Hussein Malla\/AP\/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.Jabhat
\nal-Nusra\u2019s split from al-Qaeda offers the west a unique and crucial opportunity
\nto create a fully inclusive and strengthened transition in Syria while dividing
\nal-Nusra\u2019s supporters.<\/i><\/p>\n
Jabhat
\nal-Nusra and the Islamic State are the only opposition groups banned from the
\nSyrian peace talks and excluded from the government\/rebel cessation of
\nhostilities, while organizations like Ahrar al-Sham, ideological
\nand military allies of Jabhat al-Nusra, are allowed to take part. <\/p>\n
This has enabled
\nthe Syrian government to continue bombing and attacking rebel-held areas, such
\nas Aleppo, under
\nthe pretense of attacking Jabhat al-Nusra. The justification for including Jabhat
\nal-Nusra on the list of terrorist groups and excluding them from the talks stems
\nfrom their origins within al-Qaeda, and the fear that their resources and
\nexperience will be utilized to stage attacks against the west. These attacks,
\nhowever, have never materialized.<\/p>\n
To
\nbe clear, Jabhat al-Nusra in its present form cannot exist in a post-war Syria.
\nThere will be no Islamic State or authoritarian Islamic regime replacing Assad
\nand there will be no safe-haven for terrorist attacks to be planned against
\nanyone. There are, without a doubt, violent and anti-democratic segments of Jabhat
\nal-Nusra, but there is also a fluidity to the organization\u2019s general ideology. <\/p>\n
This
\nis no more evident than when examining the leadership conflicts that plagued
\nJabhat al-Nusra in the fall of 2014, when in the wake of major territorial
\nlosses to ISIS, the
\nlargely pragmatic deputy leader Abu Mariya al-Qahtani was replaced by the more
\nradical and al Qaeda aligned Jordanian cleric Dr Sami al-Oraydi.<\/p>\n
Furthermore,
\nwhile in some areas Jabhat al-Nusra enforces strict Sharia law and carried out
\nexecutions, there are many regions where, according
\nto Charles Lister, the local populace has largely embraced the Salafi group. This
\nmay be in part because many ideologies now fight under al-Nusra's flag. <\/p>\n
Some moderate
\nrebels have joined the group, as its strength gives them the best chances
\nof survival and launching successful attacks against Assad. Additionally, some
\nforeign fighters have found that, despite holding different ideologies from those of Jabhat al-Nusra, it was the easiest opposition group for them to join.<\/p>\n
Charles
\nLister argues that "the
\ninternational community must…more forcefully push for a diplomatic settlement
\n[in Syria] so as to prevent the establishment of a longstanding jihadi safe
\nhaven.\u201d <\/p>\n
By inviting Jabhat al-Nusra to the negotiating table, the
\norganization is forced to debate the future of their movement. How much of a
\nlocalized Syrian group are they, how much control do foreign fighters and
\nclerics hold over the organization, and how many of its members truly desire an
\nIslamic State at the expense of a peaceful Syria with full political
\nrepresentation?<\/p>\n
If
\nSyria is to become a democratic country, Islamists must be allowed to
\nparticipate. Allowing even conservative Islamists, like the Salafists who
\nsupport Jabhat al-Nusra, to run in local and national elections gives the
\nSyrian people full agency in choosing their own government. <\/p>\n
It is entirely
\npossible that the Tunisian example will occur: the Islamist party wins the
\nnational elections, fails to follow through on its promises, and is promptly
\nvoted out of office. But the exclusion of one ideology from the infant Syrian
\nelectoral process will only entrench and radicalize the Salafists in Syria,
\njust as it has done to the Salafists in Jordan and Egypt, and the Sunnis in
\nIraq. <\/p>\n
Inviting
\nJabhat al-Nusra to the negotiating table does not mean acquiescing to their
\nevery demand. Instead, it allows an alternative to violence for those members
\nwho no longer wish to fight or who do not share the leadership\u2019s strict
\ninterpretation of Islam. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are many
\ndisillusioned
\nfighters
\namong the Syrian Salafist opposition. <\/p>\n
By providing a non-violent path for Jabhat
\nal-Nusra fighters, the west can separate the members who only want to overthrow
\nAssad from those who would use violence to implement their vision of Islamic
\ngovernance.<\/p>\n
The
\nSyrian members of Jabhat al-Nusra may feel that diplomacy is the best route,
\nwhile the more hardcore foreign fighters will likely choose to continue with
\nviolence. By offering the choice of non-violence, the west can hope to split al-Nusra,
\nallow a peaceful way out for those who wish it, isolate the violent jihadi
\nelements of Jabhat al-Nusra, ensure the wholeness of the Syrian political
\ntransition, and force the Syrian government to focus its fight on IS. <\/p>\n
In this
\nway, the Syrian political transition is strengthened while Jabhat al-Nusra and
\nthe Islamic State are simultaneously weakened. Yet this will only work if real,
\ntangible progress is made in the negotiations and a peaceful transition appears
\nfeasible. Otherwise, Syrian opposition fighters will see no choice other than
\nto continue fighting.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Hussein Malla\/AP\/Press Association Images. All rights reserved.Jabhat al-Nusra\u2019s split from al-Qaeda offers the west a unique and crucial opportunity to create a fully inclusive and strengthened transition in Syria while dividing al-Nusra\u2019s supporters. Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State are the only opposition groups banned from the Syrian peace talks and excluded from the government\/rebel…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1212","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1212","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1212"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1212\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1212"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1212"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1212"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}