what the EU calls \u2018secondary flows\u2019.<\/p>\n

In its proposal this week, the
\nCommission sets out a number of ideas trying to address this particular issue.
\nIn an ironic turn of affairs, given the recent UK-EU renegotiation aimed at
\nreducing the \u2018pull factors\u2019 driving EU migration to the UK, the EU now wants to
\nlimit flows across the EU by deterring asylum seekers and refugees from moving,
\nsuch as by preventing access to benefits. But it is still very unclear whether
\nthese measures can really control secondary movements, just as it is unclear
\nwhether Cameron\u2019s \u2018emergency brake\u2019 will reduce EU migration to the UK.<\/p>\n

Going nowhere fast<\/strong><\/h2>\n

So both proposals have their
\nflaws. But that\u2019s not to say they are the wrong thing to do. Critics of this
\nnew paper \u2013 of which there are many \u2013 seem to underestimate the impossible
\nsituation in which the Commission finds itself. In order to pass any
\nlegislation, it needs to satisfy both a majority in the European Parliament and
\na qualified majority in the Council of Ministers. That is, in order to become
\nlaw the proposal needs sufficient support from the governments of the EU\u2019s
\nmember states, including a wary Germany, struggling to manage the refugee
\ncrisis in its own country; a beleaguered Greece, nervous of any attempts by the
\nEU to expel it from Schengen; and a combative Hungary, stridently against
\ntaking in refugees and preparing a referendum on asylum quotas.<\/p>\n

It therefore seems clear that if
\nthe Commission proposed anything that appeared too radical or federalist \u2013 such
\nas an immediate centralisation of the asylum decision making process \u2013 it would
\ngo nowhere fast. And, conversely, any proposal that charged in a different
\ndirection \u2013 by for instance proposing restrictions on Schengen movements \u2013
\nwould be met with short shrift by those member states that see Schengen as
\nuntouchable.<\/p>\n

In this context, the
\nCommission\u2019s proposals \u2013 which tread a careful line between these two extremes
\n\u2013 seem like the only realistic options. Yes, they are far from perfect \u2013 they
\ndo little, for instance, to take into account the preferences of asylum seekers
\nin the relocation process, thereby increasing the risk of asylum seekers moving
\nto their preferred destination after being relocated. But they perhaps
\nrepresent the limit of what is politically possible, given the current
\npriorities of the member states. Indeed, it seems inevitable that the more
\nradical option proposed by the Commission will fall by the wayside, and that
\nthe final proposal will look more like Dublin Plus. <\/p>\n

Beggar my neighbour and moral failure<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The challenge will now be
\nwhether an agreement can be found in the Council and the Parliament, and,
\nwhether, provided agreement is found, any such relocation policy will actually
\ntake place on the ground. That is primarily a question of political willpower
\n(as well as of administrative competence). The natural temptation will be to
\ncontinue the \u2018beggar my neighbour\u2019 policies that have characterised the crisis
\nso far, but as the chaos continues the scope for change should increase.<\/p>\n

So yes: the Commission\u2019s
\nproposals inevitably mean further muddle and confusion for now, and they may well
\nface major challenges with implementation. They may prioritise the wrong issues
\nand lack the right ambition. But they are a step in the right direction, when
\nthe alternative is complete paralysis \u2013 and with the refugee crisis exposing
\nthe deep flaws in the current system, this would be a moral failure.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Click:tin box manufacturer Protest poster at PEGIA demonstration( Patriotic Euopeans againt Islamisization of the West). Jens Meyer \/Press Association. All rights reserved.Like the Eurozone crisis before it, Europe\u2019s refugee crisis has forced the EU into a state of permanent emergency. Refugee flows into Europe continue to dominate the headlines, punctuated by regular emergency summits and…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1290"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1290\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11576,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1290\/revisions\/11576"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}