Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson with US Secretary of State John Kerry and other European foreign ministers at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, at the start of international talks aimed at finding a way to break the political stalemate in Libya.Yui Mok PA Wire\/PA Images. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n
Unlike what some politicians may think,
\nthe Libyan revolution of February 2011 did not produce a fledgling democracy; it
\nonly opened the way for a few democratic steps, which were quickly overridden
\nby political fragmentation and polarization, ineffective state institutions,
\nand violence. <\/p>\n
The United Nations-brokered Libyan Political Agreement (PA), which
\nwas signed last December after more than a year of dialogue between different
\nLibyan rivals and factions was intended to reverse this course. However, it has
\nfailed to bear any fruits thus far because it does not address the root causes
\nof the Libyan crisis and only adds to its complexity.\u00a0 <\/p>\n
Moreover, the PA
\nhas not been legally adopted as part of Libya\u2019s constitutional declaration, the
\ndocument governing Libya\u2019s transitional period since the fall of the Qaddafi
\nregime. In fact, the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), which is a party to
\nthe agreement itself, has failed to convene in full quorum and issue the
\nnecessary constitutional amendment to make the PA enter into force and be part of national legislation. <\/p>\n
Almost one year has lapsed with these crippling
\ndeficiencies while Libya continues its slow motion freefall into chaos and
\nturmoil. This political agreement, which was supposed to put an end to Libya\u2019s political
\nnightmare, has become a nightmare itself. Let\u2019s try and understand why.<\/p>\n
The development of the nascent Libyan
\npolitical system came to a grinding halt in 2014, but the crux of the Libyan
\ncrisis is not political. What stopped the political transition, and continues
\nto prevent its resumption, is the constant threat posed by militias that
\nregularly use intimidation and violence to influence politics. <\/p>\n
In today's
\nLibya, countless non-state armed actors are holding the country hostage,
\nsuffocating its institutions, and threatening its integrity and its very
\nexistence. This is hardly the environment
\nfor any type of democratization process. <\/p>\n
Non-state armed groups proliferated
\nfollowing the 2011 revolution. They asserted their power over the entire Libyan
\nterritory and installations, and furled around the uncertain, fragile path of democratization
\nuntil they strangled it. Since its outset,
\nmilitias hijacked the transitional period, stymieing its progress and preventing
\nany attempts to broker a lasting political agreement. <\/p>\n
The most glaring example of
\nthis role played is the famous passing of the political isolation
\nlaw by the GNC in 2013, under the direct armed threat of militias. This law was
\na manifest of human rights violations which harmed Libya\u2019s democratic transition.<\/p>\n
Libya\u2019s greatest problem has been the
\nsecurity vacuum and the proliferation of armed groups. With no remedy from the PA, it has continued
\nto worsen at an alarming rate, especially in the capital Tripoli. Although the longest chapter of the Libyan political
\nagreement pertains to \u201csecurity arrangements\u201d, it is based on the existence of a
\npolitical breakthrough that has never existed.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n
The current stalemate
\nindicates that security arrangements in Libya should have preceded any
\npolitical agreement, or at least that they should have been adopted simultaneously.
\nThe political agreement turned into yet another obstacle as it became clear
\nthat it was not implementable under these conditions.<\/p>\n
The political agreement is based on
\ntwo major points: <\/p>\n
1. Libya is a fledgling democracy that
\nshould evolve and develop; <\/p>\n
2. Since the democratic transition is
\nstopped, it requires a shared power agreement through the PA with a new political
\ndesign.<\/p>\n
The PA
\npreserves both post-Qaddafi elected legislative bodies: The General National
\nCongress (GNC), which was elected in 2012, and the House of Representatives (HoR),
\nwhich was elected in 2014 in accordance with the legislation passed by the GNC.\n<\/p>\n
Despite its low turnout, this was the third successful election that took place
\nin Libya between 2012-14. The peaceful handover of power from the first elected
\nlegislature to the second represented the most crucial test of Libya\u2019s attempt
\nto democratize. Alas, it failed awkwardly when the GNC – the first elected
\nparliament – refused to hand over power to the newly elected HoR. This failure
\nhas been sealed by the Political Agreement, which preserves both bodies through
\na power-sharing arrangement.<\/p>\n
While the PA recognizes
\nthe HoR as the sole legislative authority, thereby prolonging its mandate that
\nhad expired in October 2015, it also resurrects the defunct GNC that refused to
\ndissolve. In fact, under the PA, the GNC becomes the High Council of State
\n(HCS), an authority that is supposed to share some of the power and responsibilities
\nof the HoR.<\/p>\n
Besides the
\nobvious problem of legality, this arrangement poses serious political problems.
\nIn particular, GNC members who had essentially impeded the democratization
\nprocess previously by refusing to step down from their role are being rewarded
\nwith membership in the HCS while others who had supported the legitimately
\nelected HoR are left behind.<\/p>\n
Thus, it The main Once again, However, Furthermore, the The next Since the PC Moreover, Libyans are confronted with a series of problems for which Prime Minister, al-Sarraj The PA's plan prescribed that The GNA is confined The GNA has ultimately As part of a new In April, in a hasty and controversial session, some members of the On the contrary, it has accepted the HCS as a \u201cfait accompli\u201d. The HCS symbolizes the first institution As a The tolerance manifested The The aim of a political However, what It is time to These three bases will be necessary for This Op-ed is part of the Libya Policy Forum Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson with US Secretary of State John Kerry and other European foreign ministers at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, at the start of international talks aimed at finding a way to break the political stalemate in Libya.Yui Mok PA Wire\/PA Images. All rights reserved. Unlike what some politicians may think, the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1154","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1154","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1154"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1154\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1154"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1154"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1154"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nappears that the very complex and peculiar power-sharing structure devised in
\nthe PA is intended to appease all parties in order to sign any<\/em> agreement on paper, rather than to actually implement a realistic
\none that would yield substantive results.\u00a0\n<\/p>\nThe injection of a new
\nand strange executive authority<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\ninnovation of the PA was the creation of a fresh new executive authority called
\nthe Government of National Accord (GNA), with two components: a presidency
\ncouncil (PC); and a cabinet of ministers (cabinet). <\/p>\n
\nfor the purpose of guaranteeing the sharing of power among opposing parties,
\nthe PC was designed to include nine members: a president, five deputies and three
\nministers. In accordance with the PA, PC
\ndecisions require unanimity of the president and his five deputies. <\/p>\n
\ndissension and competition ensued soon after the announcement of the PC members.
\nTwo PC members (Deputy Qatrani, and minister Al-Aswad) first announced
\ntheir boycott, and then rejoined the PC after eight months. Notwithstanding
\nhis new stance, Deputy President Qatrani refuses to join any PC
\nmeeting in Tripoli. <\/p>\n
\nPC has submitted two government proposals to the HoR, which have both been rejected.
\nIn response, the PC has endorsed its cabinet de facto,<\/em> invoking a temporarily pending approval from the HoR.
\nThis has resulted in the refusal of some nominated ministers – mainly from the east – to join the cabinet. The PC has deemed their absence a resignation, which
\nhas essentially resulted in a lack of representation of the eastern region of
\nLibya. <\/p>\n
\nserious challenge facing the PC is the submission of a third proposed cabinet to
\nthe HoR for its approval through a vote of confidence, which is not expected to
\nhappen unless serious international pressure is exerted on parliament. However,
\nthe PC first needs to agree upon its composition, which is another dilemma.<\/p>\n
\nmoved to Tripoli, the security situation has worsened significantly with
\nrampant kidnappings, thefts, and other crimes. Tripoli has become the land of lawless
\nmilitias and gangsters alike. Furthermore, the PC itself is guarded by a
\nmilitia, which makes it unable to fulfill the security tasks conferred to it in
\nthe PA. <\/p>\n
\nthere does not seem to be any solution on the horizon. These include: food
\nshortages; unemployment; raising inflation; lack of cash; devaluation of the Libyan
\nDinar; fuel shortages; power cuts; and the deterioration of education and
\nhealth care. Understandably, any public support from hopeful Libyans and
\nTripolitanians upon the arrival of the new government last March has evaporated. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nand his deputies have failed in addressing these problems with any viable remedies.
\nIn a televised interview last month, al-Sarraj
\nblamed the governor of the central bank of Libya for acute cash shortages, an
\naccusation that was refuted by the governor through an open letter two days later. Therefore, it is
\nclear that the PC is neither able to assert its control over state institutions,
\nnor to expand the geographical scope of its very limited authority.<\/p>\nGNA: a
\ngovernment among two others<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\nthe new government (GNA) is the \u201csole executive authority\u201d and that all
\nexecutive decisions issued by other entities \u201cshall be deemed null and
\nvoid\u201d. Though the GNA was supposed to put
\nan end to any duplication and division, this has simply not worked. Rather than
\nclarifying the distribution of power and unifying state institutions, the PA
\narrangements have exacerbated the chaos. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nto a small military compound in the capital Tripoli, and does not have an
\napproved cabinet from the HoR. Meanwhile two other governments are operating in
\nthe country. Thus, although the international community does not recognize any
\nparallel authority to the GNA, this body has a very limited substantive power
\nand lacks popular support on the ground. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nproven to be weak and ineffective because it was never equipped with substantive
\npower, beyond the hollow declarations of support by the international community. As a result, it is now just a third
\ngovernment in the country, adding to the fragmentation and complexity of the
\npolitical landscape.\u00a0 <\/p>\nThe early flagrant
\nviolation of the PA with no objection or consequences<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\ngoverning design for the transitional period, the PA has created the High Council of State (HCS), which absorbs the remnants of the GNC – the rump of
\nLibya's first parliament. <\/p>\n
\nGNC in Tripoli established this body in practice by electing its president and
\ndeputies under the pretext of applying the PA. This initiative violated the PA
\nprovisions, particularly the steps laid out in article 20, and in annex 3.
\nHowever, the international community has not reacted or even objected to this
\nviolation. <\/p>\n
\ncreated under the auspices of the PA. Despite
\nthe series of objections raised from expert scholars and members
\nof the GNC and the HoR, none
\namong the UN, the dialogue committee, the PC nor the international community have taken any action. They appear to be unconcerned with their role in preserving
\nthe integrity of the political agreement and overseeing its proper application. \u00a0<\/p>\n
\nconsequence to this flagrant violation and with the help of militia guarding
\nthe HCS headquarter, last month few GNC members who were not included in the
\nHCS reoccupied its premises in
\nTripoli. The HCS name and logo were taken down and were replaced by the GNC\u2019s. This
\nspecific incident, which was labeled in the media as a \u201ccoup\u201d is simply a
\nconsequence of the breach of the PA. This example proves that during the phase
\nof the PA application, its violation not only discredits it, but leads to heavy
\nconsequences. <\/p>\n
\nby the international community towards the violation of the PA by some members
\nof the GNC changed in response to the so called
\n\u201ccoup\u201d. Paradoxically, the HCS president received calls of support from different
\nstates officials, despite the fact
\nthat he himself and members of the self-declared HCS had violated the PA in the
\nfirst place. <\/p>\nConclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n
\ncomplicated Libyan political agreement hammered out by the international
\ncommunity through UNSMIL along with the Libya dialogue team has not proven to reflect
\nor address the Libyan reality on the ground. No political solution, let alone
\ndemocratization process can precede the establishment of state-enforced
\nsecurity. The current conditions of lawlessness and rampant non-state armed
\ngroups condemned the Libyan Political Agreement to failure and will prevent any
\nsuch efforts from succeeding in the future.<\/p>\n
\nagreement is to pave the way for substantive work: it must put an end to
\nsuffering and conflict. All recent events indicate that the PA is dysfunctional
\nand inapplicable. It has not been adopted as an amendment to the current
\nconstitutional declaration that is governing the transitional period by the
\nHoR, thus it is not part of the Libyan legislation yet. And the toleration of manifest
\nviolations of the PA by the international community contributes to its failure.
\nThese elements call for a profound revision of both the political agreement and
\nthe process underlying it. <\/p>\n
\nLibya needs most urgently today is not the revival of the democratic transition,
\nor the precipitous restructuring of the national political architecture. Nowadays
\nordinary Libyans just want security, economy, and national reconciliation. The dialogue
\nprocess brokered by UNSMIL and its final product under the form of the PA have
\nfailed to yield these three keys to Libya\u2019s survival. <\/p>\n
\neither open the PA for further dialogue and revision, or to devise a new one
\naltogether that is based upon restoring security, saving the unraveling Libyan
\neconomy, and launching a serious and vital reconciliation process, rather than
\ncreating new power mechanisms and roles. <\/p>\n
\nthe survival of whichever political architecture that will be devised, and to
\nprovide dignity and quality of life for Libyans. One thing is certain: the
\nstatus quo is no longer tenable – not that it ever was.<\/p>\n
\nInitiative, a US-based independent, non-partisan, and non-profit initiative
\nthat seeks to address the lack of accurate information and analysis of the
\nLibyan context.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"