{"id":1181,"date":"2019-03-27T03:50:49","date_gmt":"2019-03-27T03:50:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.sportsnewsforyou.com\/?p=1181"},"modified":"2019-03-27T03:50:49","modified_gmt":"2019-03-27T03:50:49","slug":"the-role-of-the-eu-in-the-syrian-conflict","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/?p=1181","title":{"rendered":"The role of the EU in the Syrian conflict"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><i><em>At the June<\/em><br \/>\n<em>Summit, which will take place after the UK Referendum, the High<br \/>\nRepresentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica<br \/>\nMogherini, will present the results of her global review of external strategy.<br \/>\nAs part of the review process, the Human Security Study Group, at the LSE,<br \/>\nwhich is convened by Mary Kaldor and Javier Solana, has presented a report<br \/>\nentitled <strong>From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking the EU Strategy<br \/>\nTowards Conflict <\/strong>together with twelve<br \/>\nbackground research papers . <\/em><\/i><\/p>\n<p><em><br \/><\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Conflicts are at the<br \/>\nsharp end of contemporary crises. Refugees, extremist ideologies, criminality<br \/>\nand predation are all produced in conflict. Contemporary conflicts are<br \/>\nsometimes known as \u2018hybrid wars\u2019 or \u2018new wars\u2019 in which classic distinctions<br \/>\nbetween public and private, government\/regular and rebel\/irregular, and internal<br \/>\nand external break down. They are best understood not as legitimate contests of<br \/>\nwills (the twentieth century idea of war) but as a degenerate<br \/>\nsocial condition in which armed groups mobilise sectarian and<br \/>\nfundamentalist sentiments and construct a predatory economy through which they<br \/>\nenrich.<\/em> <em>Identifying ways to address violent conflict could open<br \/>\nup strategies for dealing with broader issues.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em><br \/><\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>In this special<br \/>\nopenDemocracy series, the Human Security Study Group outlines the main<br \/>\nconclusions of our report in our introductory<br \/>\nessay together with six essays based on some of the background papers.<br \/>\nThese essays include: an analysis of the conceptual premises of the Global<br \/>\nReview (Sabine<br \/>\nSelchow); three essays on specific conflict zones \u2013 Syria (Rim Turkmani),<br \/>\nUkraine (Tymofiy<br \/>\nMylovanov), the Horn of Africa (Alex<br \/>\nde Waal); the importance of the EU\u2019s justice instrument (Iavor<br \/>\nRangelov); and how EU cyber security policy is human rights focused rather<br \/>\nthan state focused (Genevieve<br \/>\nSchmeder and Emmanuel Darmois). <\/em><\/p>\n<p><i> Germany Syria talks. Joint stroll prior to meeting of Foreign Ministers of Germany and France with UN special envoy for Syria and Head of the Higher Negotiations Cttee. May, 2016. Ferdinand Ostrop \/ Press Association. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>The EU rightly identified in its 2007<br \/>\nSyria strategy paper that <em>\u201cSyria<br \/>\nis a key factor in regional stability and plays a pivotal role as a transit<br \/>\ncountry between the EU and the Middle East<\/em>\u201d. Yet, this<br \/>\ndid not stop the EU from rushing into unwarranted political and economic<br \/>\nmeasures in the early months of the Syrian conflict that hindered its ability<br \/>\nto influence the process. Consequently, as the Syrian crisis escalated to severely affecting<br \/>\nEurope, the EU found itself in a position unable to play a significant role in<br \/>\nresolving the conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Although the Syrian conflict developed into a very complex<br \/>\ncombination of revolution, Syrian armed conflict, proxy war and terrorism, the<br \/>\nroots of this conflict remain the long-standing political oppression and<br \/>\ninjustice which initiated the public resentment. Most of the actions taken by<br \/>\nexternal powers did not help in easing this political oppression. But<br \/>\nremarkably, the Cessation of Hostilities agreement which was agreed by Russia<br \/>\nand the US in February 2016 without any Syrians present in the meeting managed<br \/>\nto bring relative calm to the country for more than two months and saved<br \/>\nthousands of lives. <\/p>\n<p>This is enough of an indicator that the US vs. Russia level<br \/>\nof this conflict is very significant. Yet it is neither Russia nor the US that<br \/>\nsuffered the most from the consequences of the war in Syria.\u00a0 It is the EU that suffered from the increased<br \/>\nsecurity threat, terrorism and the refugee crises, and it is taking a lead in<br \/>\nsupporting and funding the humanitarian programmes responding to the \u201cworld&#039;s<br \/>\nlargest humanitarian crisis since World War II\u201d. The EU, as Commission and<br \/>\nMember States, covered over \u20ac5 billion of the humanitarian bill. In addition,<br \/>\nover \u20ac3 billion were pledged at the London donor conference in February 2016. <\/p>\n<h2><strong>\u201cThe world is not only<br \/>\nEurope\u201d<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Prior to the conflict the<br \/>\nEU had rather extensive relations with Syria, and through the<br \/>\nEuro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy was<br \/>\napplying a range of instruments, with some limited effect, aimed at bringing<br \/>\nabout political and economic reform. These efforts were abandoned shortly after<br \/>\nthe conflict began, and instead the EU focused on the application of sanctions,<br \/>\nscaling down its mission in Damascus, and taking extreme political measures<br \/>\nthat led to the loss of political leverage. <\/p>\n<p>The Syrian foreign minister responded in<br \/>\nJune 2011 by announcing in a statement to the media, \u201c<em>We will forget that there is Europe on the map,\u201d <\/em>and promised to<br \/>\nlook<em> \u201ceastward and southward and in every<br \/>\ndirection that extends its hands to Syria. The world is not only Europe.<\/em>\u201d<br \/>\nIndeed, shortly afterwards, Syria did suspend its membership in the Union for<br \/>\nthe Mediterranean, and it did look in other directions for support, mainly from<br \/>\nIran, Russia and China. This served only to increase the leverage of these<br \/>\ncountries over the Syrian government and increase polarisation at all levels. The theory of change that<br \/>\nassumes that the regime is going to change its behaviour should such measures<br \/>\nbe imposed has not only proved to be wrong, but to the contrary, these measures<br \/>\nproduced the opposite outcome.\u00a0 <\/p>\n<p>August 18, 2011 saw a<br \/>\nturning point in EU policy towards Syria. Following \u201clarge-scale use of<br \/>\nmilitary force in the cities of Hama, Deir al-Zour and Lattakia,\u201d the EU<br \/>\nannounced, \u201cThe President&#039;s promises of reform have lost all credibility as<br \/>\nreforms cannot succeed under permanent repression. The EU notes the complete<br \/>\nloss of Bashar al-Assad&#039;s legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people and the<br \/>\nnecessity for him to step aside.\u201d This announcement seems to have been<br \/>\norchestrated, as the US President Obama, the British Prime Minister David<br \/>\nCameron, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela<br \/>\nMerkel, all demanded that Assad immediately resign on the same day. The logic<br \/>\nbehind the move was that if other leaders followed this move then it would<br \/>\nforce President Assad to resign. Hilary Clinton commented on this move saying, \u201cIf Turkey says it, if King Abdullah says it, if other<br \/>\npeople say it, there is no way the Assad regime can ignore it.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>All these political and economic measures<br \/>\nwere taken before any specific strategy towards Syria was outlined. A new<br \/>\nstrategy for Syria was only outlined two years later in June 2013. \u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Justice and<br \/>\nstability<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>What has been much needed for Syria throughout are policies<br \/>\naimed at improving the situation of ordinary people, providing them with much<br \/>\nneeded protection and countering the structural dynamics of the conflict. Some<br \/>\nof the EU policies, however, did just the opposite. The sanctions that targeted<br \/>\nthe general economy worsened the conditions of ordinary affected people, and<br \/>\naccelerated the development of the predatory war economy instead of pressuring<br \/>\nthe Syrian regime, which found alternative ways to overcome the impacts of<br \/>\nsanctions.\u00a0 <\/p>\n<p>One of the areas that Europe can play a key role in bringing<br \/>\nstability in Syria is justice. For sustainable peace and stability in Syria and<br \/>\nfor the underlying political and social structures that gave rise to the<br \/>\nconflict to be addressed, justice is an absolute key necessity, for the<br \/>\nconflict is deeply rooted in many layers and forms of injustice, grievance and<br \/>\ninequality. <\/p>\n<p>The EU announced commitment to justice and accountability in<br \/>\nSyria, and supported several transitional justice programmes run by civil society.<br \/>\nHowever, its role has faced a \u2018dilemma\u2019, torn between seeking accountability<br \/>\nand ending the conflict. This became apparent in the last six months after the beginning of the Vienna peace<br \/>\nprocess for Syria. The EU became a member of what is known as the International<br \/>\nSyria Support Group (ISSG), which is the catalyst of the process. The ISSG<br \/>\nissued two statements in Vienna at the end of 2015. Neither statement includes<br \/>\nany reference to the need for commitment to accountability, justice, and<br \/>\ntransitional justice mechanisms. These statements later became the backbone of UNSC<br \/>\nresolution 2254 issued on 19 December 2015, which also excluded any mention of<br \/>\njustice and accountability. \u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The EU has regularly called for the respect of International<br \/>\nHumanitarian Law in Syria, and the protection of civilians, and condemned all<br \/>\nindiscriminate attacks on civilians. Similarly, it called for allowing<br \/>\nunrestricted and constant humanitarian access <em>to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid and medical care to all<br \/>\npeople in need<\/em>. However, like most international actors the EU did not take<br \/>\nenough concrete steps to guarantee the implementation of these calls. <\/p>\n<h2><strong>Civil society in Syria<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The rise of civil society in Syria is<br \/>\none of the most positive things that has happened in Syria during the last five<br \/>\nyears. Together with Local Administrative Councils (LACs) it was able to fill<br \/>\nthe gap of the total or semi collapse of the state in different parts of Syria.<br \/>\nThe EU helped fund these civic actors in opposition-controlled areas and supported programmes that promoted<br \/>\ngood governance in Local Administrative Councils, this having helped to enable<br \/>\nthe right actors and promote a positive trend that empowers civic actors over<br \/>\narmed entities.<\/p>\n<p>In areas with mixed security control,<br \/>\nthe EU had less influence. The end of 2013 and beginning of 2014 witnessed many<br \/>\nlocal ceasefires in Syria in areas of mixed security control, typically<br \/>\nopposition-controlled areas surrounded by a government-controlled one. Although<br \/>\nthese local agreements arose amid very bad conditions including sieges, many led<br \/>\nto an improvement in the humanitarian situation. The EU played no direct role<br \/>\nin the ceasefires. In April 2014 it issued a statement criticizing these<br \/>\nceasefires: \u201cThe EU is concerned with cases of forced surrender, labelled as<br \/>\nlocal ceasefires, imposed by the regime through starvation sieges. The EU calls<br \/>\non the regime to allow effective third-party monitoring of ceasefires to<br \/>\nsustain them, to allow safe and unhindered evacuations of civilians on a voluntary<br \/>\nbasis and the passage of humanitarian convoys and personnel.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>In fact, the Syrian Government used the<br \/>\ntactics of sieges against civilians in many areas to force their submission to<br \/>\nits conditions. In some cases, as in Mouadamiya, however, not all the ceasefires<br \/>\nwere cases of surrender: but even where they did mean surrender, they provided<br \/>\nan opportunity to help civilians when nothing else worked. The EU rightly<br \/>\nidentified third party monitoring as a key factor in sustaining these ceasefires,<br \/>\nyet it is not known that it did anything to provide this monitoring. For<br \/>\nexample, it did not push for a mandate from the UNSC for a new UN monitoring<br \/>\nmission after the last one was pulled out in 2013, neither did they send a<br \/>\nmonitoring mission from the EU\u2019s Common Security and Defence Policy. <\/p>\n<h2><strong>A<br \/>\nnew round of Geneva talks<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>As a new<br \/>\nround of Geneva talks are under way, the EU should ensure that the outcome is<br \/>\nnot merely the result of US and Russian talks, which could well translate into<br \/>\ncreating further future conflicts that could affect Europe. The talks would not<br \/>\nhave ended up in Geneva had the process been \u201cSyrian led\u201d as the UNSC 2254<br \/>\nclaims it should be. Yet the EU could do much to ensure a more Syria-led<br \/>\nprocess, because only such a process will set Syria on the path to peace and<br \/>\ndemocracy. <\/p>\n<p>The EU<br \/>\ncould play a role in ensuring that the transition in Syria heads towards<br \/>\ndemocracy. Among the many concrete measures the EU could bring to this table is<br \/>\nto equip the<br \/>\nnegotiations with economic tools. All the EU instruments such as the<br \/>\nAssociation agreement, economic relations, the bilateral cooperation programmes<br \/>\nunder European Neighbourhood Policy, and partnership in the EU&#039;s regional<br \/>\nprograms together with the loan operations and technical assistance by the<br \/>\nEuropean Investment Bank and the lifting of economic sanctions: all of these mechanisms<br \/>\ncan be introduced as gradual incentives in Geneva with the aim of encouraging<br \/>\ncompliance.\u00a0\u00a0 This could have the triple benefits of: i)<br \/>\nlegalising the formal economy, which is a crucial step to combatting the war<br \/>\neconomy, ii) enhancing the humanitarian and economic situation of the Syrian<br \/>\npeople who are hit hardest by these measures, and iii) lifting these measures<br \/>\nas an incentive to the Syrian government to comply with specific human rights<br \/>\nmeasures, such as ending the shelling of civilian areas and releasing<br \/>\ndetainees. The EU could<br \/>\nalso play a role in ensuring that accountability is central to any transition<br \/>\nplan for Syria. <\/p>\n<p>In the meantime, the EU should continue the valuable work it did<br \/>\nin supporting local processes and newly-emerging legitimate local agencies,<br \/>\nparticularly the LACs, and by placing a strong emphasis on supporting<br \/>\ngood governance. The EU should play a pivotal role not only on supporting civil<br \/>\nsociety and the local civic authorities in Syria, but also should put its<br \/>\nweight behind making them an essential part of the solution, and ensuring their<br \/>\npresence at Syrian-related decision-making tables. Only their presence would<br \/>\ntruly ensure a \u201cSyrian led process\u201d and a new democratic neighbour for Europe. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>At the June Summit, which will take place after the UK Referendum, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, will present the results of her global review of external strategy. As part of the review process, the Human Security Study Group, at the LSE, which is convened by&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1181","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1181","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1181"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1181\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1181"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1181"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1181"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}