{"id":1217,"date":"2019-03-27T03:55:37","date_gmt":"2019-03-27T03:55:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sportsnewsforyou.com\/?p=1217"},"modified":"2019-03-27T03:55:37","modified_gmt":"2019-03-27T03:55:37","slug":"europes-left-after-brexit-diem25s-perspective","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/?p=1217","title":{"rendered":"Europe\u2019s left after Brexit: DiEM25\u2019s perspective"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><i> Greek PM Alexis Tsipras &amp; Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos at parliamentary session in May, 2016, ahead of Eurogroup meeting which might unlock bailout funds. Press Association\/Yorgos Karahalis. All rights reserved.This article<br \/>\naddresses left-wing critics of DiEM25 who claim that DiEM25 is pursuing the<br \/>\nwrong objective (to democratise the EU) by means of a faulty strategy (focusing<br \/>\nat the European rather than at the national level). <\/i><\/p>\n<p>But this response,<br \/>\nwhile addressed to left-wing supporters of Lexit (the strategy of calling for<br \/>\nreferenda in favour of leaving the EU, Brexit-style), is pertinent also to the<br \/>\nother political traditions that DiEM25 seeks to unite in the struggle to<br \/>\ndemocratise Europe; i.e. authentic liberals, ecologists, feminists, members of<br \/>\npirate parties, activists unwilling to be embedded in existing parties, and<br \/>\neven progressive conservatives.[1]\n<\/p>\n<h2>Three options<\/h2>\n<p>In the space of eleven<br \/>\nmonths two referenda shook up not only the European Union but also Europe\u2019s left:<br \/>\nthe Greek OXI in July 2015 and Brexit in June 2016. Exasperated by the EU\u2019s<br \/>\nmixture of authoritarianism and economic failure, a segment of Europe\u2019s left is<br \/>\nnow calling for a \u201cbreak with the EU\u201d,[2] a<br \/>\nstance that has come to be associated with the term Lexit.[3] DiEM25,<br \/>\nthe transnational Democracy in Europe Movement, rejects the Lexit logic and offers<br \/>\nan alternative agenda for Europe\u2019s progressives. <\/p>\n<p>Undoubtedly, the Left has<br \/>\na duty to confront, with all its energy and imagination, the EU\u2019s practice of de-politicising<br \/>\npolitical decision making. [4] The<br \/>\nquestion is not whether the Left must clash with the EU\u2019s establishment and current<br \/>\npractices. The question is in what context, and within which overarching<br \/>\npolitical narrative, this confrontation should take place. There are three<br \/>\noptions on offer. <\/p>\n<h2>Option 1: Euro-reformism, \u2018more democracy\u2019, \u2018more Europe\u2019<\/h2>\n<p>One (fast receding) option<br \/>\nis the standard variety of euro-reformism, practised typically by social<br \/>\ndemocrats who argue for \u2018more democracy\u2019, \u2018more Europe\u2019, \u2018reformed EU<br \/>\ninstitutions\u2019 etc. It is an option founded on a fallacy: The EU is not<br \/>\nsuffering from a democratic deficit that can be fixed with a \u2018little more<br \/>\ndemocracy\u2019 and a few reforms here and there. As I argued in a recent book,[5]<br \/>\nthe EU was constructed intentionally as a democracy-free zone designed to keep<br \/>\nthe demos out of decision-making and to defer to a cartel of Europe\u2019s big<br \/>\nbusiness and the financial sector. To say that the EU suffers from a democratic<br \/>\ndeficit is like an astronaut on the moon complaining that she is surrounded by<br \/>\nan oxygen deficit&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>The EU\u2019s institutions<br \/>\nare incapable of being reformed through the standard process of<br \/>\ninter-governmental deliberations and gradual treaty changes. For this reason,<br \/>\ncalls for \u2018more Europe\u2019 are misguided since, under the present EU regime and<br \/>\ninstitutions, \u2018more Europe\u2019 and gradualist reforms will result in the<br \/>\nformalisation and legalisation of Europe\u2019s Austerity Union along the lines of<br \/>\nwhat I have described as the Sch\u00e4uble Plan. This will, in turn, deepen the crisis<br \/>\nafflicting Europe\u2019s weakest citizens, enhance the appeal of the xenophobic rightwing and, in any case, speed up the EU\u2019s disintegration. If this is right, and<br \/>\nI believe it is, then democrats have no alternative than to spearhead a head-on<br \/>\nclash with the EU\u2019s establishment. Which brings us to the second and the third<br \/>\noptions. <\/p>\n<h2>Option 2: Lexit \u2013 leaving the EU<\/h2>\n<p>The second option is,<br \/>\nof course, the Lexit route. Tariq Ali has eloquently made the case, amongst<br \/>\nothers. [6]<br \/>\nStathis Kouvelakis, post-Brexit, sums up the<br \/>\nposition thus:<br \/>\n\u201cSo, we have to play the referendum game, while blocking the forces of the<br \/>\nxenophobic and nationalist Right from winning hegemony and diverting the<br \/>\npopular revolt.\u201d In short, to beat the xenophobic right\u2019s misanthropy we have<br \/>\nto join their call for referenda that will take our nation-states out of the<br \/>\nEU. <\/p>\n<p>This (Lexit) option<br \/>\nraises concerns regarding its realism and probity. Is its agenda feasible? In<br \/>\nother words, is it a realistic prospect that, by (in Kouvelakis\u2019 words) calling<br \/>\nfor referenda to leave the EU, the left can block \u201cthe forces of the xenophobic<br \/>\nand nationalist Right from winning hegemony and diverting the popular revolt\u201d? And,<br \/>\nis such a campaign consistent with the left\u2019s fundamental principles? DiEM25<br \/>\nbelieves that the answer to both questions is negative and, for this reason,<br \/>\nopposes the Lexit option. Let me explain these two answers before briefly<br \/>\ndiscussing DiEM25\u2019s alternative proposal (the third option below).<\/p>\n<p>The left used to be<br \/>\ngood at separating static from dynamic analyses. Since Marx, drawing upon<br \/>\nHegel, prioritised process over outcomes, the left learned how to take into<br \/>\naccount the direction of change, not just the various states of the world. In<br \/>\nthe case of the EU, this is crucial. For example, the position we should have<br \/>\ntaken before the common market, or the Eurozone, were created cannot be the<br \/>\nsame once these institutions were in place. It was, therefore, perfectly<br \/>\nconsistent <\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>to oppose<br \/>\nGreece\u2019s entry into the common market and\/or into the Eurozone, <em>and<\/em> <\/li>\n<li>to oppose a<br \/>\nreferendum for Greece to exit the common market and\/or the euro. <\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Even more<br \/>\nsignificantly, it makes a huge difference whether our starting point is a<br \/>\nborderless Europe (in which European workers exercise free movement) or a<br \/>\nEurope like that of the early 1950s where nation-states controlled borders and<br \/>\ncould create at will a new category of Italian or Greek proletarians called<br \/>\ngastarbeiters.<\/p>\n<p>This last point<br \/>\nhighlights the dangers of Lexit. Given that the EU has established free<br \/>\nmovement, Lexit involves acquiescence to (if not actual support for) its ending<br \/>\nand for the re-establishment of national border controls, complete with barbed<br \/>\nwire and armed guards. Granted that, if we were to re-run history, the left<br \/>\nshould demand common minimum wages in exchange for its support for the Single<br \/>\nMarket, do supporters of Lexit truly believe that, today, the left can win the<br \/>\nbattle for hegemony against the xenophobic right by endorsing the latter\u2019s call<br \/>\nfor building new fences and ending free movement? Similarly, do they truly<br \/>\nbelieve that the left will win the discursive and policy war against the fossil<br \/>\nfuel industry by supporting the re-nationalisation of environmental policy?<br \/>\nUnder the Lexit banner, in my estimation, the left is heading for monumental<br \/>\ndefeats on both fronts.<\/p>\n<h2>Option 3: DiEM25\u2019s proposal for disobedience within the EU<\/h2>\n<p>And so we come to the<br \/>\nthird option, the one proposed by DiEM25. It rejects both the euro-reformist<br \/>\ncalls for \u2018more democracy\u2019 and \u2018more Europe\u2019 as well as Lexit\u2019s support for<br \/>\nreferenda to abolish the EU level altogether and return full control to<br \/>\nnation-states. Instead, DiEM25 proposes a pan-European movement of civil and<br \/>\ngovernmental disobedience with which to bring on a surge of democratic<br \/>\nopposition to the way European elites do business at the local, national and EU<br \/>\nlevels. <\/p>\n<p>At DiEM25 we do not<br \/>\nbelieve that the EU will be reformed through the usual channels of EU policy<br \/>\nmaking, and certainly not by bending the existing \u2018rules\u2019 on budget deficits by<br \/>\nhalf or one per cent of national income (as the governments of France, Italy,<br \/>\nSpain and Portugal are doing). Vicente Navarro recently wrote that \u201cparliaments still have<br \/>\npower, including the power to question austerity policies\u201d. This is correct, as<br \/>\nthe first five months of the Syriza government demonstrated. But Navarro is,<br \/>\nregretfully, wrong when using as an example the new Portuguese<br \/>\ngovernment which, he claims, \u201cstopped the application of the austerity policies<br \/>\nimposed by the European Commission\u201d. I only wish that were true. Before being<br \/>\ngiven the mandate to form a government by the troika-friendly right-wing<br \/>\nPresident, the parties of the Portuguese left had to sign up to the previous<br \/>\ngovernments\u2019 \u201ccommitments to the Eurogroup\u201d \u2013 that is, they capitulated to the<br \/>\ntroika\u2019s existing program on Day One and confined themselves to delaying, for a<br \/>\nyear or so, the introduction of fresh austerity measures.[7]<\/p>\n<p>In short, yes, national parliaments and<br \/>\ngovernments have power \u2013 the power to do what our Syriza government did during<br \/>\nthe Athens Spring, before capitulating on the night of the OXI referendum. But<br \/>\nwith the European Central Bank on the ready to start a bank run in retaliation,<br \/>\neven to close down its banking system, a progressive national government can<br \/>\nonly use this power if it is prepared for rupture with the EU troika. This is<br \/>\nwhere we, at DiEM25, agree with the<br \/>\nLexit camp: a clash with the EU establishment is inescapable. <\/p>\n<p>Where we disagree<br \/>\nwith Lexit proponents is in their assumption that this clash can take only one<br \/>\nform: a campaign to leave the EU. We reject this assumption wholeheartedly and<br \/>\ncounter-propose a clash with the European establishment based on a campaign of<br \/>\nwilfully disobeying the unenforceable EU \u2018rules\u2019 at the municipal, regional and<br \/>\nnational levels while making no move whatsoever to leave the EU. <\/p>\n<p>Undoubtedly, the EU<br \/>\ninstitutions will threaten us (i.e. rebel governments and finance ministers<br \/>\nadopting DiEM25\u2019s agenda) with expulsion, with bank runs, bank \u2018holidays\u2019 etc.,<br \/>\njust as they threatened the Greek government (and me personally) with Grexit in<br \/>\n2015. At that point it is crucial not to succumb to the fear of \u2018exit\u2019 but to<br \/>\nlook them in the eye and say: <\/p>\n<p>\u201cBring it on! The only thing that we are truly scared<br \/>\nof is your sole offering: the perpetuation of the debt-deflationary spiral that<br \/>\ndrives masses of Europeans into hopelessness and places them under the spell of<br \/>\nbigotry.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>If we do not blink,<br \/>\nthen either they will blink (in which case the EU will be transformed) or the<br \/>\nEU will be torn asunder by its own Establishment. If the Establishment (the<br \/>\nCommission, the European Central Bank, Berlin and Paris) dismembers the EU to<br \/>\npunish progressive governments that refused to abide by their inane policies,<br \/>\nthis will galvanise progressive politics across Europe in a manner that Lexit<br \/>\ncould never do. <\/p>\n<p>Consider the profound<br \/>\ndifference between the following two situations: <\/p>\n<p>(A)<br \/>\nThe EU<br \/>\nestablishment threatening progressive Europeanist governments with \u2018exit\u2019 when they<br \/>\nrefuse to obey its authoritarian incompetence, <em>and<\/em> <\/p>\n<p>(B)<br \/>\nProgressive<br \/>\nnational parties or governments campaigning alongside the xenophobic right for<br \/>\n\u2018exit\u2019. <\/p>\n<p>It is the difference<br \/>\nbetween: <\/p>\n<p>(A) Clashing against the EU establishment in a<br \/>\nmanner that preserves the spirit of internationalism, demands pan-European<br \/>\naction, and sets us fully apart from the xenophobic right, <em>and<\/em><\/p>\n<p>(B) Walking hand-in-hand with nationalisms that<br \/>\nwill, inescapably, reinforce the xenophobic right while allowing the EU to portray<br \/>\nthe left as populists insufficiently distinguishable from Nigel Farage, Marine<br \/>\nLe Pen etc. <\/p>\n<p>Naturally, part of the<br \/>\nDiEM25 agenda must involve developing strategies that will allow our cities,<br \/>\nregions and nation-states to rebel against a EU establishment that retaliates<br \/>\nwith threats of \u2018exit\u2019, or \u2018expulsion\u2019. Another part of the same agenda must<br \/>\ninclude plans to deal with the EU\u2019s collapse or disintegration if its Establishment<br \/>\nis foolish enough to activate these threats against disobedient national<br \/>\ngovernments. But this is profoundly different to initiating the EU\u2019s<br \/>\ndisintegration as the Left\u2019s own objective.<\/p>\n<p>In short, DiEM25,<br \/>\nrefuses to endorse \u2018exit\u2019 as an end-in-itself, or even to deploy it as a<br \/>\nthreat. But we shall not be deterred from governmental disobedience when<br \/>\nfaced with the threat of \u2018expulsion\u2019 or forced \u2018exit\u2019.<\/p>\n<p><i> Eurogroup meeting, May 2016.Geert Vanden Wijngaert\/Press Association. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n<h2>Internationalism, the EU and the nation-state<\/h2>\n<p>The Left\u2019s traditional<br \/>\ninternationalism is a key ingredient of DiEM25, along with other constituent<br \/>\ndemocratic traditions from a variety of political projects (including<br \/>\nprogressive liberalism, feminist and ecological movements, the \u2018pirate\u2019 parties<br \/>\netc.). DiEM25\u2019s position on the EU reflects precisely this type of<br \/>\ninternationalism. I hope my comrades on the left will permit me to remind them<br \/>\nthat when Marx and Engels were adopting their \u2018proletarians of the world unite\u2019<br \/>\nslogan they were not rejecting the importance of national culture or of the<br \/>\nnation-state. They were rejecting the idea of a \u2018national interest\u2019 and of the<br \/>\nview that struggles must prioritise the realm of the nation-state. <\/p>\n<p>DiEM25 proposes a<br \/>\nrebellion to deliver authentic democracy at the levels of local government, national<br \/>\ngovernments and the EU. We do not prioritise the EU over the<br \/>\nnational level, just like we do not prioritise the national over the regional<br \/>\nor the municipal level. Alas, several European leftists insist on a reverse<br \/>\nprioritisation: that of the national over the EU level. Stefano Fassina, for example, in a reply to an article in la<br \/>\nReppublica by Lorenzo Marsili and myself, takes us, and DiEM25 to task by arguing<br \/>\n(quoting Ralf Dahrendorf) that democracy at the EU level \u201cis not possible\u2026 because<br \/>\na \u2018European people\u2019, a European demos for a European democracy, doesn\u2019t exist&#8230;.\u201d<br \/>\n\u201cAmong the idealists and the euro-fanatics\u201d, Fassina continues \u201csome still<br \/>\nthink that the European Union can transform itself into a kind of nation-state,<br \/>\nonly bigger: the United States of Europe.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>This leftwing<br \/>\nobjection to DiEM25\u2019s call for a pan-European movement is interesting and<br \/>\npuzzling. In effect, it argues that democracy is impossible on a supranational<br \/>\nscale because a demos must be characterised by national and cultural homogeneity. This leftwing objection to DiEM25\u2019s call for a pan-European movement is interesting and puzzling. In effect, it argues that democracy is impossible on a supranational scale because a demos must be characterised by national and cultural homogeneity.I can just imagine Marx\u2019s rage at hearing this! Just as I can imagine the<br \/>\npuzzlement of leftwing internationalists who dreamt of, and struggled for, a<br \/>\ntransnational republic from the Atlantic to as far to the East as possible. <\/p>\n<p>The left, lest we forget,<br \/>\ntraditionally opposed the bourgeois belief in a one-to-one relationship between<br \/>\na nation and a sovereign parliament. The left counter-argued that identity is<br \/>\nsomething we create through political struggle (class struggle, the struggle<br \/>\nagainst patriarchy, the struggle for smashing gender and sexual stereotypes,<br \/>\nemancipation from Empire etc.). DiEM25, therefore, by calling for a<br \/>\npan-European campaign of disobedience with the transnational elites, in order<br \/>\nto create the European demos that will bring about Europe\u2019s democracy,<br \/>\nis in tune with the left\u2019s traditional approach \u2013 the very approach that is<br \/>\nunder fire from Fassina and others who argue for the return to a<br \/>\none-nation-one-parliament-one-sovereignty politics, with internationalism being<br \/>\nreduced to \u201cco-operation\u201d between Europe\u2019s nation-states.<\/p>\n<p>To support his<br \/>\nprioritisation of the national level, Fassina evokes Antonio Gramsci and his<br \/>\nadvocacy of the \u201ccategory of the \u2018national-popular\u2019 to give popular roots and<br \/>\nhegemonic capacity to that Italian Communist Party, which in its symbol had the<br \/>\nred flag with a hammer and sickle resting on the flag of Italy\u201d. Gramsci\u2019s<br \/>\npoint was, indeed, that, to achieve progress at the international level it was<br \/>\nnecessary to create a progressive movement at the level of the town and of the<br \/>\nnation. It was not, however Gramsci\u2019s intention, to prioritise the national<br \/>\nover the transnational level and to argue that transnational democratic<br \/>\ninstitutions are either infeasible or undesirable. <\/p>\n<p>In the same Gramscian<br \/>\nspirit, DiEM25 insists that our European rebellion should happen everywhere, in<br \/>\ntowns, regions, nation-state capitals and in Brussels, without prioritising any<br \/>\nlevel over any other. Only through this pan-European network of rebel cities, rebel<br \/>\nprefectures and rebel governments can a progressive movement become hegemonic<br \/>\nin Italy, in Greece, in England, indeed anywhere.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, one may cheekily<br \/>\nask: \u201cWhy stop at the EU level? As internationalists, why don\u2019t you campaign<br \/>\nfor worldwide democracy?\u201d Our answer is that we do campaign for<br \/>\ndemocracy everywhere and from an internationalist point of view. Indeed, DiEM25<br \/>\nis building strong links with Bernie Sanders\u2019 \u2018political revolution\u2019 in the<br \/>\nUnited States and is even signing up members in Latin America, Australia, even<br \/>\nAsia. But, given that history has, for better or for worse, delivered a<br \/>\nborderless EU, with common policies on the environment and a variety of other<br \/>\nrealms, the (by definition internationalist) left must defend this<br \/>\nabsence of borders, the existing EU commons of climate change policy, even the<br \/>\nErasmus programme that gives young Europeans the opportunity to mingle in a<br \/>\nborderless educational system. Turning against these splendid artefacts of an<br \/>\notherwise regressive EU is not consistent with what the left ought to be about.<\/p>\n<p><i> Britain&#039;s PM Theresa May and Pres. European Council Donald Tusk talk BREXIT in London, Sept.8,2016. Kirsty Wigglesworth\/Press Association. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n<h2>DiEM25\u2019s progressive agenda for Europe <\/h2>\n<p>Progressives have a<br \/>\nduty to lead the fight for re-politicising political decision-making and<br \/>\ndemocratising this reclaimed political realm. Donald Trump in the United<br \/>\nStates, right-wing Brexiters in Britain, Le Pen in France etc. rose up as a result of an economic crisis that was brought on by the crisis of<br \/>\nfinancialisation and of liberal democracies that can no longer function as<br \/>\nliberal democracies in the era of financialisation\u2019s crisis. The question for<br \/>\nEurope\u2019s leftwing, for progressive liberals, greens etc. is, now, whether this<br \/>\nstruggle, this project, should take the form of a campaign to leave the EU (e.g.<br \/>\nLexit) or, as DiEM25 suggests, of a campaign of civil, civic and governmental<br \/>\ndisobedience within but in confrontation with the EU. <\/p>\n<p>DiEM25 rejects the<br \/>\neuro-loyalists\u2019 campaign to reform the EU by working within the framework of<br \/>\nthe EU\u2019s establishment where change is either glacial or in the wrong<br \/>\ndirection. We also reject Lexit\u2019s rationale of turning the EU\u2019s disintegration<br \/>\ninto our objective. DiEM25 was formed to create a genuine alternative: a borderless<br \/>\nsurge of unifying politics across Europe (EU and non-EU countries alike) based<br \/>\non an alliance of democrats across various political traditions (including the left but not confined to it) and at all levels of political engagement (towns,<br \/>\ncities, regions and states). <\/p>\n<p>To recap, to those who<br \/>\nberate DiEM25 and its call for a pan-European democratic movement as utopian,<br \/>\nour answer is that a transnational, pan-European democracy remains a legitimate,<br \/>\nrealistic long-term goal, one that is in concert with the left\u2019s time honoured<br \/>\ninternationalism. But this objective must be accompanied by pragmatism and a<br \/>\nprecise plan for immediate action:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8211; Oppose any talk of \u2018more Europe\u2019 now, when<br \/>\n\u2018more Europe\u2019, under the present circumstances, translates into the iron cage<br \/>\nof institutionalised austerity envisaged by the EU\u2019s establishment. <\/li>\n<li>&#8211; Present Europeans with a blueprint (a<br \/>\ncomprehensive set of policies and actions) of how we plan to re-deploy Europe\u2019s<br \/>\nexisting institutions in order to stem the economic crisis, reverse inequality<br \/>\nand reinvigorate hope. <\/li>\n<li>&#8211; And ensure that the same blueprint makes<br \/>\nprovisions for keeping internationalism alive in the event that the EU<br \/>\nestablishment\u2019s incompetent authoritarianism causes the EU\u2019s disintegration.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\u201cThe EU will be democratised.<br \/>\nOr it will disintegrate!\u201d<\/p>\n<p>This was, and remains,<br \/>\nDiEM25\u2019s guiding pronouncement. We cannot predict which of the two<br \/>\n(democratisation or disintegration) will occur. So, we struggle for the former<br \/>\nwhile preparing for the latter. And we do this by working towards a Progressive<br \/>\nAgenda for Europe that is put together both at the grassroots level and with<br \/>\nthe help of progressive experts. Its purpose? To defeat the worst enemy of<br \/>\ndemocracy in Europe: euro-TINA, the reactionary dogma that there can be no<br \/>\ngenuinely progressive alternative to current policies within a united Europe. <\/p>\n<p>DiEM25\u2019s antidote to euro-TINA<br \/>\nis, indeed, the Progressive Agenda for Europe which we will be rolling out, in<br \/>\nconsultation with local, regional and national actors, over the next eighteen<br \/>\nmonths. Putting together our Progressive Agenda for Europe, throughout the<br \/>\ncontinent and its surrounding isles, is our way of demonstrating to defeated,<br \/>\ndisheartened and disillusioned Europeans that, astonishingly, there is<br \/>\nan alternative.\u00a0 <\/p>\n<p>DiEM25\u2019s Progressive<br \/>\nAgenda for Europe will be pragmatic, radical and comprehensive. It will comprise<br \/>\npolicies that can be implemented immediately to stabilise Europe\u2019s social economy,<br \/>\nwhile: <\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8211; affording more sovereignty to city<br \/>\ncouncils, prefectures and national parliaments, <\/li>\n<li>&#8211; proposing institutional interventions and<br \/>\ndesigns that will reduce the human cost in case the euro collapses and the EU<br \/>\nfragments, <em>and<\/em><\/li>\n<li>&#8211; setting up a democratic Constitution Assembly<br \/>\nprocess that enables Europeans to generate a European identity with which to<br \/>\nbolster their reinvigorated national cultures, parliaments and local<br \/>\nauthorities.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>DiEM25\u2019s Progressive<br \/>\nAgenda for Europe aims at a unifying campaign with which a European Progressive<br \/>\nInternational can counter the Nationalist International that is now going from<br \/>\nstrength to strength. <\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>The EU is at an<br \/>\nadvanced stage of disintegration. There are two prospects. <\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8211; The EU is not past the point of no<br \/>\nreturn (yet) and can, still, be democratised, stabilised, rationalised and<br \/>\nhumanised <\/li>\n<li>&#8211; The EU is beyond the point of no return<br \/>\nand incapable of being democratised. Therefore, its disintegration is certain, as<br \/>\nis the clear and present danger of Europe\u2019s descent into a postmodern version<br \/>\nof the deflationary 1930s[8]<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>DiEM25 believes that dropping<br \/>\nthe campaign to democratise the EU would be a major error for progressives in<br \/>\neither<em> <\/em>case. If is still possible<br \/>\nto fashion a democratic EU (a prospect that is wearing thin by the minute), it<br \/>\nwould be a pity not to try. But, even if we are convinced that the existing EU<br \/>\nis beyond democratisation, and thus salvation, to abandon the struggle to<br \/>\ndemocratise the EU (and to turn \u2018exit\u2019 and \u2018disintegration\u2019 into an end-in-itself)<br \/>\nwill play into the hands of the only political force capable of benefitting<br \/>\nfrom such an agenda: the intransigent, xenophobic right.[9] <\/p>\n<p>So, what should<br \/>\nprogressives do? DiEM25\u2019s answer is:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8211; Campaign vigorously along internationalist,<br \/>\ncross-border, lines all over Europe for a democratic Union \u2013 even if we do not<br \/>\nbelieve that the EU can, or ought to, survive in its current form<\/li>\n<li>&#8211; Expose the EU Establishment\u2019s authoritarian<br \/>\nincompetence<\/li>\n<li>&#8211; Coordinate civil, civic and governmental<br \/>\ndisobedience across Europe<\/li>\n<li>&#8211; Illustrate through DiEM25\u2019s own transnational<br \/>\nstructure how a pan-European democracy can work at all levels and in all<br \/>\njurisdictions<\/li>\n<li>&#8211; Propose a comprehensive Progressive Agenda for<br \/>\nEurope which includes sensible, modest, convincing proposals for \u2018fixing\u2019 the<br \/>\nEU (the euro even) <em>and<\/em> for managing<br \/>\nprogressively the EU\u2019s and the euro\u2019s disintegration if and when the<br \/>\nEstablishment brings it on. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><strong>Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[1] In the words of its<br \/>\nManifesto, DiEM25 appeals to European democrats that \u201c\u2026come<br \/>\nfrom every part of the continent and are united by different cultures,<br \/>\nlanguages, accents, political party affiliations, ideologies, skin colours,<br \/>\ngender identities, faiths and conceptions of the good society\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>[2] See Stathis Kouvelakis\u2019 article entitled \u2018The EU Cannot Be Reformed\u2019, June 26, 2016<\/p>\n<p>[3] i.e. a left-wing call, and support, for referenda<br \/>\nproposing exit from the EU<\/p>\n<p>[4] I stand convinced that many other European<br \/>\ndemocrats, greens and liberals, who do not think of themselves as on the left,<br \/>\nalso have a duty to confront the EU\u2019s authoritarian incompetence.<\/p>\n<p>[5] And the Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe, Austerity<br \/>\nand the Threat of Global Stability, London: Bodley Head and NY: Nation Books, 2016<\/p>\n<p>[6] See here for a debate between us on Brexit and here for another speech he gave in favour of the Lexit<br \/>\nagenda more generally.<\/p>\n<p>[7] There is a second qualm I have with<br \/>\nNavarro\u2019s article on a matter unrelated to Lexit: Vicente misunderstood my<br \/>\nUniversal Basic Income proposal. It is not envisaged as a substitute for the<br \/>\nstandard social security\/welfare system. The UBI I favour will be funded not<br \/>\nfrom taxation but by transferring equity over <em>all<\/em> capital to a social trust (e.g. 10% of all shares of all listed<br \/>\ncompanies) from which UBI payments will be drawn. But this is best left for<br \/>\nanother discussion.\u00a0 <\/p>\n<p>[8] The EU\u2019s and the euro\u2019s break-up will most<br \/>\ncertainly cause the creation of at least two Europes. One will begin at the<br \/>\nriver Rhine and expand eastward (north of the Alps) to the Baltics and the<br \/>\nUkraine, based on a revived version of the Deutsche Mark whose unstoppable<br \/>\nappreciation will generates deflation and mass unemployment. The other,<br \/>\nLatin-Catholic Europe (with or without the addition of Greece), will revolve<br \/>\naround depreciating currencies that spearhead acute stagflation (a combination<br \/>\nof high inflation and high unemployment). In this bleak economic environment,<br \/>\nEU and non-EU countries (like Britain, Norway etc.) will become cesspools of<br \/>\nright-wing bigotry. It is the post-modern 1930s that I am referring to.<\/p>\n<p>[9] Speaking from experience, right-wing nationalists in<br \/>\nNorthern Europe would be mightily helped in bolstering their campaign if I were<br \/>\nto call upon my fellow Greeks to vote in favour of Grexit. Similarly, with<br \/>\nother Spanish, Italian, Portuguese left-wingers calling upon their compatriots<br \/>\nto exit the EU. In contrast, DiEM25\u2019s call for a pan-European, internationalist<br \/>\ncampaign of civic and governmental disobedience within and against the current<br \/>\nEU denies them access to disaffected Europeans.<\/p>\n<p><em>This piece has been published in several media outlets and languages across Europe <\/em><em><em>since September 5, 2016<\/em>: Jacobin (US), P\u00fablico (Spain), Neues Deutschland (Germany), France\u2019s Liberation and Italy\u2019s Il Manifesto.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Greek PM Alexis Tsipras &amp; Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos at parliamentary session in May, 2016, ahead of Eurogroup meeting which might unlock bailout funds. Press Association\/Yorgos Karahalis. All rights reserved.This article addresses left-wing critics of DiEM25 who claim that DiEM25 is pursuing the wrong objective (to democratise the EU) by means of a faulty strategy&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1217","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1217","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1217"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1217\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1217"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1217"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1217"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}