Protesters to the opposition are covered with shields in front of the attacks of tear gas bombs that the Venezuelan National Guard fired to disperse the march destined the Ministry of Interior and Justice in the center of Caracas.May 18, 2017 – Caracas, Venezuela. Adrian Manzol\/Zuma Press\/PA Images. All rights reserved.<\/i><\/p>\n
Amid the tumult on the
\nstreets of Venezuela, which has cost dozens of lives in the past six weeks, two
\ncrucially important, and related, events threaten to spur even greater violence
\nand eclipse all possibility of international engagement aimed at redressing the
\ncountry\u2019s plight.<\/p>\n
One was the announcement on
\n23 April by Foreign Minister Delcy Rodr\u00edguez that the country would withdraw
\nfrom the Organization of American States (OAS) in response to what the
\ngovernment of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro sees as \u201cinterference\u201d in Venezuela\u2019s internal
\naffairs. The other move, which immediately incensed protesters and brought
\nwidespread foreign repudiation, was a presidential decree of 1 May convening an
\nassembly to rewrite the country\u2019s constitution.<\/p>\n
These two decisions mark the crossing of a threshold in Venezuela, and the formal abandonment by the \u201crevolutionary\u201d regime in Caracas of representative democracy.<\/p>\n
According to Maduro\u2019s
\nblueprint, half of the assembly\u2019s members are to be elected by organisations,
\nsuch as trade unions and peasant groups, which in all likelihood will be
\nsatellites of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). The other
\nhalf would be elected at the municipal level, under a system (yet to be fully
\nexplained, and perhaps even decided) that seems designed to over-represent
\npro-government forces. Political parties will be excluded, although the precise
\ndesign of the election system for the assembly is in the hands of the
\ngovernment-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE). It is worth noting that
\nthe combination between sector-based and municipal representatives is identical
\nto that in the National Assembly of Cuba.<\/p>\n
Taken together, these two
\ndecisions mark the crossing of a threshold in Venezuela, and the formal
\nabandonment by the \u201crevolutionary\u201d regime in Caracas of representative
\ndemocracy. They came in response to pressure, both external and domestic, on
\nthe Maduro government to hold elections, restore the separation of powers, free
\npolitical prisoners, and open a \u201chumanitarian channel\u201d to ease the country\u2019s
\ncritical shortages of food, medicines and other basic goods. Rather than accede
\nto demands for genuine negotiations with the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD)
\nalliance \u2013 which controls a legislature shorn of power by the Supreme Court
\n(TSJ) \u2013 the government has made good on its threat to \u201cdeepen the revolution\u201d
\nby creating a so-called \u201ccommunal state\u201d. What is proposed is similar to the
\nconstitutional reform Maduro\u2019s predecessor and mentor Hugo Ch\u00e1vez put to a
\nreferendum in 2007, which was rejected by the electorate \u2013 Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s sole
\nnational electoral defeat in his 14 years in power.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Shotguns firing plastic pellets are also often used Meanwhile, in response to In several parts of the If greater violence is to be A new \u201ccommunal\u201d The central demand of the A number of Latin American Venezuela\u2019s 1999 constituent \u201c<\/em>But preservation of the 1999 constitution could well become a rallying cry for hitherto loyal government supporters who revere Ch\u00e1vez but repudiate his successor.\u201d\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n <\/em>Maduro is gambling that a Maduro is gambling that a new, \u201ccommunal\u201d constitution will consolidate the revolution.<\/p>\n Marching Maduro\u2019s explicit abandonment The decision by the OAS The date and venue for the A way Maduro\u2019s decision to close The opposition is convinced that to abandon street protests at this point would be to permit the consolidation of a dictatorship.<\/p>\n Perhaps the greatest International pressure is Genuine negotiations \u2013 as The government itself \u00a0A decision by the bulk of the armed forces not to obey government orders to use violence against demonstrators […] could galvanise both sides into seeking a peaceful and negotiated solution."<\/p>\n If not limited to the OAS, Ultimately, of course, Venezuelans will decide how Previously __________<\/em><\/p>\n Post-script (26 May, 2017)<\/strong><\/p>\n After Attorney-general Ortega\u2019s On On Protesters to the opposition are covered with shields in front of the attacks of tear gas bombs that the Venezuelan National Guard fired to disperse the march destined the Ministry of Interior and Justice in the center of Caracas.May 18, 2017 – Caracas, Venezuela. Adrian Manzol\/Zuma Press\/PA Images. All rights reserved. Amid the tumult on…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1124","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1124","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1124"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1124\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1124"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1124"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1124"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nat almost point-blank range, and demonstrators caught alone can expect to be
\nseverely beaten.<\/em><\/p>\n
\nalmost daily demonstrations by the MUD, security forces have clearly been given
\norders to intensify the repression. By 10 May, six weeks of violence had killed
\n39 people, according to the PROVEA human rights organisation. At least two
\ndemonstrators have been killed and many more injured by riot squads repeatedly
\nfiring tear-gas grenades directly into crowds. Police use them to disperse
\nstatic crowds, often firing in front of and behind protesters, trapping them.
\nRetreating protesters are pursued with volleys of tear gas, which is now
\nfrequently being fired into residential or commercial premises, and has even
\naffected schoolchildren and hospital patients. Shotguns firing plastic pellets
\nare also often used at almost point-blank range, and demonstrators caught alone
\ncan expect to be severely beaten. Over seven hundred injuries are reported,
\nalong with 2,000 arrests, according to legal aid group Foro Penal. Once again,
\ncivilian parapolice gangs, armed with pistols, have been deployed to intimidate
\nprotesters, some of whom have died of gunshot wounds, often to the head.<\/p>\n
\ncountry, including the capital, nightfall has brought episodes of looting,
\nwhich in one particularly violent night in Caracas led to the deaths of at
\nleast a dozen people. In Venezuela\u2019s third city, Valencia, looting also took
\nplace in broad daylight, with around 100 warehouses, shops and supermarkets
\nsystematically ransacked as police and national guard troops looked on.<\/p>\n
\naverted, the government will need to abandon its self-serving plan to rewrite
\nthe constitution and its use of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators.
\nIn turn, opposition forces, together with Venezuela\u2019s regional neighbours,
\nshould devise a plan to encourage more pragmatic elements of the regime to
\nnegotiate a return to democracy, while offering a potential exit strategy for
\nthose in power who can have no future political role and fear imprisonment – or
\nworse – if they are ousted.<\/p>\n
\nconstitution<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nopposition is that a free election be held to allow Venezuelans to determine
\nthe way out of the conflict. But the government, whose support in the polls
\nhovers around 20-25 per cent, fears that submitting to a vote would be
\npolitical suicide. The proposed constituent assembly is a way of evading
\ndemocratic accountability. It would have supra-constitutional powers that would
\nallow it to dissolve parliament, restructure the state and even govern the
\ncountry indefinitely, if it so chose, without any need to hold fresh elections.
\nOAS Secretary-General Luis Almagro called the move \u201ca fresh coup d\u2019\u00e9tat\u201d aimed
\nat \u201cconsolidating this authoritarian regime\u201d.<\/p>\n
\ncountries have rewritten their constitutions in recent years, with varying
\nresults. Colombia\u2019s 1991 constitution, which sprang from a citizens\u2019 movement
\nseeking greater participation, is often cited as a success. More recently, in
\nBolivia and Ecuador, the process began in the wake of electoral victories for
\nmajor new political forces \u2013 most significantly, an indigenous peoples\u2019
\nmovement led by Evo Morales – but was extremely contentious, with opposition
\nforces steamrollered or excluded at crucial points. In both countries, a
\nmajority of voters approved the new constitutions at the polls.<\/p>\n
\nassembly was 95 per cent composed of supporters of President Ch\u00e1vez, despite
\ntheir having won only a little over half the vote. But after Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s failed
\nattempt to reform it in 2007, and the government\u2019s increasing violation of its
\nkey provisions, the 1999 constitution came to be seen as a potentially unifying
\nelement between the opposition and moderate chavistas. Most constitutional
\nscholars argue that only at times of broad national consensus can a successful
\nconstitution be drafted; the alternative is a document that enshrines the
\nvictory of one side over another. The present constitution furnishes a \u201croad
\nmap\u201d with broad support that would be perilous to abandon at this point of
\nextreme polarisation.<\/p>\n
\nnew, \u201ccommunal\u201d constitution will consolidate the revolution. But preservation
\nof the 1999 constitution could well become a rallying cry for hitherto loyal
\ngovernment supporters who revere Ch\u00e1vez but repudiate his successor. Already the
\nAttorney General (fiscal general) Luisa Ortega D\u00edaz, who recently distanced
\nherself from the regime by saying the \u201cconstitutional thread\u201d had been broken
\nfollowing a Supreme Court ruling to strip parliament of its powers, has weighed
\nin. In a 3 May interview with The Wall Street Journal<\/em>, Ortega said the
\n1999 constitution could not be improved. Her words were echoed by a
\npro-government legislator. But aside from these and other cases, so far there
\nis no firm indication of mass defection from the regime, nor has this dissent
\ngone unpunished. Now that the public prosecution service (ministerio p\u00fablico<\/em>),
\nwhich Ortega heads, is no longer regarded by the regime as trustworthy,
\narrested demonstrators are increasingly being arraigned before military
\ntribunals. Dozens have been indicted, and sent to a jail far from their place
\nof residence.<\/p>\n
\nout of the OAS<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nof democratic rule has, however, clarified matters abroad. It is increasingly
\ndifficult even for the country\u2019s allies in the region \u2013 all of which, except
\nCuba, adhere to democratic norms \u2013 to defend its posture, and the group of nations
\npushing for a restoration of democracy seems bound to grow. At the same time,
\nthe Venezuelan government seems prepared to become ever more isolated in the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
\nPermanent Council on 23 April to convene a consultative meeting of the region\u2019s
\nforeign ministers to discuss the Venezuelan conflict prompted the Maduro
\ngovernment to storm out of the organisation \u2013 although the process of
\ndisengagement, under OAS rules, takes two years. In a clear sign of the
\nregime\u2019s increasing estrangement, its bid to have the issue debated instead by
\nforeign ministers of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
\n(CELAC \u2013 a body that includes Venezuela\u2019s ally Cuba but excludes the United
\nStates and Canada) fell flat. Only four of 33 CELAC foreign ministers showed up
\nto the meeting on 2 May and it concluded with no resolution. Seven countries
\nboycotted the meeting, and on 4 May Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
\nGuatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay issued a sternly-worded statement to
\n\u201ccondemn the excessive use of force on the part of the Venezuelan authorities\u201d
\nagainst protesters in the streets.<\/p>\n
\nOAS foreign ministers\u2019 meeting, agreed by the OAS Permanent Council on 26
\nApril, is to be held on May 31st, and Venezuela has announced it will boycott
\nit. The imminence of the organisation\u2019s regular, scheduled General Assembly \u2013
\nin Mexico in late June \u2013 means the Venezuelan issue will almost certainly have
\nto be dealt with there, although the gravity of the crisis merits greater
\nurgency.<\/p>\n
\nforward<\/strong><\/p>\n
\noff the limited democratic space that still exists \u2013 on the streets and,
\npotentially, at the ballot box \u2013 guarantees that there will be more violent
\nunrest. The opposition is convinced that to abandon street protests at this
\npoint would be to permit the consolidation of a dictatorship; it senses that it
\nhas nothing left to lose. It will not desist from its mobilisation until, at
\nthe very least, there is a binding commitment from the government to hold free
\nand fair elections.<\/p>\n
\npotential danger is posed by a chaotic fragmentation of the regime. In the
\nevent that the armed forces were to split into roughly equal parts, Venezuela
\ncould face civil war. At the very least, there could be a period of violent
\nanarchy on the streets, with armed, pro-government groups and criminal gangs
\nspreading mayhem. The civilian population, already facing hunger and a
\nbreakdown of the country\u2019s basic infrastructure, would suffer even greater
\nhardship, and the task of reconstructing Venezuela would become far more
\ntaxing. In contrast, a decision by the bulk of the armed forces not to obey
\ngovernment orders to use violence against demonstrators – and to take action
\nagainst armed civilians acting as parapolice groups – could galvanise both sides
\ninto seeking a peaceful and negotiated solution. Already there have been signs
\nof internal dissent, with dozens of officers, including two generals,
\nreportedly under investigation by military intelligence (DGCIM).<\/p>\n
\nvital, but needs to be carefully calibrated, with carrots as well as sticks, so
\nas to offer a way out to those members of the regime who may be inclined to
\nnegotiate a return to democracy. In this spirit, the National Assembly should
\nconsider legislation offering partial, conditional, amnesty to both military
\nand civilian regime members, thereby signalling their intent to seek
\nreconciliation and to avoid witch-hunts in the event of a transition. While the
\nSupreme Court almost certainly would veto this, the bill would send a message that
\ncould isolate those, relatively few, who are unlikely to benefit from amnesty
\ndue to their involvement in activities such as drug-trafficking or grave human
\nrights abuses. Individual sanctions, already imposed by the United States
\nagainst certain regime leaders, could be widened to target figures associated
\nwith egregious human rights violations, as a bipartisan proposal tabled in the
\nU.S. Senate last week seeks to do.<\/p>\n
\nopposed to the interminable \u201cdialogues\u201d the government prefers \u2013 are essential,
\nand should ideally lead to elections and to an interim government of national
\nunity in which some current officials (perhaps including Attorney General
\nOrtega) could play a part. Any such outcome should include in the short term
\nrecognition of the current National Assembly, and respect for its powers. There
\nis no longer any future for the mediation effort led by former Spanish Premier
\nJos\u00e9 Luis Rodr\u00edguez Zapatero, although some of its elements might be
\nincorporated into a stricter and more effective negotiating structure. This
\nought to be a primary focus of the OAS initiative, which will require setting
\nup a \u201cgroup of friends\u201d, including at least one country sympathetic to the
\nMaduro government.<\/p>\n
\nrecently invited the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, St Vincent and
\nUruguay to \u201caccompany\u201d its proposed dialogue. The role of the group of friends
\n– which might usefully be expanded under the aegis of the Secretary-General of
\nthe United Nations – could include devising a viable asylum plan for those
\nhigh-ranking regime members who have reason to fear future prosecution, and
\nconvincing them to accept it. Another priority for the group would be to adopt
\nimmediate measures to address the humanitarian and security crisis.<\/p>\n
\nthe initiative might eventually benefit from the assistance – formal or
\notherwise – of other governments that have influence with Caracas. This is
\nparticularly the case for Cuba, which is not a full OAS member and has a conflict-prone\u00a0relationship
\nwith the organisation, and China. Both these countries would want to see their
\ninterests safeguarded in the event of a change of government.<\/p>\n
\ntheir country should be run. But with a president who seems determined to deny
\nthem the right to do so, they need outside help to produce a negotiated
\nsolution and avert a catastrophe.<\/p>\n
\npublished by International Crisis Group.<\/em><\/p>\n
\ntwo months of street protests the death toll stands at 58, with thousands more
\ninjured. According to the legal aid group Foro Penal<\/em>, there had been over 2,800
\narrests by late May; almost 1,200 people remained in detention, of whom 338
\nfaced trial by military tribunal. In the state of Barinas, where the late Hugo
\nChavez grew up, the murder of a young demonstrator set off several days of
\nrioting which brought half a dozen more deaths, a wave of looting and the
\ntorching of several government buildings.<\/p>\n
\n(fiscal general<\/em>) Luisa Ortega
\nconfirmed the responsibility of the security forces in much of the violence at
\na press conference she gave on 24 May. Most strikingly, Ortega refuted the
\ngovernment version of the 26 April death of Juan Pernalete, saying he had died
\nafter being struck in the chest by a teargas canister, fired at close range by
\nthe National Guard (GNB). Government ministers had claimed he had been shot by
\nanother demonstrator, using a captive-bolt pistol.<\/p>\n
\nnew-found determination to apply the law is a major problem for the government
\nsince her office has a monopoly on criminal prosecutions. The transfer of many
\ncases to the military justice system (in contravention of the Venezuelan
\nconstitution and international treaties) is a response. President Maduro has
\nalso moved to transfer cases of political violence to a government-created
\n\u2018Truth Commission\u2019 and prosecutors in various parts of the country have
\nreported that they are being coerced, or bribed, to speak out against Ortega.<\/p>\n
\n23 May President Maduro presented the electoral authority (CNE) with the
\ngovernment-designed voting system for the election of his proposed constituent
\nassembly. Of the 545 members, 364 will be elected \u2018territorially\u2019 (one per
\nmunicipality, two for each state capital and seven for Caracas), vastly
\nover-representing lightly populated rural areas where the ruling party is
\nstrongest. For example, the Andean state of Merida (pop: 730,000) will have 24
\nrepresentatives, while Miranda (pop: 2.3m) will have 22. The remaining members
\nwill be elected \u2018sectorally\u2019, with the \u2018sectors\u2019 (workers, fishermen, indigenous
\npeople, women etc.) chosen by the government. The election is to be held in
\nJuly, with elections for
\nstate governor (due under the constitution in December last year) set for
\nDecember 2017.
\nThe constituent assembly will, however, have the power to suspend the latter,
\nor even abolish state governors, should it choose to do so.<\/p>\n
\nthe international front the UN Security Council, at the request of the United
\nStates, held a closed-door session on 17 May to discuss Venezuela. After the
\nsession the chair of the UNSC (currently held by Uruguay) said there was no
\nneed for further action. At the regional level, however, OAS foreign ministers
\nare to meet on 31 May to discuss the crisis.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"