President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the 28th Arab League Summit at the Dead Sea, south of the capital Amman, Jordan, March 2017. Xinhua\/SIPA USA\/PA Images. All rights reserved.In the first meeting between President
\nTrump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Netanyahu articulated
\na shifting dynamic in the region, that of Sunni Arab regimes viewing Iran
\nrather than Israel as the main threat to their national security. <\/p>\n
<\/i><\/p>\n
This was followed by reports
\nthat President Trump is supporting the formation of a NATO-like Arab alliance,
\nwhich would include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Israel, not
\nformally part of this alliance, would coordinate closely with it. <\/p>\n
This idea of an Arab military alliance is
\nnot new, it was suggested
\nby President Sisi in February 2015 and set
\nin motion by the Arab League during the Sharm El Sheikh summit in March
\n2015. <\/p>\n
Even though President Sisi publicly
\nendorsed the call for an Arab military alliance, Egypt\u2019s regional role has been
\neroding over the past few years due to its adoption of a conservative foreign
\npolicy, which has been causing tensions with regional
\nallies, most notably Saudi Arabia. <\/p>\n
Moreover, Egypt has only played a symbolic
\nrole in the war in Yemen. It has also played no effective role in the war in
\nSyria or Libya. On the contrary, Sisi has publicly opposed intervention in both
\nLibya and Syria, following
\nthe line of supporting \u201cnational\u201d armies; in the case of Syria, offering moral
\nsupport to the Iranian backed Assad regime. <\/p>\n
This should raise concerns regarding Egypt\u2019s
\nwillingness to play an effective role in any proposed conservative
\nSunni Arab alliance aimed at containing Iran.<\/p>\n
Egypt, as the most populous Arab Sunni
\nstate with the largest army, is expected to play an integral role in any
\nproposed alliance. One only needs to remember the second Gulf War when the
\nEgyptian military played
\nan operative role in the containing Saddam Hussein in the lead up to Desert
\nStorm, in addition to playing an integral part in ground operations. <\/p>\n
Thus, Egypt\u2019s leadership is in a rather
\ndifficult position between appeasing allies, most notably the United States and
\nSaudi Arabia, and being confronted by a domestic crisis, which restricts its
\nability to act as a regional power. <\/p>\n
These pressures result in contradictory
\npositions. Calling for an Arab alliance, while opposing intervention in
\nregional conflicts, and attempting to appease allies, while maintaining
\ndomestic stability. In essence, attempting to straddle the fence in a feeble
\nattempt to solicit international support, while avoiding making any tangible
\ncommitments.\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
The domestic pressures on the regime can
\nbe attributed to two main factors, Egypt\u2019s economic woes as well as the
\nfragility of its domestic front.\u00a0<\/p>\n
In terms of the economy, the regime has
\nfollowed a dual policy of large prestigious infrastructure projects as well as
\nincreased austerity and neo-liberal reforms, which have led to rapid inflation,
\nincreased pressure on the lower and middle classes, and the expansion of the military\u2019s
\neconomic empire at the expense of the private sector. <\/p>\n
The Egyptian regime invested 8 billion USD in the expansion
\nof the Suez Canal, a project that has resulted in little tangible returns to the
\nEgyptian economy. This project was primarily undertaken by the military,
\nhelping to finance the growth of its economic empire. <\/p>\n
Another example, is the new
\nadministrative capital. Another mega infrastructure project, primarily being
\nexecuted by the military; acting, once again, as a catalyst for the expansion
\nof the military\u2019s economic empire. <\/p>\n
These mega projects are accompanied by unpopular austerity measures, imposing regressive
\nVAT taxation as well as a free-floating currency due to a 12 billion USD IMF
\nloan agreement, which has led to a significant increase in inflation, reaching 32.5% – the highest
\nsince the 1980s.<\/p>\n
These policies have not only increased
\ndiscontent among the lower and middle classes, increasing pressure on the
\nregime, they have also pushed the regime to rely on debt and aid to counter the
\ngrowing fiscal crisis. <\/p>\n
In spite of receiving billions in aid
\nfrom Gulf states, the levels of external debt have now reached a whopping 60.1
\nbillion USD , the highest in Egyptian history. <\/p>\n
Even though the Egyptian regime controls
\nthe largest Arab army, its economic base cannot sustain prolonged military
\noperations in Yemen or Syria. It is simply too fragile and debt ridden to do
\nso. <\/p>\n
Funds have been squandered on
\ninfrastructure projects that have failed to generate revenue or stimulate wider
\neconomic growth, thus negatively affecting the economic base of the
\nregime.\u00a0 <\/p>\n
Wealth is being concentrated in the hands
\nof the military elites and this is eroding the regime\u2019s ability to project
\npower beyond its borders.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/p>\n
The fragility of Egypt\u2019s domestic front figures
\nmore prominently in the ability of the regime to engage in long-term military
\noperations abroad. <\/p>\n
The most notable symptom of which is the
\nincreased level of terror attacks across Egypt since the military coup of July
\n2013. <\/p>\n
The total number of terror
\nattacks has increased from 376 in 2013 to 812 in 2016, constituting an 115%
\nincrease, with 2015 being the bloodiest year with attacks reaching 1097 across
\nthe country. <\/p>\n
There are also worrying trends of an
\nincreasingly active branch of IS operating in the mainland, which is
\norganizationally distinct from Wilayat Sinai, the IS branch operating in Sinai.
\nThis mainland branch of IS has claimed responsibility for a number of Church
\nbombings: one in December 2016, which claimed the lives
\nof 25 worshipers; and the twin bombings on Palm Sunday in April 2017, which
\nclaimed the lives of 44
\npeople. <\/p>\n
The latest series of bombings have
\nprompted the regime to declare a state of emergency across the country, which
\nwill only heighten and legalize already existing repression; widening the
\nregime\u2019s brutal crackdown on its critics and the media. <\/p>\n
In addition to the wave of terror
\nattacks, Egypt has been experiencing a wave of social protests and labor
\nstrikes, in-spite of mass repression, arrest and media censorship. <\/p>\n
As of the end of 2015, the Egyptian
\nregime faced on average
\nfive times more protests than the Mubarak regime did in the years from
\n2008-2010, which resulted in the mass eruption at the beginning of 2011. <\/p>\n
Based on a report issued by the Egyptian
\nCenter for Economic and Social Rights, in 2016 there were 1736 protests and 726 strikes.
\nThe most notable examples of which were
\nthose by workers of state-owned companies, such as those of the petroleum
\nsector. The strikes revolve around work conditions and economic grievances. <\/p>\n
Additionally, 2016 witnessed the first mass
\nprotest against the regime in opposition to the transfer of two islands
\nin the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia. A move that has not only sparked anger, but
\nalso led to a prolonged legal battle. <\/p>\n
Thus, the regime is not only having
\neconomic difficulties, it is also facing strong domestic discontent regarding
\nits economic and social policies. As such, any foreign involvement can lead to
\nintensified opposition, especially if it could potentially result in high levels
\nof causalities. <\/p>\n
The regime has limited room for maneuver
\nand can offer little in terms of material support to allies. Based on this, one
\ncan argue that the value of Egypt as a pivotal state in the region and member
\nof a potential alliance to counter Iranian influence is rather limited. <\/p>\n
This raises questions regarding the value
\nof American aid to Egypt, since it only helps to perpetuate the grip of a
\nde-stabilizing regime, which is primarily concerned with the short term goals
\nof elite enrichment and regime security, and is in essence, weakening the
\nability of Egypt to act as a balancer and guarantor of regional and Gulf
\nsecurity. <\/p>\n
Considering external and internal
\npressure on the regime, it has little choice but to attempt to straddle the
\nfence in an attempt to appease all parties. However, as time passes, pressure
\non the regime will mount and a choice will have to be made between a domestic
\ncrisis, loss of valuable allies and international support.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the 28th Arab League Summit at the Dead Sea, south of the capital Amman, Jordan, March 2017. Xinhua\/SIPA USA\/PA Images. All rights reserved.In the first meeting between President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Netanyahu articulated a shifting dynamic in…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1072","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1072","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1072"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1072\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1072"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1072"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/googmn.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1072"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}