Amr Nabil\/AP\/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.In many parts
\nof the Arab world, especially amongst the urban middle class, moderate Islamists
\nhave fallen out of favor. <\/p>\n
<\/i><\/p>\n
The Muslim
\nBrotherhood in Egypt witnessed a spectacular fall from grace; moving from the presidency
\nto prison cells. In Tunisia, El-Nahda was able to avoid a similar fate,
\nprompted by events in Egypt and an increased polarization of the political
\nsystem, by wisely choosing to give up power, losing the pre-eminent positon it had gained through fair and free elections. <\/p>\n
This was
\nfollowed by an attack on Islamism as an ideological construct by secular Arab
\nmiddle classes equating Islamism with backwardness and in some cases equating
\nmoderate Islamists with radical groups in order to justify their repression. This was stark in the case of Egypt. The Muslim
\nBrotherhood were declared a terrorist organization and blamed for all acts of
\nviolence perpetuated against the state after the coup of 2013. <\/p>\n
Some might
\nargue, correctly, that moderate Islamist groups failed in their brief tenure of
\npower due to short-sightedness, a desire to be in a position of power and their
\ncollusion with elements of the deep state.<\/p>\n
All of this is
\ntrue, however, it ignores a deeper structural issue with Islamist ideology,
\nwhich was decisive in its collapse; namely, its intellectual poverty and focus
\non the preservation of the status quo.<\/p>\n
Islamism,
\nin spite of decades of political engagement, has shown a remarkable weakness in
\nits ideological development. It has failed to provide an ideological vision
\nthat critically differs from that of its secular rivals. On the contrary,
\nmodern Islamism has shown a strong neo-liberal leaning not very different from that
\nof Arab ruling elites. <\/p>\n
This manifested
\nitself in their message for the focus on the individual, under the notion that
\nreforming the morals of citizens will reform society without the need to
\nperform any substantial changes in social relations. Their idea is rather
\nsimple; problems in the Arab World stem from individuals deviating from \u2018the true path of Islam\u2019. As such, when the morals of
\nthe individual are reformed a \u2018proper\u2019 family will emerge, which will then
\nmultiply and lead to the birth of a reformed society. <\/p>\n
This shifted
\nthe focus away from overarching societal problems to individual moral problems.
\nIssues like sex segregation, sexual morality, and women\u2019s dress codes became of
\nparamount importance. This was compounded with an increased Salafi influence, which
\nplaces a high premium on issues of personal morality and piety. <\/p>\n
Thus, when
\nmoderate Islamists were in power they showed no desire or vision to offer
\nalternatives to their followers. On the contrary, they carried on with the
\npolicies of the autocrats they replaced. During Morsi\u2019s brief tenure in power, for
\nexample, a loan with the IMF was negotiated which would mean a continuation of
\nthe Mubarak era policies of austerity and neo-liberalism.\u00a0 <\/p>\n
This focus on Based on this, This The simple solution The resonance For example, as The second This does not He points out Khomeini divided society into two main Thus, Islamism can deliver social change, Amr Nabil\/AP\/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.In many parts of the Arab world, especially amongst the urban middle class, moderate Islamists have fallen out of favor. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt witnessed a spectacular fall from grace; moving from the presidency to prison cells. In Tunisia, El-Nahda was able to avoid a similar fate, prompted…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1228","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1228","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1228"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1228\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1228"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1228"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1228"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nthe individual serves to act as a status quo ideology, as it moves the burden
\nof responsibility from the ruling class to the governed. Simply put, issues such
\nas rural poverty, urban decay, working class exploitations and the collapse of
\nthe social safety net become of secondary importance. Poverty becomes
\ndepoliticized and is no longer seen as a social problem that arises from a
\ncertain configuration of power relations. It is seen as a problem that can be
\nresolved through the implementation of Sharia, namely zakat<\/em>, the
\ncompulsory alms the rich give the poor. <\/p>\n
\nif \u2018proper Islam\u2019 is implemented the problem would disappear. However, the
\nnature of the exploitive relationship between rich and poor rarely makes an
\nappearance in Islamist discourse. This ideological orientation explains the weak
\nintellectual development of the movement, failing to produce a cohesive
\nideological vision that promises radical social change. Even though there are
\nintellectuals associated with Islamism, like Tarek El
\nBishri and Selim El Awa, they
\nhave yet to produce a strong transformative vision of society.<\/p>\n
\nideological outlook takes a very elitist approach towards society. It assumes that
\nthe people are morally corrupt. A perspective that is shared by the secular
\nelites, who also view the masses as backward and in need of civilizing. Thus,
\nthe malaise of the secular forces is shared by their Islamist foes. <\/p>\n
\nis good governance and fighting corruption, however, it is assumed to stem from
\nthe abandonment of Islam. This, however, does not mean that Islamism is the
\nideology of the elite. On the contrary, Islamists have a broad base of support,
\nespecially among the poor in urban and rural areas where Salafism made
\nsignificant inroads and contributed to the \u201cSalafisation\u201d of this Islamist
\nbase. <\/p>\n
\nof the Islamist message is based on two pillars: their deep reach into civil
\nsociety, and the organic connection of Islamist language to the culture of the
\nmasses. <\/p>\n
\nthe state retreated from its traditional role as the provider of social
\nservices in post-Nasserist Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood started to fill the
\nvoid by providing services, such as health care, education and charity drives.
\nThe provided services were packaged in the moral language of the group, delivering
\ntheir message of the need for personal reform. Health care services were
\nsegregated by sex, thus enforcing Islamist sexual morals among the masses, which
\nin the end had the effect of entrenching itself in the psyche of those
\nreceiving this service. <\/p>\n
\npillar is the notion that, unlike other secular ideologies, Islamism has a
\ndeeper cultural connection with the masses, offering a mystical view of the
\npast as it promises to recreate it out of the ashes of a world devastated by
\ncolonial encounters. This makes it easier for Islamists to communicate their
\nmoral message, which is devoid of social content, and gain support amongst the
\nmasses by simply appealing to their sense of religious duty and obligation. In
\na way, they become the symbol of the divine and a way to salvation from a
\ntroubled world, as they promise not only salvation in the after life, but also
\nin this world if only \u2018proper Islam\u2019 were implemented.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nmean that Islamism cannot act as a vehicle for social change. One only needs to
\nreflect on the Iranian Revolution and the explosive impact Islamism, mixed with
\nsecular ideologies, had. As Ervand Abrahamian eloquently argues, Khomeinism is not a radical
\nIslamist ideology as many would like to believe, it is heavily influenced by
\nsecular Third World ideologies, making it part of the Third World intellectual
\ntradition of resistance that includes thinkers like Franz Fanon. <\/p>\n
\nthat the intellectual base of Khomeinism comes from the work of Ali Shariati,
\na French educated intellectual, who was influenced by Fanon and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq
\nwho took part in armed action against the Shah. This intellectual tradition
\nmixed elements of Marxism and Shia Islamism, producing a potent, radical,
\nindigenous ideology of social action and change. <\/p>\n
\nclasses: the exploiters \u201cMustkabreen\u201d and the exploited \u201cEl-Mustafeen\u201d, urging
\naction against the exploiters using Islamist and traditional rhetoric. This
\nallowed him to make a strong connection to the urban poor in south Tehran,
\nwhich enabled him not only to defeat the Shah, but also to survive a brutal war
\nand bloody power struggle with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.<\/p>\n
\nbut only if mixed with a focus on social issues and exploitive social
\nrelations. Modern day Islamism represents the interests of a specific social
\nclass, unlike in Iran, the worldview of a non-revolutionary class, namely, the
\npetty bourgeoisie and some elements of the bourgeoisie that have no qualms with
\ncurrent social and economic structures. Their main aim is to increase their
\nshare of state power, not to alter social relations or enact revolutionary
\nchange. They simply want a greater piece of the political pie, making modern Islamism
\nvery docile, and placing them in the same position as the despots.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"