Press Association\/AP\/Nasser Nasser. All rights reserved.The question of the Egyptian revolution\u2019s future has become as much a
\nclich\u00e9 as the discourse on its utopian history. The former is as excessive in
\nits pessimism as the latter is in its optimism. Although neither abide by
\nempirical rationale, both are politically understandable.<\/i><\/p>\n
But before asking the classical question: \u201cdoes the
\nEgyptian revolution still have a future?\u201d; let us first agree that such a
\npessimistically oriented question, or rather proposition, is engrained in and
\nstems from a wider and more comprehensive history of Egypt and the revolution
\nas independent concepts. We do not give rise to such propositions, for history
\nthrusts them upon us as questions nagging for answers, while hiding its own
\nanswers within the questions it imposes. So let us not repeat after the
\n\u2018written-by-the-victorious\u2019 history what it wants us to keep repeating; and
\nrather seek hidden impulses beneath the surface of contemporary understandings
\nof the Egyptian revolution.<\/p>\n
That a huge number of Egyptians took to the streets in A revolution is an incomplete rupture; a rupture in Will the attempt at rupture answer the call of If the above is ambiguous, it is only because I did To begin with, let us agree that the word \u2018state\u2019 is "We know that the State apparatus may survive, as Indeed, there were moments in history, though brief The calls in June 2013 were not a breaking of silence. They were calls for the reinstitution of silence.<\/p>\n The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia offers great Their opponents had no recourse other than an archaic To say that the Bolshevik hold on power marked the end This is exactly what happened in the Arab world in During the year Morsi was in office, we heard Some people like to attach those calls to As such, the calls in June 2013 were not a breaking of Press Association\/AP. All rights reserved.Gramscians might have an answer. The ideological In transcending party politics, the Sisi regime based While the above has only proffered a diagnosis of what "The surest enemy of authority is contempt and The event is that of Shady AbouZeid and Ahmed Malek By being utterly absent from all serious political debates, Sisi made of himself the hero of the masses\u2019 fantasies.<\/p>\n Shady and Ahmed made a very short video that made the That is not to say that \u201claughter\u201d is a solution by But what I argue here, following Arendt, is that Herein lies the challenge: how to convert such a This is what Abdel Fattah El Sisi understood. Instead For apolitical militarism cannot and in any case Thus, as to the question \u201cdoes the Egyptian revolution Press Association\/AP\/Nasser Nasser. All rights reserved.The question of the Egyptian revolution\u2019s future has become as much a clich\u00e9 as the discourse on its utopian history. The former is as excessive in its pessimism as the latter is in its optimism. Although neither abide by empirical rationale, both are politically understandable. But before asking the classical…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1273","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1273","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1273"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1273\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1273"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1273"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1273"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n2011 was a necessary moment, a proposition that forced itself. Other
\npropositions were later born out of that momentous rupture. But it was not
\nexactly a rupture; not a total break with the past. It is only an\u00a0attempt<\/em>\u00a0at rupture, better yet a crack.<\/p>\n
\nthe making; a groping for answers yet impervious to immediate answers. If the
\nact of revolting took place, it was only a call for the rupture that had been
\nthere. The call did not beget it, only called for it. To employ a Derridean \u2013
\nabove all a Marxian \u2013 term, the revolution is a \u2018spectre\u2019, always there if
\nunseen, waiting to be conjured up or to conjure itself up. But the call was
\nequally a necessary call; a call that united otherwise mutually hostile groups,
\npoliticised the apolitical and neutralised the anti-political.<\/p>\n
\ndemocracy? An answer to this question is conditional. We cannot respond to it
\nunless we dig a little deeper and ask: will democracy answer the people\u2019s call?
\nOr dig a bit further and ask: was the people\u2019s call a \u201cgenuine\u201d call for
\ndemocracy?<\/p>\n
\nnot make myself clearer by drawing on a few lessons of history. But before I go
\nabout doing this, allow me to resolve few theoretical ambiguities that have a
\ndirect bearing on our topic.<\/p>\n
\nan abstraction, i.e. it is only understood through its attributes. Thus, the
\nstate is state power, a wielding of the state apparatus (both repressive and
\nideological), namely its machinery of persuasion, surveillance and repression
\nthat ensures the reproduction of a\u00a0status
\nquo<\/em>, a mode of economic, social and political production. A
\nrevolution is anattempt<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>to summon a rupture to
\nthe state apparatus; a redefinition of the\u00a0raisons
\nd'\u00e9tat<\/em>\u00a0that
\npreserves the\u00a0status
\nquo<\/em>. But such an attempt seldom initially succeeds. Here, it
\nis worth quoting\u00a0Louis Althusser\u00a0at some length:<\/p>\n
\nis proved by bourgeois \u2018revolutions\u2019 in nineteenth-century France (1830, 1848),
\nby\u00a0coups
\nd\u2019\u00e9tat\u00a0(2 December, May 1958), by collapses of the State
\n(the fall of the Empire in 1870, of the Third Republic in 1940), or by the
\npolitical rise of the petty bourgeoisie (1890-95 in France), etc., without the
\nState apparatus being affected or modified: it may survive political events
\nwhich affect the possession of State power\u2026Even after a social revolution like
\nthat of 1917, a large part of the State apparatus survived after the seizure of
\nState power by the alliance of the proletariat and the small peasantry: Lenin
\nrepeated the fact again and again."<\/p>\n
\nand with mixed results, when the rupture was realised. After all, a revolution
\nis a protest against rulers\u2019 estrangement from their subjects. The more
\nprofound the estrangement, the more intense and unyielding the protest, and the
\ncloser appears the rupture. But what the revolutionaries in Egypt bitterly
\nlearned was that protesting is more of a sign of discontent than an actual
\ncontestation; thus the now glamourous clich\u00e9 used by almost all diverse political
\nactors on the Egyptian scene: \u201cprotesting is not enough\u201d.\u00a0<\/p>\n
\ninsights in this regard. Like that of France prior to the French Revolution of
\n1789, the Russian aristocracy suffered from paralysis, a function of years of
\ndiscussions separated from any obligation to take productive decisions, let
\nalone crystallise them into plans of action. The resultant lacuna was naturally
\nfilled by men the likes of Lenin and Stalin, with the vision not only to wrest
\ncontrol from the jaws of anarchy, but also to consolidate their rule through
\niron discipline.<\/p>\n
\nhabit of obedience that had collapsed, and a long-held patriotism that had been
\ndissolved thanks to the despotic Czars. Revolutionary millennial fancies
\nsupplemented by a clear-headed philosophy enabled the Bolsheviks to draw
\ncitizens to their side, through political maneuvering on the one hand and
\ninfusing them with vigour about a utopian future on the other. Clearly, in
\ntimes of uncertainty the people are in dire need of those who promise order and
\nsolidarity, even if their ultimate objectives are questionable. The Bolsheviks
\npromised both and the rupture was\u00a0partially<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>realised.<\/p>\n
\nof ideology for the Russians is to ignore the glasnost and perestroika
\ninitiated by Gorbachev in the 1980s. I do not intend to share Fukuyama\u2019s rather
\nhasty conclusion that the demise of Marxism-Leninism marked the end of history
\neither. It is always futile to attempt to put a full stop to history. No sooner
\ndo scholars \u2013 and masses \u2013 rest satisfied with their assertions than history
\ndisappoints them.<\/p>\n
\n2011. Although there were predictions of a building resentment in some camps,
\nthe tide of Arab uprisings came as a shock to most Arabs (including the
\nrevolutionaries and political activists themselves), more so to the westerners.
\nThe fact that the revolutionaries\u2019 call for democracy came to the liking of
\nend-of-history scholars is not a sufficient proof of their \u2018triumph of the
\nwest\u2019 theory, for it accounted neither for the rise of political Islam nor for
\nthe fierce resistance battle waged by military generals (i.e. the survival of
\nthe state apparatus).\u00a0<\/p>\n
\ndesperate calls for a return to the pre-2011 period, a return to so-called
\nstability. Those calls were even intensified after the overthrow of Morsi. They
\nwere not calls for the mere overthrow of Morsi and the restoration of the
\ndemocratic transition. They were rather calls for cleaning up the whole
\nrevolutionary mess. What is more interesting is that these calls brought
\ntogether the silent 'couch potatoes' who had no stakes in the 2011 uprising to
\nbegin with and the very revolutionaries who were panicked by the vivid demise
\nof their end-of-history revolutionary project.<\/p>\n
\ncounter-revolutionary forces. It makes sense, for who else would have wanted to
\nrevoke the democratic gains of the revolution? However, it is hard to determine
\nthese \u201ccounter-revolutionary\u201d forces. In fact, being counter-intuitive in
\nitself, it cannot be understood except in juxtaposition with the
\n\u201crevolutionary\u201d. But who knows who represents this revolution? There are only
\nassumptions. As I have\u00a0discussed
\nearlier, there was not one homogenous group that revolted for the
\nsame demands.<\/p>\n
\nsilence. They were calls for the reinstitution of silence, for the restoration
\nof their feel-good couches. What explains this euphoria for self-oppression?
\nWhat accounts for this habit of consent?<\/p>\n
\nunderpinning is a function of hegemony, Gramsci contends, which operates on
\nvarious levels and takes many forms, but primarily a function of hegemony as an
\nappendix to domination (i.e. the exclusive exercise of coercion or \u2018armed
\nforce\u2019). The dominant group is at once the hegemonic group, but this shall not
\nbe taken for granted. Sisi understood that better than Mubarak, Tantawi or even
\nthe democratically elected Morsi. When the new and young general rose to power,
\nhe did not merely exercise authority through military tanks. He relied on what
\nGuillermo O\u2019Donnell, referring to Latin America, coined "delegative
\ndemocracy". Refusing to identify with any political faction, partly to
\navoid the missteps of his predecessor and partly to strike a nationalist chord,
\nSisi has projected himself as a \u2018paternal figure\u2019 whose destiny is bound up
\nwith that of the entire nation.<\/i><\/p>\n
\nitself on obscurantism (including the identities of Sisi\u2019s close advisors) and
\nis represented as anonymous and apolitical. This surely runs in naked contrast
\nto representative democracy, but yet in parallel with a castrated form of it,
\nwith parliamentary elections being a critical sideshow to beguile and divert
\nthe people\u2019s attention away from a serious bid to install military authority.
\nTo maintain appearances, he retains electoral politics, but then curtails it
\nwith all sorts of dilatory electoral rules that filter out true independents
\nand dissidents and ensure the success of those with either material resources
\nor connections with the seats of power. Besides ensuring politically correct
\nelection results, the \u2018crowning\u2019 achievement of all this is political
\nincoherence, with alienated oppositionists at a loss whether to totally boycott
\nor\u00a0participate in political life
\nand under which banner(s). This makes such a form of delegative democracy a
\npolitical deism, in which the voters delegate authority to the president who
\nthen acts as he sees fit.<\/p>\n
\nwent wrong, what follows is an attempt to show how to put it right, and to put
\nthe question \u201cdoes the Egyptian revolution still have a future?\u201d to rest. But
\nfirst it is important to again acknowledge that the rupture is unavoidable, for
\nthe rupture is already there. Where? Some would ask. Not in actual mass
\nmobilisations, but in various other means of contestation to the state\u2019s very
\nunstable hegemony. There is one event and quote which combined give a vivid
\nexample. The quote is Hannah Arendt's:<\/p>\n
\nthe surest way to undermine it is laughter."\u00a0<\/p>\n
\ndistributing balloons made of blown up condoms to proud, narcissistic policemen
\nin Tahrir on 25\u00a0January 2016. The
\nstate had set this day as a moment of reinstating its authority, not only by
\nusing force and warnings to prevent any protestor from entering Tahrir, but
\nalso by bringing in pro-state mobs to celebrate the day as Police (not
\nrevolution) Day.<\/p>\n
\ncelebrators, the large swathes of police officers, and the pro-state media
\nappear utter idiots. The videos went viral on social media and the police took
\nit a bit too seriously and threatened them. Shady refused to pull back,
\nalthough Malek understandably but sadly did apologise. Now social media is full
\nof statements supporting Shady by making further fun of the police, putting
\nforward a plethora of ridiculous hashtags and groups.<\/p>\n
\nand in itself. In fact, making a joke of the oppressor is only making the event
\nof oppression \u2013 which was vivid with tanks fully occupying Tahrir on the
\nanniversary of a revolution against the rule of those very tanks \u2013 less
\nserious. Even Arendt herself asserts that \u201cdetachment and equanimity in view of
\nordinarily unbearable tragedy is the worst sign of dehumanisation.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nlaughter is a means of communication between potential revolutionaries when
\nother means are absent. It is a sign that the revolution is still alive.<\/p>\n
\n\u201csilent revolt\u201d (borrowing S\u00f8ren Kierkegaard term) into a grounded challenge to
\noppressive authority? My answer is, I do not know. No, that is not the right
\nanswer. The answer is: I shall not know. The answer shall not come from the
\nsame few educated elites who imposed themselves on January 2011\u2019s agenda,
\nultimately leading to its current lamentable fate. The answer shall happen on
\nits own, stem from a rupture of the already existing crack, impose itself, not
\nbe imposed. As Gramsci contended, and as we later saw in the Egyptian
\nrevolution, \u201cthe dangers inherent in introducing knowledge from above lead to
\nthe bastard trio of skepticism, sectarianism and tragedy. The knowledge to be
\nimparted must derive inspiration from the beliefs and mode of thinking of the
\nmasses.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nof proposing a particular agenda to the masses, he was one of the few
\npresidents in the 21st\u00a0century
\nto run for president without even a nominal mandate. By being utterly absent
\nfrom all serious political debates, he made of himself the hero of the masses\u2019
\nfantasies. That is also precisely what a counter-Sisi movement ought to do.
\nStay silent for a while and wait to see what the rupture will beget. Meanwhile,
\nfollow Albert Camus\u2019 revolutionary catalogue: \u201claugh, laugh, laugh and laugh
\nagain.\u201d<\/p>\n
\nshould not be challenged with a political agenda; for it is out of the
\npolitical realm. Shady and Malek have thankfully shown an alternative way to
\ncounter apolitical authority, perhaps without noticing their impact and most
\ncertainly without thinking of Arendt's or Camus' philosophy.<\/p>\n
\nstill have a future?\u2019 I do not think it does, for it never actually did have a
\npresent; but I see it coming.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"