{"id":1224,"date":"2019-03-27T03:56:25","date_gmt":"2019-03-27T03:56:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sportsnewsforyou.com\/?p=1224"},"modified":"2024-10-23T09:57:56","modified_gmt":"2024-10-23T09:57:56","slug":"penal-populism-and-the-bds-movement-after-security-council-res-2334","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/?p=1224","title":{"rendered":"Penal populism and the BDS movement after Security Council Res. 2334"},"content":{"rendered":"

Click:provides a<\/a><\/p>\n

Housing construction is ongoing on the eastern slopes of Pisgat Zeev, in East Jerusalem, January 23,2017.Nir Alon Zuma Press\/Press Agency. All right reserved. In recent weeks great attention and debate have
\nfollowed the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) Resolution 2334, which reaffirmed with clarity the international
\nillegality of the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian Territory occupied
\nsince 1967, including East Jerusalem. By contrast, an important statement
\nsigned \u2013 on the eve of the UN SC vote \u2013 by more than
\n200 lawyers and professors of International Law (among whom were John Dugard,
\nGuy Goodwin-Gill, Kevin Jon Heller, Robert Kolb, Alain Pellet, Marco Sass\u00f2li
\nand William Schabas) passed almost unnoticed. <\/i><\/p>\n

The document is directed against the measures adopted
\nby several states to outlaw, prohibit, and in some cases to criminalize the \u201cBoycott, Divestment
\nand Sanctions\u201d (BDS) campaign, which has for years engaged in the promotion of
\ncritical consumerism and economic non-cooperation of national and local
\ninstitutions with Israeli companies and bodies involved in the occupation of
\nthe West Bank and in practices violating the human rights of Palestinians.<\/p>\n

One of the decisive passages of the statement
\ndeclares: \u201cWhether one approves of the aims or methods of BDS is not the issue.
\nThe issue is whether, in order to protect Israel, an exception is to be made to
\nthe freedom of expression that occupies a central and pivotal place among
\nfundamental human rights. States that outlaw BDS are undermining this basic
\nhuman right and threatening the credibility of human rights by exempting a
\nparticular state from the advocacy of peaceful measures designed to achieve its
\ncompliance with international law\u201d.<\/p>\n

The problems reflected in the statement offer
\ndifferent profiles of interest. They intersect, in fact, between at least two critical levels of international legal discourse: on the
\none hand, the growing debate \u2013 even jurisprudence \u2013 related to the content and
\nlimits of the right to freedom of expression, as enshrined in human rights
\nconventions; on the other hand, the growing discussions about horizons and
\ncontradictions of the human rights
\nmovements, about the decline of
\ntheir emancipatory potential and
\nthe emergence of a \u201cdark side\u201d
\nof these rights capable of altering, and even capsizing, their protective
\nfunctions. <\/p>\n

The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
\ncampaign<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The BDS campaign has recently achieved
\nsignificant world impact. Campaign activists have greeted as success the sale of most of its activities in Israel by the British company
\nof security services 'G4S', targeted for providing equipment and technologies for Israeli
\nmilitary prisons, checkpoints and settlements in the West Bank. Moreover,
\nmobilizations for the boycott caused, according to many observers, the withdrawal of the French telecommunications giant Orange from
\nactivities in Israel (in particular after the publication of a report denouncing involvements of the company in the
\ninfrastructure of the Israeli occupation). <\/p>\n

In recent years this impact has induced the Israeli government to develop c<\/strong>ountering strategies that have raised
\nconcerns from various human rights organizations. In July 2011, the Knesset had
\napproved the Bill for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel Through
\nBoycott<\/em>, which, as a result of amendments that changed the provisions
\noriginally intended to create a criminal offence, sanctioned the promotion of
\nboycott as a civil offence. The law sparked protests from several Israeli civil rights NGOs and pushed
\norganizations like Human Rights Watch to assert that the bill\u00a0 "stifle[d]
\nexpression".<\/p>\n

The radicalization of the state-sponsored opposition
\nto the BDS movement has since grown steadily, both in intensity and in the kind
\nof arguments used. In March last year, for example, the Israeli intelligence
\nMinister Yisrael Katz spoke openly of the need for \u201ctargeted
\ncivil eliminations\u201d in relation to BDS movement
\nleaders. This motivated Amnesty International to issue a tough statement, inferring from the expression of the Minister an allusion
\nto targeted killings ( \u201cthe term alludes to \u201ctargeted assassinations\u201d which is
\nused to describe Israel's policy of targeting members of Palestinian armed
\ngroups\u201d) and requesting the government of Israel to \u201cstop intimidation against human
\nrights defenders\u201d and to \u201cprotect them from attack\u201d. According to several
\nnational newspapers, in 2015 the Government of Israel (in support of what some
\ncommentators have called a \u00abdeclaration of war\u00bb against the campaign) has allocated some 100 million NIS
\n(26 million euros) for internal and international activities against the
\nmovement. Similarly, anti-BDS activities have been a major point in the covert lobbying
\ncampaign (and recruiting
\nactivities) linked to the Israeli Embassy in the
\nUnited Kingdom, as recently unveiled by Al Jazeera, whose inquiry led to the resignation of a young Israeli diplomat.<\/p>\n

What level of \u201cthreat\u201d, therefore, is posed by the BDS
\nmovement? Is it a threat for the State of Israel? Or does the campaign pose a
\nthreat only for its illegal occupation? <\/p>\n

It is significant, in this regard, the constitutive appeal of the campaign (available here), entitled: \u201cCall for Boycott,
\nDivestment and Sanctions against Israel Until it Complies with International
\nLaw and Universal Principles of Human Rights <\/em>[emphasis added]\u201d,
\nsigned in 2005 by over 170 Palestinian organizations of different inspirations. The call requests the implementation of divestment
\ninitiatives against Israel "similar to those applied to South Africa in the
\napartheid era" in order to "end the occupation and colonization of all Arab
\nlands and dismantle the Wall", to "recognize the fundamental rights of the
\nArab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality" and to promote "the
\nrights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as
\nstipulated in UN resolution 194". This request, addressed significantly also to "conscientious Israelis for the sake of justice and genuine peace<\/em>
\n[emphasis added]", is openly qualified by the subscribers as a last resort
\ntool, because \u2013 as they underline \u2013 "all forms of international intervention
\nand peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply
\nwith humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its
\noccupation".<\/p>\n

In light of these explicit premises,
\narguments against BDS centred on accusations of racism and anti-Semitism
\nfrequently directed at the campaign by several commentators (see, between many,
\nHirsh) appear to lack persuasive force. On the contrary, it
\nseems only fair to note that (no matter how subjectively one shares or disagrees
\nwith the arguments of the mentioned call) the \u201corder of discourse\u201d of international
\nlaw, along with the keywords of self-determination,
\nprotection of human rights, non-discrimination and peace, constitute the main anchor of
\nthe campaign claims.<\/p>\n

This observation is particularly evident by virtue of
\nthe recent UN SC Resolution 2334, the content of which appears to highlight
\nthat the instances of the BDS movement reproduce, on the level of civic
\nmobilization, numerous warnings and calls from international institutions
\nagainst the long-lasting violations of international law reiterated in the
\nMiddle East conflict. <\/p>\n

The resolution, in fact, expresses strong condemnation
\nof the construction and expansion of settlements and the related \u201cconfiscation of land, demolition of homes
\nand displacement of Palestinian civilians\u201d continued over the years. The
\nSecurity Council, therefore, emphasized that the \u201cthe status quo<\/em> is not sustainable\u201d, as it is \u201csteadily eroding the
\ntwo-State solution and entrenching a one-State reality\u201d.<\/p>\n

The Resolution also calls on third countries to \u201cdistinguish, in their
\nrelevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories
\noccupied since 1967\u201d and, above all, it reaffirms the obligation of Israel to
\nfreeze \u201call settlement activity\u201d and to dismantle \u201call settlement outposts
\nerected since March 2001\u201d.<\/p>\n

Legal validity<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Despite the dramatic reactions of the Israeli government, the remarks of the UN SC are
\npredominantly a consolidation of orientations already followed several times
\nbefore by different international institutions.
\nFor a brief reconstruction of the international legal issues of the Israeli occupation, it is worth
\nrecalling that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the well known
\nAdvisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in
\nthe Occupied Palestinian Territory, authoritatively concluded on the international illegality of the Israeli settlements
\nin the West Bank, stating that they violate the provisions of art.
\n49, par. 6 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,
\nprohibiting an occupying power from \u201ctransfer parts of its own civilian
\npopulation into parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
\noccupies\u201d.<\/p>\n

It is important to note that this prohibition, among the sources of
\ninternational humanitarian law, holds particular force, as it is: 1) considered
\nof customary rank and 2) qualified as a grave
\nbreach of the Conventions protection system by art.
\n85(4)(a) of their 1977 First Additional Protocol.
\nThe article has then been used as a model in the drafting of the war crimes
\noffenses of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which, in
\nfact, codifies the conduct in question in its art. 8(2)(b)(viii).<\/p>\n

For these reasons, the Resolution recalls that the
\npolicy of Israeli settlements \u201chas no
\nlegal validity\u201d and constitutes a \u201cflagrant violation\u201d of the Fourth Geneva Convention (reiterating
\nthe assertions of Resolutions 446
\nand 452
\nof 1979, and of the ICJ itself in the mentioned Advisory Opinion, see par.
\n120).<\/p>\n

Even the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907
\ndictates prescriptions relevant for the situation at issue. In the Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on
\nLand annexed to the Convention, in fact, art.
\n55 states that \u201cThe occupying State shall be
\nregarded only as administrator and usufructuary<\/em> [emphasis added] of
\npublic buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to
\nthe hostile State, and situated in the occupied country\u201d. It is also provided
\nthat the capital of these properties must be safeguarded, and they should be
\nadministered in compliance with the rules of the usufruct. Clearly the law of
\narmed conflict is no longer that of 1907, but according to several recent
\nreconstructions, dedicated specifically to the law of occupation, there are
\nonly two conditions (developing from the mentioned article) that justify the
\nexercise of economic activities in occupied territory by the occupying power,
\nnamely: 1) the presence of imperative reasons of military necessity and 2) the
\nbenefit to the population under occupation (v.among others, Arahi Takahashi, p.169). At the domestic
\nlevel, Israeli courts have made reference to these conditions in different
\ncases (see the Israel High Court of Justice in Beth El [Ayub et al. v. Minister of Defense et al<\/em>., HCJ
\n610\/78] and Elon
\nMoreh and Cooperative
\nSociety [ Duweikat et al. v. Government of
\nIsrael et al.<\/em>, HCJ 390\/79]), while no acknowledgement of their compulsoriness
\nhas come from the Government. On the contrary, the Knesset has discussed in
\nrecent weeks the controversial Regulations Bill<\/em> that, if passed, would
\nlegalize retroactively the situation of thousands of houses built in violation
\nof the above-mentioned principles and insisting on private Palestinian
\nproperties subject to illegal expropriations (as underlined by Ronen
\nand Shani).<\/p>\n

United Nations Charter<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Effects of the Israeli occupation also collide with
\nseveral principles of the United Nations Charter. The right to self
\ndetermination of the Palestinian people, repeatedly recognized internationally
\n(see again the ICJ Advisory Opinion, cit., par.149), is clearly obstructed and eroded by the territorial
\natomization due to the continuing growth and multiplication of the settlements
\nthemselves (see, among others, Ben-Naftali,
\nGross e Michaeli).<\/p>\n

Even in terms of human rights violations, the use of concepts such as
\n\u2018apartheid\u2019 or \u2018segregation\u2019 cannot be reduced to a mere activists' claim, in
\nparticular if one confronts the definitional elements of the two phenomena
\nprovided by the Convention
\nfor the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973 and the Convention
\non the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, as numerous
\nand distinguished jurists have done, sharing \u2013 in many cases \u2013 the opinion that "there are indeed strong grounds to conclude that a system of apartheid has
\ndeveloped in the occupied Palestinian territory<\/em>" (Dugard e
\nReynolds, p. 912).<\/p>\n

A protest against the expanding of Jewish settlements in Kufr Qadoom village near the West Bank city of Nablus, Jan. 20, 2017. Xinhua SIPA USA\/Press Association. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n

Considering all these legal issues,
\nscholars have sustained, even more categorically than the BDS campaign, the
\nexistence not only of a faculty, but of an international obligation upon third
\nstates not to trade products from Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian
\nterritory.(see Moerenhout here
\nand here;
\ncontra<\/em>, see Kantorovich
\nand Crawford).\n<\/p>\n

One of the most discussed aspects of this
\ndebate is the existence, or not, of self-executing obligations of non-recognition from third States with respect to
\noccupations and annexations violating the prohibition of aggression and the
\nprinciple of territorial integrity of States. It is legitimate, in this regard,
\nto draw a comparison with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.
\nThe Council of Europe responded to the annexation prohibiting imports from the
\nregion and from Sevastopol (see the Council conclusions of March 2014). The issue remains controversial (see Milano). However, the presence of such an open and challenging
\nlegal debate renders the \u2018lawfare\u2019 exercised against the BDS movement by states particularly striking.<\/p>\n

Significantly, the fact that the claims of
\nthe campaign clearly echo International Conventions, UN General Assembly and
\nSecurity Council resolutions, as well as relevant decisions of the
\nInternational Court of Justice, not only failed to stop \u2013 in the political
\ndebate \u2013 the mislabelling of
\nthis peaceful form of mobilization (intended to influence the political and
\nmilitary decisions of a government<\/em>) as an incitement to racial discrimination on an ethnic or
\nnational basis, but failed even to discourage legislative initiatives seeking
\nto impose this debatable vision juris
\net de jure.<\/em><\/p>\n

These initiatives are too numerous and
\ndifferentiated to be exhaustively examined here. A few examples, however, serve
\nto elucidate:<\/p>\n

–\u00a0 In
\nthe United States, the measures
\nat issue were taken mostly in the form of laws adopted by Federal States to ban
\ncommercial collaborations with, or to exclude from public procurements, the
\ncompanies participating in boycotts against States not affected by embargoes or
\nsanctions. Particularly explicit, among others, the legislation adopted by
\nIllinois, which prompted the drafting of a blacklist
\nof companies \u201cengaging in actions that are
\npolitically motivated and are intended to penalize, inflict economic harm on,
\nor otherwise limit commercial relations with the State of Israel or companies
\nbased in the State of Israel or in territories controlled by the State of
\nIsrael\u201d. This legislation banned the State pension fund from contracting or
\ninvesting with those companies (see the amendment to the Pension Code here). Similar provisions are being considered or have been
\nadopted by several other States (such as the South Carolina Bill H.3583, commented on the Harvard Law Review).<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

– In February, the Canadian Parliament approved a motion
\nrejecting the campaign, which \u2013 according to the text \u2013 \u201cpromotes the
\ndemonization and delegitimization of the State of Israel\u201d, and calling on the
\ngovernment to "condemn any attempt by organizations, groups or individual
\nCanadians to promote the BDS movement". There have also been voices in support
\nof the criminalization of the boycott as a form of hate
\nspeech.<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

– In the same month, the United Kingdom <\/strong>Government, <\/strong>with the declared intention of countering BDS, passed a controversial Policy
\nNote regarding public procurements, which
\nessentially required local institutions, public bodies and executive agencies
\nto cut ties with companies adhering to boycott campaigns, unless already \u201cformal
\nlegal sanctions, embargoes and restrictions have been put in place by the UK
\nGovernment\u201d. On the other hand, in June, the High Court of Justice dismissed the claims of Jewish Human Rights Watch against the motions of three
\nCity Councils (Leicester, Swansea and Gwynedd) endorsing the boycott on goods
\nproduced in illegal settlements in the West Bank.<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

– In France the
\nlegal and jurisprudential scenario is particularly relevant to this discussion.
\nThe home of Charlie Hebdo<\/em> is the only state besides Israel itself that
\ncriminalizes citizens propagating the boycott of Israeli products. Art. 225-2
\n\u00a7 2 of the French Criminal Code criminalizes
\nthose who, on the basis of discrimination or of incitement to discriminate on
\ngrounds of the origin or membership of a national group, \u201cobstructs the exercise
\nof any economic activity\u201d, with a penalty up to three years\u2019 imprisonment.
\nOne of the cases discussed by French legal scholars, however, emerged from
\nindictments based on different provisions. In October 2015, the Criminal
\nChamber of the Cour de Cassation<\/em> confirmed the sentence imposed and the
\nindictment issued by the Colmar Cour d'Appel <\/em>against a group of
\nactivists for distributing leaflets calling for the boycott of Israeli products
\nin a supermarket. The judges stated that in this case the Court of Appeal had
\nrightly extended the applicability of Art.
\n24 \u00a7 8 of the Loi
\nsur le libert\u00e9 de la presse,<\/em> which punishes public incitement
\nto discrimination. The Court of Cassation also asserted that the Colmar Court
\nhad correctly excluded the actions at issue from the scope of application of the
\nright to freedom of expression laid down in art.10 of the European Convention
\non Human Rights (ECHR). According to the judgement, the defendants had incited
\ndiscrimination, urging customers not to buy goods because of their national
\norigins, justifying the compression of freedom as necessary by virtue of other
\npeople's rights, as provided by art. 10 \u00a7 2 of the ECHR (Cass. Crim., 20 octobre 2015, No. 1480021, av.
\nhere). The reasoning of Court of Cassation has been subject to
\nmuch criticism (see, among others, M\u00e9dard) for
\nundermining the distinction occurring between products and producers, and for
\nfailing to clarify to what extent the \u201cincitement\u201d to boycott was characterized
\nby racist or xenophobic motives.<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

– Even in Italy
\na draft law to stifle the BDS movement has been deposited for
\nexamination at the Senate. The draft includes new amendments to the Italian law
\nratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
\nDiscrimination in order to punish with imprisonment from six months to four
\nyears those who \u201cobstruct the exercise of any economic activity\u201d on the basis
\nof discrimination against physical or juridical persons, on the grounds of \u201cmembership
\nof national, ethnic, racial, religious, state or territorial groups\u201d. The draft
\nalso proposes to punish with imprisonment up to six years those who direct or
\npromote movements with these purposes.<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Penal populism<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Similar instances of criminalization reveal serious
\ndangers. Particularly at odds with the arguments behind the adoption of these
\nlaws (and the rhetoric of the forces advocating for them) is the risk of incriminating the same groups they are
\nintended to protect from discrimination: which would be the outcome of
\nthese penal norms in the numerous cases of staunch Zionist commentators, Jewish organizations, and Holocaust survivors endorsing the boycott in recent years. If inviting to boycott Israeli
\nproducts, as these laws assume, equates with incitement to racial
\ndiscrimination or anti-Semitism, it may well be possible to indict these
\ncommentators for the same offenses contested in the case of BDS activists and
\nleaders.<\/p>\n

The paradoxes of these legal initiatives, however, are
\nmore general and complex. The laws and draft laws
\nmentioned previously indirectly utilize the Convention on the Elimination of
\nAll Forms of Racial Discrimination as a source
\nto criminalize citizens actively advocating for
\nthe respect of the rights therein. The legal tools to be
\namended in order to introduce these penal norms, in fact, are precisely the
\nnational laws ratifying the Convention.<\/p>\n

This therefore precisely reveals a short circuiting of international
\nlegal discourse: the possibility of outlawing
\nand suppressing, at state level, not
\nthe violations of international law, but rather the struggles for its affirmation and for international
\nlegality.<\/p>\n

One would be hard-pressed to find a more emblematic illustration of the \u201cdark side\u201d of
\nhuman rights, as revealed by the growth of repressive optimisms too
\noften assuming criminal law as the main
\ninstrument to guarantee the effectiveness of these rights. <\/p>\n

This over-reliance on penal sanctions, in fact,
\nusually ignores the dangers arising from the uncontrolled expansion of criminal
\nsystems, in particular when combined with the growth of criminal policies inclined
\nto pursue merely symbolic functions. A tendency, in other words, leading to penal populism and, consequently, jeopardizing human rights themselves.<\/p>\n

Depoliticization
\n<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Human rights tend to the universal, but universalism brings with it the
\nimpulse for the de-politicization
\nand the removal of the adversarial dynamics from which human rights have
\narisen. Universalism, in fact, abstracts the human <\/em>within the Conventions from
\nthe field of tension in which, instead, men<\/em> exist and operate as historical and political subjects. The more one tries to expand the universalist implications
\nof these rights and their supposed neutrality, the more generalized the
\ntendency to transform the human rights language becomes, in a kaleidoscope
\nof translations and claims intended to universalize<\/em> particular
\ninterests. Within this tendency, depending on
\nwho in a determined context acts as \u201ctranslator\u201d, the concepts of abuse, perpetrator and victim
\nbecome dramatically interchangeable
\n(see Gordon and Perugini).<\/p>\n

Can collective
\nsubjects, in opposition to transnational dominant powers, restore a progressive
\nhistorical function to these rights?<\/p>\n

Concepts such as \u201cendtimes\u201d or \u201ctwilight\u201d
\nof human rights and of their emancipatory potential are
\nbecoming a topos <\/em>of the human rights debate (see, in particular, Hopgood and Posner).
\nParticularly significant, within this ambit, is the point of view of those who underline that, in the
\nage of neoliberalism, what escapes the possibilities
\nof the human rights discourse \u2013 neutralizing its performativity \u2013 is to assume equality as a crucial factor of
\ntransformation of the reality. \u201cEven perfectly realized \u2013 as has been
\nefficaciously noted \u2013 human rights are compatible with radical inequality\u201d (see
\nMoyn here and,
\nmore extensively, here). <\/p>\n

It seems, however, that the <\/strong>short circuit
\ntriggered by campaigns such as BDS testifies to a possibility. It is, on the one hand, surely possible to
\nagree with the opinion of the jurists subscribing the statement quoted at the
\nbeginning of this argument, that BDS is a campaign exercising the rights
\nto <\/strong>freedom of expression and political dissent and that, as such,
\nit must be protected even by <\/strong>those
\nwho do not share its claims. <\/p>\n

But, on the other hand, this point of view does not
\ncatch a crucial aspect: campaigns such as BDS have the distinctive
\ncharacteristic of going beyond the individual dimension of human rights and their
\nmere expression. This transforms
\nthese rights into a platform of collective action that, even using the
\nsame \u201cidiom of the hegemonic\u201d, has shown itself able to organize a confrontational pressure of civil
\nsociety against the radical inequalities
\nin the enjoyment of human rights, as well as against the discriminatory selectivity of
\nthe mechanisms to sanction their serious violation on
\nthe basis of power relations.<\/p>\n

\nGramscian hegemony<\/strong><\/h2>\n


\n<\/strong>From this point of view, the critical issues
\nmentioned bring to mind the views of jurists attempting to actualize the lessons
\nof Antonio Gramsci and his theory
\nof hegemony, by projecting them into the international arena. Some of these jurists, referring to the Prison Notebooks
\nof the Italian intellectual, have underlined the tactical and strategic
\ncentrality of movements for critical consumerism in the global struggle for
\neffectiveness and equal enjoyment of human rights. <\/p>\n

Within a perspective intended to show the
\ntransformative potential of a theory of International Law \u201cfrom below\u201d, these
\nscholars have substantially argued that, as in Gramscian theory, even in the
\ninternational arena transnational dominant<\/em> powers are able to rule over
\ntheir social adversaries<\/em> also because they obtain the consensus<\/em> of their social allies<\/em>.
\nFor this reason, international lawyers should look at states \u201cas a plural and
\nfragmented terrain of contestation rather than as a monolith\u201d. Adopting
\nthis view would induce the acknowledgement that, as
\nshown by the case at issue, \u201cinternational law and institutions provide
\nimportant arenas for social movement action\u201d, with the consequence of \u201cexpanding
\nthe space of transformative politics\u201d based on the nexus between freedom,
\nsocial justice and peace (see
\nRajagopal, pp. 19 e 23).<\/p>\n

After all, the possibility of contending
\ntheir outer limits is one of the constitutive
\nelements of the historical process of codification of human rights. In contradistinction to recent attention directed
\nat euro-centrism and the colonial mindset behind the
\nrise of modern international law, many scholars are illustrating how the importance of the
\nopposite Weltanschauung <\/em>of decolonization
\nhas been significantly underestimated, and are striving to demonstrate the
\ncrucial endeavours of politicians, jurists and
\ndiplomats of the Global South<\/em> in setting the human rights agenda between 1948 and the 1960's (see the important
\nwork of Jensen here, and
\nmore synthetically here). <\/p>\n

In conclusion, it cannot only be argued that the right to campaign for boycotts
\nto pursue the affirmation of basic human rights should be protected
\nby every jurist, legislator and citizen sensible to
\nthe Rule of Law but, more profoundly, it seems
\nthat campaigns such as BDS seem to have formulated new horizons of civil and
\npolitical practice <\/em>(in opposition to declamation) <\/em>of human rights; horizons that can be useful for those who intend to let these
\nrights \u201cwalk<\/em>\u201d, in their dialectic relation with the international
\npowers, \u201cupon their feet rather than on their head<\/em>\u201d.\u00a0<\/p>\n

This article originally appeared in Italian on the blog
\nof the Italian Society of International Law.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Click:provides a Housing construction is ongoing on the eastern slopes of Pisgat Zeev, in East Jerusalem, January 23,2017.Nir Alon Zuma Press\/Press Agency. All right reserved. In recent weeks great attention and debate have followed the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UN SC) Resolution 2334, which reaffirmed with clarity the international illegality of the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1224","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1224","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1224"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1224\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11173,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1224\/revisions\/11173"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1224"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1224"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1224"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}