Photo courtesy of Nueva Sociedad. This article is being
\npublished as part of the partnership between Nueva Sociedad and
\ndemocraciaAbierta. You can read the original article\u00a0here.<\/i><\/p>\n
The regional elections of October 15 were a true catastrophe for the opposition
\nin Venezuela. Few times in history has an electoral event had such overwhelming
\nconsequences: practically, the destruction of the loser \u2013 nothing less. The
\nDemocratic Unity Table (MUD), the alliance of parties that, with some success,
\nhad been confronting Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, has dissolved and the parties that made it
\nup, each with its own interpretation of what happened, have now regrouped into
\nthree large blocks which are more or less opposed to each other. The candidates
\nwho, until the day before the elections, had been well placed in the polls, are
\nnow blurred to the point that nobody seriously considers them as potential
\ncandidates for the forthcoming elections in 2018. And the opposition voters, who
\nare still in a majority, have sunk into hopelessness and do not know if to give
\nup and accommodate as best they can with the situation, or to find a way to
\nmove abroad.<\/p>\n
How was this hecatomb possible? How is it that, after four months of
\nprotests that practically paralyzed the country, with a government disapproval \u00a0rate of about 80%, international condemnation
\nand sanctions, the worst economic crisis in the history of the country and the
\npossibility of a default in the very short term, Maduro can claim victory and
\nsuch a huge one at that?\u00a0<\/p>\n
The answer to these questions is key to understanding the changing
\nVenezuelan situation and to extracting some useful lessons for political
\nanalysis. The way in which each side played their cards, with one side being able
\nto gather its forces while the other dispersed theirs, the importance of the narratives
\nand of the leaders who give meaning to events that move the population, and the
\nrole of appearances for conquering power or maintaining it, are all factors that
\nhave been at play in the chain of events and decisions that led to the results
\nof the October 15 elections.\u00a0<\/p>\n
How is it that, after four months of protests that practically paralyzed the country (…) Maduro can claim victory and such a huge one at that?<\/p>\n
Let us start with the appearances. The sheer size of the protests and their
\ncontinuity in time led many to think that the regime\u2019s fall was near. But the
\ntruth is that, except from the dissidence of Attorney General Luisa Ortega
\nD\u00edaz, the government block did not break, at least not in any apparent way, or
\nenough so as to be forced to accept the opposition\u2019s demands: an electoral
\ntimetable, the freeing of political prisoners, the opening of a humanitarian
\nchannel. On the contrary, while the police, the National Guard and the
\nso-called "collectives" managed to control – although barely – a
\nsociety which felt tired after more than three months of protests and more than
\none hundred dead, Maduro took the lead by calling a National Constituent
\nAssembly (NCA).\u00a0<\/p>\n
From that moment on, the opposition struggled to avoid its establishment
\nand it won some great victories, such as the symbolic referendum on July 16 and
\nthe condemnation of Maduro\u2019s initiative by many foreign countries. But the move
\nallowed the government to lead the debate. And here is where the narrative links
\nwith the appearances: Maduro had no reason to roll back on his decision, but he
\nmade a couple of feints, such as his proposal to postpone the NCA if the opposition
\nwas willing to accept it. The
\nindications are that the opposition leadership was so
\nsure that they would manage to stop the initiative that, apparently, they did
\nnot prepare for the possibility that the NCA would finally be established. On
\nthe other hand, considering that opposition to the NCA was very strong among their
\nfollowers, it was almost impossible for them to accept participating in it without
\noffending them. The long list of unfulfilled promises which were made during
\nthe dialogues between the opposition and the government before the crisis also went
\nagainst their heeding Maduro\u2019s offer.<\/p>\n
The
\ngame of appearances and the narratives that give
\nthem meaning had another side to them: probably in order to consolidate the
\nmobilization against the NCA, it was stated that, if the Assembly were finally
\nestablished, that would give absolute power to the government. But this meant
\nthat it was recognized, in advance, that absolute power would be bestowed on
\nthe government if this actually happened and that therefore, if it did happen,
\neverything would be lost.<\/p>\n
The opposition\u2019s narrative turned out to be a rope tied around its neck<\/p>\n
And, well, this is indeed what happened. And the opposition\u2019s narrative turned
\nout to be a rope tied around its neck. On July 30, when the National Electoral
\nCouncil declared that eight million Venezuelans had voted for the Constituent
\nAssembly (an estimated seven million participated in the referendum on July
\n16), the opposition leadership did not hit back with anything forceful. At the
\nmost, they said that these figures were the result of a huge fraud. A few days
\nlater, Smartmatic, the firm in charge of the vote counting, said that the
\nresults had been manipulated, thus endorsing this thesis. But elections of governors
\nhad already been called by then, and this meant that the opposition had to face
\nthe dilemma of either participating in these elections, despite all the serious
\ndoubts about their fairness, or refusing to do so and thus risk losing power spaces
\nand leave all the governorates in the hands of Maduro\u2019s government.\u00a0<\/p>\n
It was decided \u2013 on the basis of sound reasons \u2013 to go for the first
\noption, but it is obvious that many voters saw in this an incongruity: how can you
\nask voters to participate in elections which are organized by those whom you
\nyourself have accused of being dishonest? Although there were leaders who did
\ncall for the voters\u2019 abstention, it did not take too much effort to sow doubt,
\nespecially because instead of explaining the risks and the reasons why it had
\ndecided to participate, the opposition chose to jump on an over-confident narrative
\nwhich said that it would surely win, if not all, almost all the country\u2019s governorates.\u00a0<\/p>\n
And this is where Maduro confirmed that he was a better player. While in
\nthe opposition-dominated constituencies people decided not to vote – maybe the loss
\nof middle-class voters who have emigrated began to be felt too -, the
\ngovernment ran an efficient voter co-optation machine through its aid \u2013
\nespecially food – distribution channels and its well-disciplined militancy. Some
\nobservers say that this is very similar to what the Mexican Institutional
\nRevolutionary Party does: electoral authoritarianism \u2013 that is, a system in
\nwhich there is no need for massive fraud, you have only to add up many
\ndifferent forms of shifting the advantage to the government\u2019s side so as to win
\nalways, with or without a majority. The forms in which the government can do,
\nand does it range from last-minute transfer of middle-class opposition voters
\nto polling stations further away from their homes, or to polling stations
\nlocated in places they would consider dangerous, to using food distribution
\ncouncils to mobilize voters.\u00a0<\/p>\n
The
\nresult was the knockout of October 15: nineteen governorates for the government
\nand five for the opposition.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Again, there was some talk of fraud, but low voter turnout was quickly
\nblamed for the results, which suggests that the government's victory was
\nperfectly clean \u2013 or that the defeat was recognized by the opposition. The
\nicing on the cake was that four of the five elected opposition governors were
\nsworn in before the National Constituent Assembly which had been declared
\nillegitimate by the opposition.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Maybe the experience has taught some lessons to the opposition players<\/p>\n
Following this, the differences that everyone knew were brewing inside the
\nMUD surfaced and ended up splitting the alliance into three bloks: the Social
\nDemocratic parties Democratic Action and A New Time, which have taken the
\noption of operating within the limits set up by the regime (although some say
\nit is simply connivance with the established power); at the other end, the Liberal
\nparty Come Venezuela and the Social Democratic Brave People Alliance led by Mar\u00eda
\nCorina Machado and Antonio Ledezma, which, united under the I Am Venezuela
\nalliance, are committed to uncompromising resistance; and, finally, Justice
\nFirst (center), Popular Will (Social Democratic) and Radical Cause (Socialist),
\nwhich present themselves as the true heirs of the MUD under a new alliance,
\nVenezuela Comes First.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Notwithstanding the fact that the rejection by a majority of the
\npopulation, the disastrous economic situation which is bound to get even worse,
\nand the international sanctions, do not make things easy for Maduro, the opposition
\ntragedy has meant that political discussion now focuses on the possibility of Maduro
\nrunning for re-election next year, or on whether the United Socialist Party of
\nVenezuela will opt for a leadership renewal and present as a candidate young
\nH\u00e9ctor Rodr\u00edguez, a promising figure of Chavismo who has just won the very
\nstrategic Mirando State \u2013 which covers, basically, the hinterland of Caracas –
\nand who, so it seems, is currently rising in the polls. It is being ruled out
\nthat any other figure stands any real chance.\u00a0<\/p>\n
The disaster experienced by the Venezuelan opposition
\nwill probably be a study case. For it shows that, in politics, things are not
\nwhat they seem and that the narratives which are built on them can carry
\nfundamental weight. The game continues and there are still cards up the sleeve.
\nMaybe the experience has taught some lessons to the opposition players.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Photo courtesy of Nueva Sociedad. This article is being published as part of the partnership between Nueva Sociedad and democraciaAbierta. You can read the original article\u00a0here. The regional elections of October 15 were a true catastrophe for the opposition in Venezuela. Few times in history has an electoral event had such overwhelming consequences: practically, the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1144","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1144"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1144\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1144"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}